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„Przegląd Strategiczny”

Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM

ul. Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego 5, 61-614 Poznań, tel. 61 829 65 17

e-mail: strategi@amu.edu.pl, <http://www.studiastategiczne.amu.edu.pl>

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Skład komputerowy – „MRS”, 60-408 Poznań, ul. P. Żołotowa 23, tel. 605087690

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Hanna LAVRYNENKO

Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, Ukraine
ORCID: 0000-0001-7705-6545

DOI : 10.14746/ps.2023.1.23

Łukasz DONAJ

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-7720-1260

UNIFICATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN A POSTWAR PERIOD AS A PREVENTIVE MECHANISM TO AVERT THE CRISIS OF STATE

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last year the modern world order has been facing daunting challenges, which regard mainly the formation of novel safety regulations, division of the spheres of influence, creation of new formulae of relations based on renovated priorities and values. Current configuration of political forces has transformed the perception of individual political players, and also outlined the required “red lines,” crossing of which will distance one from possibility of peaceful coexistence over the long term. In a given situation Ukraine is happened to be on the fault line of political plates. The challenge being thrown to it embodies that, thrown to all democratic community. And, depending on how well Ukraine manages to remain standing, the balance of power and further ways of development of a number of countries will depend.

However, the postwar period poses no less threat when the states will face the challenges in home policy and of economic and social character. The growing political and economic crisis, alongside with the confrontation of the civil one, will lay bare the simmering for decades social conflicts. And the utmost blow is on Ukraine’s course again. One of the key issues on agenda will be the search of universal approaches of forming of modern Ukrainian society, overcoming the stumbling blocks, society division and confrontation of its separate clusters, as well as stimulation of return migration, which mediates the relevance of the given research.

Article aims at defining the main risks of postwar transformation and unification of Ukrainian society in terms of preventing the crisis of state system.

Hypothesis. The absence of due attention to the issues of unification of Ukrainian society and returning of displaced people to Ukraine in a postwar period at the state level can aggravate the rift in the society and induce the crisis of state system.

The methodological study framework of issues of the unification of Ukrainian society in a postwar period as an approach of preventing the crisis of nation state system comprises an interdisciplinary approach, which accumulates the various aspects of the given problem and methods of its solution.

Most of them are elicited in the studies of U. Beck (Beck, 1999: 132–136), R. F. Inglehart (Inglehart, 1997: 18–28), P. Bernard (Bernard, 1999: 47–59), P. Schmitter (Schmitter, 1996: 16–27), J. Chan (Chan J., To, Chan E., 2006: 293), K. Vitman (Vitman, 2013: 421–427), O. Maiboroda (Maiboroda, 2017: 145–149), O. Kutsenko (Kutsenko, 2022), A. Deineko (Deineko, 2021: 200), A. Kolodii (Kolodii, 2013: 40–54), G. Lutsyshyn (Lutsyshyn, 2012: 33–42), O. Pashkova (Pashkova, 2012: 62–71), Yu. Polyschuk (Polyschuk, 2018: 120–127).

The key method of social-philosophical analysis of existent social-political reality is used, which allows to collate the relevant problems and present rifts in a modern society with ongoing transformation current of forms of civic challenges.

The special attention is also paid to the problem of implementation of return migration and repatriation policy. Hence, from the viewpoint of historic-demographical direction of a historical approach the experience of return migration and effective repatriation policy implementation in a number of countries is being studied in terms of historical evolution of demographical processes. And from the viewpoint of legal direction of jurisprudential approach, the key legislative enactments and legal norms are being considered, which regulate migration policy, the basic rights of migrants and ways of stimulating their return to the ethnical Homeland.

THE CASE OF NATIONALS' LOCATION AS A POTENTIAL FACTOR OF SOCIETY DIVISION

Along with global tasks, there is a great number of current challenges lying ahead of Ukraine. They might trigger conflicts escalation and new precedents of division of Ukrainian society upon a cessation of hostilities.

The case of nationals' location during the ongoing war efforts on Ukraine's territory might most probably become the one of such stumbling blocks upon war termination. Within the given context one can clearly observe the division into those citizens who stayed in Ukraine and those who went abroad.

Currently, the tension in relationships between groups mentioned above has only been increasing and hasn't reached its pinnacle yet. Moreover, at present it has been latent in nature, whereas upon returning of citizens to Ukraine (the data of International Organization for Migration (IOM) shows that not less than 60% of migrants become beneficiaries of voluntary repatriation and reintegration programmes annually (*Report on migration in the world*, 2020); while 2020 may be considered as an exception, when the rate of those who returned to their country of origin or place of habitual residence decreased due to COVID-19 pandemic (*World Migration Report*, 2022)) it may turn into open opposition. Nevertheless, it is already possible to trace the attempts of pinning labels on the representatives of the opposite groups. Having studied the most widespread combinations of perception and relationships between group representatives, who left Ukraine and who stayed onsite, the 4 basic categories can be distinguished: "victim," "traitor," "patriot" and "savior." The identification of categories was based on psycho-sociological model of human interaction, described by Stephen Karpman (Karpman, 2007). Undoubtedly, the given model was adjusted to

modern socio-political realities and was also complemented by new categories having consideration for updated substantial constituent. Such realities are actively manifested among citizens of Ukraine. It is worth noting, that virtually each of categories being exemplified can be referred to the person who stayed in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion, as well as to the person who went abroad, which, in turn, might lead to the loss of conceptual univocity. Yet at the same time the differences themselves can be distinctively observed in terms of characteristic of given categories.

Hence, citizens who left Ukraine after 24 February 2022 and were bound to stay abroad referred themselves to the category of “victim.” As reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of refugees from Ukraine registered for Temporary Protection Directives in Europe on 31 January 2023 was estimated to be more than 4 million people. The total number of those who crossed the border after 24 February 2022 – more than 8 million (Ukraine Refugee Situation, 2023). Someone justifies one’s actions with safety issues, someone refers to the necessity to evacuate underage children from territories where military operations take place, someone accounts for job losses. Every citizen has one’s own reason for going abroad, but each asserts oneself as a “victim,” who was forced to leave the family (referring mostly to men by 60 years old), home, Homeland and adapt to new conditions while seeking a sanctuary.

On the other hand, citizens of Ukraine who due to various circumstances decided or were forced to stay in Ukraine, in spite of martial law being declared and hostilities taking place, also referred to themselves as “victims.” They justify the victimhood of their own position with daily health and life threat, loss of home (destroyed or occupied), the lack of financial stability (job loss, business shut down, inflation, discrepancy between social payments and increased standard of living), separation or loss of relatives.

In both instances, citizens tend to label themselves as a “victim” on their own, regardless one’s location. Therefore, at the current stage the increasing level of competition for conventional status of “actual victim” is being observed, which, over the course of time, is progressing and contributes to the confrontation in relationships.

One of the possible results of such confrontation might be the emergence of a “traitor” category, using which people who stayed in the homeland labelled those who went abroad. In most cases such factors like unwillingness to take the position of an opposing party, preoccupation with one’s own problems, envy serve as justification. At the same time, one cannot disregard the opposing party sometimes going to extremes when they claim about the exceptional character of one’s dire situation, and also the advancing guilt for inaction at such a challenging time for Homeland. Moreover, there is a downside that is worth noting. It concerns assigning the label “traitor” to citizens who for some reasons were caught up in the occupation for an indefinite term. These sorts of accusations can originate from citizens, staying on the territory of Ukraine, as well as beyond its borders. However, the resolution of these types of conflicts must be a subject matter of another discussion (Prymush, Lavrynenko, 2020: 297–316).

The next category, both groups of Ukrainian citizens prefer to associate themselves with, – “patriot.” It’s natural that citizens are eager to ascribe themselves positive qualities, justify own actions and put emphasis on achievements and merits, neglecting

own weaknesses, misjudgements and ambiguous motives at the same time. Citizens, who stayed on the territory of Ukraine, consider themselves patriots, underpinning that they are the first and directly accept challenges, the country is facing, protect their own land, support economy by paying taxes, carry out volunteering activities, and also help fellow citizens who became displaced.

At the same time, citizens who left Ukraine actively take on the status of a “patriot.” They demonstrate their patriotism by volunteering, taking part in rallies in support for Ukraine, displaying the national flags. However, from the viewpoint of citizens who stayed in Ukraine, the mentioned actions are not enough to claim about patriotism. They believe those who stayed in Ukraine make incommensurate efforts of struggling for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity compared to the nature of actions of those who went abroad. Though, the standoff hasn’t reached the global scale yet to claim about developing of open conflicts between separate citizens groups, there are still chances to turn the latent opposition into an active confrontation.

The last category, which is worth to mention within the framework of various combinations of perception and relationships between citizens, who left Ukraine and who stayed onsite, is a “savior.” It is mostly characteristic of the citizens who didn’t leave Ukraine, but stayed on the territory of Ukraine in spite of military operations. First and foremost, they associate themselves with “heroes,” “saviors,” who by all means defend the interests of Ukraine. It’s worth to mention that citizens, who left Ukraine, tend to question and criticize the heroism of their fellow citizens, which can be manifested in all sorts of sarcastic statements and verbal sparring. The mentioned actions, however, are mostly of protective nature, as each wants to identify oneself with “a savior,” “a hero.” In no way want they to play second fiddle when there are life-defining times at hand.

Still, notwithstanding the modifying and combining of social categories, which can be displayed in greater number and be conformed to separate categories of citizens, it’s worth to remember that every person has a right to choose a behavioral model in this or that situation independently. The inner social contradictions, anyway, can occur and they will. But, it’s essential that the actions of separate citizens groups would stay within the legal framework, and democratic rights and freedoms would be upheld without question.

Furthermore, the one should consider, that continuing military operations on the territory of Ukraine may result in the new waves of migration flows. The latter will probably lead to the renewal of categories and behavioral models, which will affect the public sentiment and cause new rounds of citizens confrontation. These must become an object of research for unification and reconciliation of society upon the return of emigrated nationals to Ukraine.

CURRENT TRENDS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF REPATRIATION POLICY

All the mentioned challenges do not pose the greatest threat for the future of Ukraine, since the referred scenarios imply the return of Ukrainians to the Homeland. Hence, Ukrainian authorities will have to perform a number of urgent tasks. It involves overcoming socio-economic discrepancies within the Ukrainian society, which might

trigger another serious round of crisis on a postwar stage (Kushch, 2022). Restoration of infrastructure and creation of new workplaces will, undoubtedly, become the government's prerogative. In addition, the extremely heightened sense of justice will come to the forefront, as far as a price, supposed to be paid for the future of Ukraine, is too high – the price of human lives. Consequently, any political, social and economic injustice will be taken utmost negatively. The problem of social inequality, which has become more acute due to hostilities and growing crisis, will become one of the key issues in Ukrainian society. Intolerance towards corruption with the demand of ultimate deoligarchisation will increase to the maximum. It implies that Ukrainian society will no longer compromise on these matters. And it will express highly negative reaction, which might result in conflicts, subsequently destabilizing the situation inside the country. The model of “attractive Ukraine” is considered to be possible to create only by adhering to fair social-economic development policy. This will allow to reverse the migration flows.

Furthermore, according to the head of Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, academic Ella Libanova, the sense of patriotism can serve as a driving force for return of those who went abroad after the full-scale invasion. “Currently, there are two unidirectional processes ongoing each month: on the one hand, the economy is collapsing, homes are being destroyed, on the other hand, Ukrainians who left the country are more and more adapting to their new homes abroad. One must work on it, so that the confidence in victory gave Ukraine and Ukrainians a new beginning, once we achieve this victory” (Libanova, 2023).

It's worth to remember, that it's human capital that is major in the global economy. Consequently, most investments must be aimed at the human resource development in the first place. Otherwise, it will obstruct the implementation of further reforms. And, only after the above-mentioned set of conditions have been observed may one speak of returning back citizens to Ukraine, i.e. return migration.

According to IOM's approach (2004), “return migration” refers to the movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country (*International Migration Law*, 2004: 15).

Considering various ways and types of return implementation, it is repatriation policy that should be performed in the case of Ukraine. Based on International Migration Law, a repatriate is considered to be a person who, for reasons of a socio-economic or personal nature, voluntarily resettled in the country of one's citizenship or origin for the purpose of permanent residence (*International Migration Law*, 2004: 78). Therefore, county authorities consider the policy of repatriation as a kind of return migration – voluntary return to a country or region of one's origin. The right of Ukrainians to return to the country of citizenship is guaranteed by the provisions of various international documents, like the 1907 Hague Convention (*Hague Convention*, 1907), the 1949 Geneva Convention (*Geneva Convention*, 1949), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (UN General Assembly, 1966).

Considering all the immense complexity of the situation, it's necessary to look into the matter of existing types of repatriation policy implementation and to characterize the most acceptable to Ukraine. Studying the experience of other states in terms of

carrying out the repatriation policy is also required. As for types of repatriation policy implementation, depending on degree of state and international organizations involvement, it is possible to distinguish the following:

- when the return is stimulated directly and actively;
- when the return is stimulated indirectly and by mediation;
- when there is no stimulation, and it occurs spontaneously and in a disorganized way.

Clearly, the last type cannot contribute a constructive solution to the situation in Ukraine, as the process of return must firstly be organized and controlled by government. It is exactly the relevant way that can demonstrate the most positive effect. Secondly, the citizens' return to Ukraine must be stimulated by government, as it is the creation of competitive working conditions, economy development, improvement of living standards that are the key criteria for assessment of situation in the country and citizens' decision on returning to the Homeland.

Hence, it is sensible to pay attention to the first two types of return migration, which involves the state's stimulation of nationals' voluntary returning to the ethnical Homeland. Direct and active stimulation implies developing and implementing state programmes on returnees' attraction and their further reintegration and accommodation, provision of jobs opportunities and social guarantees. The given programmes have clear goals and tasks, are of long-term nature, expected to last for several years and involve funding from the state budget. This type of implementation of repatriation policy may be considered as the best option for Ukraine. The state openly shows interest in returning nationals, defines prospects and opportunities. With enough financial help of external donors, the mentioned option also seems to be pretty realistic, since the transparent mechanism of its use is provided.

In the case of indirect or mediated stimulation, the special governmental programme of a long-term nature is not provided. Only short-term options are possible, as well as implementation of measures of returnee support. In the given instance one doesn't refer to the wide masses, it rather concerns the separate professional and socio-cultural groups. The mentioned type can be used by the government of Ukraine for implementation of repatriation policy, however, comparing to the previous type, it bears a spot-like character without covering vast swathes of citizens who went abroad upon full-scale invasion started.

When analyzing the other countries' existing experience of conducting the repatriation policy, the following cases draw attention.

Germany. Despite the fact that widely unfolded repatriation policy began in the years of a postwar period, at the beginning of 1990s more than 2.5 million of ethnical German still lived beyond Germany territories, mainly on the territory forming part of USSR. At the base of governmental policy on returning Germans, apart from constitution norms which provide equality of all citizens residing on German territory, the wide range of benefits was embedded for a prompt integration of returnees. To simplify the system of German citizenship acquisition for people whose relatives were the holders of one, the amendments to legislation were introduced, for instance, to Art. 1 of The Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles, 1953 (*Germany: Act Concerning...*, 1991). According to one of such amendment, spouses of ethnic German, without being

of German origins themselves, were also entitled to inherit the German citizenship. It is worth noting, that the legal norms introduced to legislation are virtually of unlimited duration. Repatriates with low income, who returned to Germany, were provided with social housing, construction of which was provided by governmental funding of the local authorities. Loans were allocated for the purchase of own housing with partial exemption or subsidized interest payments, benefits were paid as well, and small and medium-sized businesses were promoted to open through the provision of both advisory and financial assistance. The loss of repatriates' income was also compensated during their acquisition of vocational education, the assistance in children's placement to kindergarten and school was provided. Therefore, the policy of repatriation and prompt integration into economy and social life of Germany for recently returned nationals was directly and actively stimulated by German state and was provided by the vast governmental programmes, funding at the expense of the federal and local budgets, as well as the church foundations (Horban, Lavrynenko, 2021: 161–171).

The Czech Republic. The ethnical Czechs actively started returning to the Homeland at the beginning of 1990s, and the process of return migration occurred in several waves. The first wave (1991–1993) – in the course of resettlement out of Chernobyl zone, the returnees (about 2000 people) were given the permanent residency, and they also were provided with the jobs and housing. During the implementation of repatriation policy, the amendments were introduced to the Czech Citizenship Act, which allowed to simplify the procedure of citizenship acquisition for the ethnical Czechs returning to the country. The second wave (1996–2001) comprises the compatriots (up to 1000 people), who lived in considerably remote and fluctuating territories and aimed to return to the Homeland. The list of such territories was approved directly by the authorities of the Czech Republic and it entailed separate regions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova. All resettled were assisted with job placement and housing. The third wave (2007) was the smallest in number of returnees (up to 200 people) and implementation terms. In a given period, in terms of social support, the situation of those ethnical Czechs who returned was no different from that of refugees and asylum-seekers. During the implementation of repatriation policy, repatriates were provided with municipal housing and also got permanent residency and an opportunity to attend free language courses. The return to the historical Homeland for ethnical Czechs in terms of special programmes occurred only within above-mentioned periods. At all other times, the ethnical Czechs had to go through the universal migration procedure. Hence, the Czech government put emphasis on short-term programmes on returning of ethnical Czechs, and the repatriation policy, though stimulated by the state, still was of mediated nature (Drbohlav, 2008: 89).

Thus, it's important to be aware of the fact that the key component of consistent country development is the controlled process of a return migration, actively implemented by a number of states. The accumulated, large-scale experience in the given course is primarily focused on the universal approaches on organization and measures of implementation of repatriation policy, including specifically the process of resettlement, adaptation, further integration of nationals in new places within their ethnical Homeland. Among the most widespread the following are distinguished:

- the creation of simplified system of residence permit and citizenship acquisition (Germany, Poland, Israel);
- compensation of travel expenses to the new place of residence (Hungary);
- provision of repatriates and their family member with healthcare and social support (Germany, Hungary, Israel, Greece);
- assistance in the purchase or immediate provision of the housing or a land plot (Greece, Israel, Kazakhstan);
- assistance in job placement (Hungary, Kazakhstan);
- financial aid in the forms of monetary payments for accommodation and household needs (Germany, Israel, Kazakhstan);
- provision of help in learning language (language courses), advanced training, re-qualification, education acquisition (Poland, Hungary, Greece).

CONCLUSIONS

Upon the war termination, the unification of Ukrainian society can face with number of challenges. The existent division into those citizens who stayed in Ukraine and those who went abroad might become the one of such stumbling blocks. Though, the tension between given groups has only been increasing and has been latent in nature, it is already possible to trace the attempts of pinning labels on the representatives of the opposite groups. Among the distinguished by authors 4 basic categories virtually each can be referred to both groups, which, in part, might lead to the loss of conceptual univocity. Particularly, the citizens who stayed in Ukraine, as well as those who went abroad, associate themselves with categories of “victim” and “patriot.” A similar situation is observed in the case of “savior” category, as the citizens who stayed in Ukraine identify themselves with a giving category, and those who went abroad are also eager to ascribe themselves to the mentioned category, demonstrating their active citizenship in terms of helping native land win a prompt victory in the war. One can observe diametrically opposed situation with the “traitor” category, which is being pinned as a label to Ukrainian citizens who left Ukraine, the label they try the hardest to get rid of. Hence, it’s the struggle for relative titles, as well as unwillingness to identify themselves with negative associations and characteristics that can aggravate the opposition between representatives of various groups and make a process of unification of Ukrainian society in a postwar period more complicated.

It’s worth to noting, that upon war termination, Ukrainian authorities will have to create a fair social-economic development policy aimed at returning home those Ukrainians who left, as well as reestablishing good neighbourly relations between those who stayed in Ukraine throughout wartime and those who went abroad. The value of human capital must become a major priority in a postwar state development strategy.

In addition, the repatriation policy must underlie the postwar unification of Ukrainian society. For its successful implementation, it’s essential to carry out well-coordinated economic, social and demographic policy at the state level. Having studied the existing types of implementation of repatriation policy, it’s worth to state, that the most universal and acceptable options for Ukraine involve the direct and active or indirect

and mediated state's stimulation of citizens' returning. First case implies openly showing interest in returning nationals by demonstrating prospects and opportunities. In the second case, state policy on citizens return concerns the limited groups of people, though bears a purposeful character as well. Therefore, the third type is the least sensible for Ukraine, when citizens' returning isn't stimulated by the state at all and occurs spontaneously and in a disorganized way.

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ABSTRACT

The study involves the analysis of unification of Ukrainian society in a postwar period to prevent the crisis of state system. It is claimed, that upon the war termination the issue of creation of universal Ukrainian society forming model arises, which is supposed to represent a symbiosis of foundations of nationwide well-being and prospects of Ukraine strategic development. It is shown, that the existent division of society into those who stayed in Ukraine and those who left for other countries can scale up in a long run. The loss of conceptual univocity in the course of developing such categories as “victim,” “patriot,” “traitor” and “savior” in civil society bears evidence to the mobility of self-identification process of existing population clusters and possible appearance of new categories of populace in the not so distant future. The rationalization for human capital is provided as well as the necessity of having regard to the mentioned factor while elaborating the postwar country development strategy. Special attention is paid to the problem of implementation of repatriation policy. Its types are defined, and the mostly acceptable options for Ukraine are characterized, including the direct and active or in-

direct and mediated state's stimulation of nationals' returning to the ethnical Homeland. Based on the conducted analysis of current experience of European countries, it was concluded that it is the controlled process of return migration that is the key component of consistent country development.

Keywords: civil society, return migration, repatriation policy, state, unification of society, universalization, safety, crisis of state system

UNIFIKACJA SPOŁECZEŃSTWA UKRAŃSKIEGO W OKRESIE POWOJENNYM JAKO MECHANIZM ZAPOBIEGANIA KRYZYSOWI PAŃSTWA

STRESZCZENIE

Przedmiotem publikacji jest analiza procesu unifikacji społeczeństwa ukraińskiego – w okresie powojennym – jaki jest niezbędny by zapobiec kryzysowi państwa. Zdaniem autorów, po zakończeniu wojny palącym problemem będzie kwestia stworzenia uniwersalnego modelu kształtowania się społeczeństwa ukraińskiego, którego zadaniem będzie symbioza podstaw ogólnonarodowego dobrobytu oraz perspektyw strategicznego rozwoju Ukrainy. Podkreślono, że istniejący podział społeczeństwa na tych, którzy pozostali na Ukrainie i tych, którzy wyjechali do innych państw, w dłuższej perspektywie może się pogłębiać. Utrata jednoznaczności pojęciowej – w toku kształtowania się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego – takich kategorii jak „ofiara”, „patriota”, „zdrajca” i „zbawiciel” świadczy o mobilności procesu samoidentyfikacji istniejących skupisk ludności i możliwym – w niedalekiej przyszłości – pojawieniu się nowych kategorii ludności. Przedstawiono również zagadnienie racjonalnego wykorzystania kapitału ludzkiego oraz konieczność uwzględnienia tego czynnika przy opracowywaniu powojennej strategii rozwoju państwa. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na problem realizacji polityki repatriacyjnej. Zdefiniowano jej rodzaje i scharakteryzowano najbardziej akceptowalne opcje dla Ukrainy, w tym bezpośrednie i aktywne lub pośrednie i stymulowane przez państwo powroty obywateli do etnicznej Ojczyzny. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy dotychczasowych doświadczeń państw europejskich uznano, że to właśnie kontrolowany proces migracji powrotnych jest kluczowym elementem spójnego rozwoju państwa.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczeństwo obywatelskie, migracje powrotne, polityka repatriacyjna, państwo, unifikacja społeczeństwa, uniwersalizacja, bezpieczeństwo, kryzys państwa

