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CHANGES IN THE LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR AND LANGUAGE ATTITUDE OF RESIDENTS OF THE BLACK SEA COAST OF UKRAINE AFTER FEBRUARY 24, 2022

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1. Introduction

The full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine caused significant changes¹, not to mention the issue of language policy, language identification, and the attitude of many Ukrainians to the languages used in everyday communication. Today, transformations in the national-linguistic consciousness occur even among the residents of those territories where Russian-speaking behavior prevailed for a long time and where there was a tolerant attitude towards the Russian language (see about this, for example: Bezsmeretna 2022; Kulyk 2022; Kulyk 2023; Šumic'ka 2022; Matveëva 2023; Zaliznák 2023; Sokolova 2023; Šarkan' 2023).

Thus, Taras Kremin, the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language in Ukraine, notes that “the ideological aim of the occupiers turned out to be flawed, because, ironically, since the beginning of the war, users of Russian in Ukraine

1 For a detailed analysis: Golovahi, Makeëva ed. 2022.

started attending courses to improve their Ukrainian language skills” (Kremin’ 2022). It is primarily about Russian-speaking displaced people who left the occupied territories for Western Ukraine during the war. Observing their linguistic behavior, Taras Kremin states that “the war changed consciousness and accelerated the rejection of the use of the language of the occupier. Thus, the competition between two languages in one national space has ended, Russian speakers, having been displaced, are happy to learn the Ukrainian language” (Ibid.).

The results of the sociological research conducted in 2022–2023 by the Sociological Group “Rating”, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation named after Ilko Kucheriv, the research company Gradus Research, and the Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communications, reveal the characteristics of the current language situation in Ukraine, which indicate the share of citizens who, during the war, started actively using the Ukrainian language in everyday life (for details, see: Demokratični inīciativi 2022; Sociologična grupa “Rejting” 19.03.2022; Sociologična grupa “Rejting” 24.07.2022; Gradus Research 2023; Ukraīns’kij īnstitut media ta komunikacii 2023).

Similar trends are also revealed in the study of the peculiarities of the language behavior of Ukrainians in social networks. Thus, Daniel Racek and his colleagues, in the study of the choice of language codes in Twitter by citizens of Ukraine during the war, concluded that, with the Russian invasion, more than half of Russian-speaking tweeters switched to Ukrainian. The authors interpret these findings as a conscious choice of users in favor of Ukrainian (online) identity and self-determination by Ukrainians (Racek et al. 2024).

Nataliya Bezsmertna, analyzing some Ukrainian public groups in social networks, concludes that Russian aggression contributed to the process of Ukrainization and the return of lost positions to the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life (Bezsmertna 2022:8).

Concurrently, the attitude towards the Russian language among many Ukrainians is changing. According to Volodymyr Kulyk, 58% of respondents are sure that the Russian language is not significant at all (for comparison: in 2014, there were only 9% of such respondents) (Kulik 2023).

2. Data

We focus on the tendencies of changes in language behavior and attitudes towards the language codes used in everyday communication, which were observed among the residents of Odesa and Mykolaiv regions after the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine.

Odesa and Mykolaiv regions are the regions where one of Putin’s declared goals of the so-called Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine was the protection

of the Russian-speaking population that was allegedly persecuted by “Ukrainian nationalists”.

The southern regions of the Black Sea coast were traditionally distinguished by the Russian-speaking behavior of many of its inhabitants. However, they should be recognized as a multilingual area where various language codes are actively used. According to the results of the study “Hybridization from two sides: Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian code mixing in the context of the sociolinguistic situation in the South of Ukraine along the Black Sea coast”² that was conducted during 2019–2021, in the everyday speech of residents of Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions active use of Ukrainian, Russian, and Suržyk occurs. It should be specified that most respondents stated that they are multilingual and use several codes in language practice (for details, see: Hentschel, Palinska 2022). Of course, there are clear differences between them (for example, some are mostly focused on one code, others on two, and some quite actively use all the three codes due to the influence of many factors. However, in general, a rather distinct multilingual situation can be observed, in which not only Russian but also Ukrainian and Suržyk are spoken. This study reveals the peculiarities of the language situation in the southern regions of Ukraine before the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine. Although it is obvious that after February 24, 2022, various trends of change may occur here.

To determine these changes, we made a comparative analysis of the results of a sociological survey of 30 residents of the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions, which was conducted in 2020–2021 and 2023. In our opinion, it is longitudinal studies that can demonstrate rather interesting trends of changes, determine their causes, and the attitude of a specific person to certain phenomena/actions/situations at different intervals of time.

Our research is based on the materials of sociological surveys that were obtained in 2020–2021 during the implementation of the project “Hybridization from two sides: Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian code mixing in the context of the sociolinguistic situation in the South of Ukraine along the Black Sea coast”, which was aimed primarily at studying Suržyk, a mixed Ukrainian-Russian language. During the research 1.200 people were interviewed in the Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions. Respondents were asked questions about their attitude to language policy, general geopolitical orientation, independence, identity, and linguistic behavior in various situations.

2 The project “Hybridization from two sides: Ukrainian-Russian and Russian-Ukrainian code mixing in the context of the (socio)linguistic situation in the South of Ukraine along the Black Sea coast” was implemented under support of the German Research Society and the Austrian foundation FWF – der Wissenschaftsfond (HE 1566/ 17-1 / AOBJ: 661263) under the guidance of prof. Gerd Hentschel (Oldenburg, Germany) and prof. Tillman Reuther (Klagenfurt, Austria).

In 2023, we held the same survey among 30 residents of the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions (it should be emphasized that these were the same respondents whom we interviewed during the implementation of the mentioned project during 2020–2021). As a result, we identified trends of change that were most clearly manifested in language policy issues, in the definition of one's own identity, attitude to the language codes used in everyday language practice (to Ukrainian, Russian, and Suržyk), as well as in the direct language behavior of the respondents.

In addition to the results of the sociolinguistic study of one sample of respondents in 2020–2021 and 2023, individual comments received during the survey, as well as journalistic interviews published in the Ukrainian media during 2022–2023 were included in the analysis. In the following part of the article we will consider the identified change trends in more detail.

3. Results of the sociolinguistic research

3.1. Attitude to language policy

For a long time, the issue of language policy in Ukraine has been the focus of attention and debates for various political forces. The attitude towards the status of the state language and the available bilingual Ukrainian-Russian situation in Ukraine has been particularly controversial (for a detailed analysis, see: Ažnůk 2021; Pereguda et al. 2017; Majboroda et al. 2008).

As Tetyana Prystupenko pointed out, for a long time social processes have been characterized by political speculations on the language issue to increase opposition and division of the Ukrainian society (Pristupenko 2019: 15). This, in turn, led to various assessments and attitudes of Ukrainians towards language issues.

In the study, the respondents were asked several questions to identify their attitudes toward language policy. One of them was to agree or disagree with the following three statements: *the only state language in Ukraine should be Ukrainian, the only state language should be Russian, or the state languages should be Ukrainian and Russian*.

Unlike the 2020–2021 survey, according to which 69% of respondents expressed support for the Ukrainian language as the only state language, and more than a third supported the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the 2023 survey revealed 100% support for the Ukrainian language as the only state language of Ukraine. Not a single respondent spoke in favor of two state languages.

During the war, the vast majority (67%) expressed their negative opinion about Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism in Ukraine. Before the war, there were only 27% of them. A third of respondents emphasized a neutral attitude to this issue, in contrast to half in 2020 (see Diagram 1).




Diagram 1. Attitude toward Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism in Ukraine

To the question of *whether respondents agree that all residents of Ukraine should be fluent in the Ukrainian language*, in 2023 all respondents gave an affirmative answer (although in 2021, only 60% agreed with this); to the question about fluency in the Russian language, “rather agree” was chosen by 16% of respondents as opposed to 40% in 2021 (see Diagram 2).




Diagram 2. Do you agree that all residents of Ukraine should be fluent in...

Negative answers were also received to the question *Do you agree with the fact that all employees of the public sphere of Ukraine should speak Russian*: in 2023 all respondents gave the “disagree” answer (78% answered “disagree” and 22% – “rather disagree”). At the same time, in 2020–2021 50% of respondents expressed their consent on this issue.

As it is illustrated, a year after the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a clear consolidation of the Ukrainian society as the war significantly affected the attitude of citizens toward the status of the state language, the bilingual situation in the country, and the need to master the Ukrainian language in general.

3.2. Defining identity

As it is known, identity is a rather multifaceted concept that consists of shared values and attitudes such as culture, language, religion, ancestry, and collective experience that distinguish a certain community from others (Blankenhorn 2003: 27). It is never complete, it is changing sustainably with the appearance or alienation of individual essential components, which is caused by the influence of various factors. What exact characteristics become part of identity depends on each person's current attitudes (Kittel et al. 2018: 90).

During the war, most Ukrainians understood their distinctiveness from the Russians and began to feel the classic “us-them” opposition. Thus, our research revealed the confidence of all respondents that it is impossible to be Russian and Ukrainian at the same time, and that Ukrainians and Russians are different peoples (although in 2020, 77% of respondents said this).

Gradually, the title *state language* began to play a significant role among the criteria for determining identity as the cultural basis of Ukraine's independence and a factor of social integration (Kulyk 2013; Gončarova 2015; Masenko 2020; Rêzник 2022; Zeller 2022; Palins'ka 2022). According to our data, today there is a trend that demonstrates a connection between the status of Ukrainianhood and the mastery of the Ukrainian language: in 2023, to the question of *whether you agree that all residents of Ukraine should speak Ukrainian*, 100% of respondents gave an affirmative answer (although in 2020 there were 60% of them).

The obtained results also testify to the high level of identification of the native language with the Ukrainian language: when asked *what their native language is*, in 2023, 100% of respondents recognized Ukrainian as their native language (in 2020, there were 83%), among whom 61% indicate the presence of two native languages: Ukrainian and Suržyk.

According to Svitlana Hrytsenko (Gricenko 2022), “the language has now actualized one of its leading functions – it has become an identifier of national belonging, a marker that defines “friend” and “foe” in the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022” (Ibid.: 10). This situation is particularly evident in the refusal to recognize the Russian language, which is identified with the hostile and aggressive “Russian” world as a native language. This fact is noted by many respondents, such as:

The motivation to speak Ukrainian is a great desire not to have anything to do with the occupiers (Ukrains'ka pravda. 05/28/2022);

I can't, I don't want to speak Russian. Now Russian is the language of my enemy (ICTV. 05/20/2022);

... the language of public communication in a country that is at war with Russia, in my opinion, cannot be Russian. Now, at the front, I reconsidered it, became less

tolerant of the Russian language. Because the people who shoot at us, who bomb us, speak Russian. On the other side of the border, those people speak Russian, and I don't want to speak the same language with the people who are killing us (NTA. 09/4/2023);

Now, the Ukrainian language for me is a small trench on the front of a big war with Russia. I live near Odesa... I am like a little soldier, and, communicating in Ukrainian, I wage my "war" against the Russian occupation (Radio Svoboda. 03/28/2018).

At the same time, the Ukrainian language as a native language is distinguished by a rather powerful symbolic connection with the people, ethnic group, and nation, revealing its metaphorical essence: "the language is the code of the nation", which is demonstrated by the analysis of the respondents' answers regarding their understanding of the concept of a "native language" (see Table 1).

Table 1. What does "native language" mean for you

| | 2021 | 2023 |
|---|------|------|
| The language I learned to speak as a child | 55 | 61 |
| The language I speak best | 27 | 27 |
| The language I use in my everyday life | 17 | 27 |
| The language I think with | 44 | 39 |
| The language of my parents | 67 | 72 |
| The language of my country | 72 | 77 |
| The language of the nationality to which I belong | 44 | 55 |
| The language that I love and appreciate | 61 | 27 |
| The language of my homeland and my ancestors | 61 | 67 |

As the data show, most of the selected criteria received quite high positive responses, among which the most frequent options were "native language is the language of my parents" (72%), "native language is the language of my country" (77%) and "native the language is the language of my homeland and my ancestors" (67%).

In the essence of the concept of "native language" (by which all respondents defined Ukrainian), the symbolic layer related to patriotism turned out to be the most powerful. It is slightly higher in 2023 compared to the study conducted in 2020–2021 (77% versus 72%), which once again shows that the native language (which is Ukrainian for all respondents) is perceived primarily as a symbol of the Ukrainian people, a conditional marker of the national self-identification, which is especially evident during the war.

3.3. Attitude to Suržyk

Suržyk as a language code has always caused ambiguous attitudes both among its researchers and its speakers. It has become traditional in the scientific circles of Ukrainian linguists to evaluate this communicative code with a projection onto the norm, defining it primarily as a negative phenomenon, as a rudiment of “inferiority”, which is better either forgotten or “eradicated”, not even bothering with thoughts about its nature” (Bricin, Saplin, Trub 2011: 91–92). At the same time, they noted the destructive influence of Suržyk on the literary form of the Ukrainian language, as well as its pathogenic potential (see, for example: Trub 2000; Matiáš 2002).

This evaluation of Suržyk differs from its evaluation by the speakers themselves. In particular, Gerd Hentschel and Jan Patrick Zeller, when analyzing the massive data collected in the course of a sociolinguistic study of Ukrainian-Russian mixed speech (performed within the framework of the project of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the University of Oldenburg³), single out four conditional groups of respondents regarding the attitude to this mixed subcode, namely: “convinced opponents” (Suržyk is culturally harmful, it should be avoided even in the private sphere), “moderate skeptics” (Suržyk does not threaten culture, but should still be avoided in the private sphere), “cautious supporters” (Suržyk is culturally harmful but convenient in the private sphere), “persuasive friends” (Suržyk is in no way harmful culturally and it is convenient in the private sphere) (Gentšel, Celler 2017).

The attitude towards any language code cannot be unambiguous, it can acquire variable values in different situations, different periods, etc.

In 2023, we find a mostly loyal attitude toward Suržyk speaking in many respondents. In contrast to 2020–2021, when one third of the respondents showed their negative attitude towards this subcode, and 23% positive, in 2023 negative evaluations were given by 6% and positive by more than 50% (Diagram 3).

According to our observations, a “loyal” attitude towards mixed speech has appeared even among Russian-speaking communicators – particularly those who, after the large-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, gradually began to switch to Suržyk in certain communicative situations, thereby revealing their pro-Ukrainian position. Thus, some respondents noted in this regard:

It’s better to speak this Suržyk, not the Russian language;
I try to speak Ukrainian, it’s still difficult, but Suržyk helps.

During the interview, some respondents emphasized the symbolic role of Suržyk as a code of a “friend”:

3 Variability and stability in a mixed substandard in broad and time-stable language contact: Ukrainian-Russian mixed speech in Ukraine (2014–2019) with support of the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung Fund, № 10.14.1.066.




Diagram 3. How do you feel about the fact that some people use a mixed language?

Well, if a man, well, for example, came up and chats in our language, then we also chat in our language; Well, you must speak in Surżyk among your people. It's like at home.

3.4. Language behavior

During the research in 2023, we found clear changes in the frequency of use of codes in various communicative situations. We consider the most significant trend to be a sharp shift towards Ukrainian-speaking behavior, as stated by more than 80% of respondents (only 50% expressed this in 2020–2021).

As a rule, expressive trends of changes in behavior patterns are recorded in extra-family communication. In the family, however, we record stable language behavior: the frequency of using Ukrainian, Russian, and Surżyk practically did not change during the war (Diagram 4).




Diagram 4. Which of the following languages, and how often, are spoken in your family?

Such a situation, in our opinion, may indicate the “persistence” of the family language tradition of using a certain code when communicating with relatives, which, in turn, is due to their long-term relationships and family habits. In this regard, some respondents stated:

It turned out that it was the most difficult to switch to Ukrainian with my parents and older brother; I still switch to Russian most often. I assume this is because I have been communicating with these people in Russian for more than 20 years, and this transition feels artificial and the atrical;

I have Suržyk, I can recollect a word in Ukrainian for a long time; if I don't recall it, I say it in Russian.

A slight increase in the frequency of using the Ukrainian language was recorded in the family sphere during conversations with children (from 17% to 23%), which may indicate the influence of the Ukrainian-speaking behavior of their children who study in Ukrainian-speaking educational institutions and, accordingly, transfer Ukrainian-speaking behavior models to the family. Children themselves in such situations can act as stimulators who, at the same time, need help and help to introduce the Ukrainian language into the language practice (of their Russian- and Suržyk-speaking parents). The latter case can be noticed in situations when, communicating with their Suržyk- or Russian-speaking parents, children play the role of a “teacher”: they correct language mistakes, suggest Ukrainian words, etc. In our opinion, such a linguistic relationship between parents and children can have positive results, at least in terms of changes in the language attitudes of parents.

On the other hand, cases have been recorded when middle-aged parents consciously switch to Ukrainian behavior to form the appropriate communicative competence of their minor children: “*No, no, we try to speak Ukrainian with our children. We need to teach them to speak correctly*”.

Suržyk as a family code is most often used in conversations with the older generation, parents (67%), and neighbors (53%), which is obviously due to the habit of speaking in this situation in the language that close or well-acquainted people used to communicate with each other.

As for communication outside the family, there are more pronounced trends of change. First, this refers to the frequency of use of the Ukrainian and Russian languages (Diagram 5).

The Ukrainian language began to be used more actively in the city (from 27% in 2020 to 50% in 2023), in the shops (from 40% to 70%, respectively), in means of transport (from 37% to 56%), and at the market (from 30% to 60%). Accordingly, in these situations, the frequency of using the Russian language has significantly decreased: in the city – from 60% in 2020 to 37% in 2023, in public places – from 56% to 33% (see Diagram 6).




Diagram 5. Estimate which of the following languages, and how often, are spoken in your environment, except for your family.




Diagram 6. Which of the following languages do you most often use in conversation with strangers?

As you can see, the service sector is an effective practice for acquiring language skills and habits. In this situation, the language law on the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language in the service sector played a certain role. It has a rather productive effect on the consolidation of Ukrainian-language behavior models.

It is obvious that the current intensification of Ukrainian-speaking behavior was caused primarily by the war. After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine occurred, many Ukrainians began to consciously refuse to use the Russian language as the language of the aggressor. Thus, according to the results of a sociological study of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center of “National Culture and Language in Ukraine: Changes in Public Opinion after the Year of the War”, in 2022 the number of citizens who use the Ukrainian language in everyday life increased compared to 2021. If, in 2021, this indicator was 64%, in 2022 it increased to 71%. At the same time, the level of use of the Russian language decreased by almost 10% (Demokratičnì inìciativi 2022).

According to our observations, the frequency of the use of Russian may decrease due to the more active use of Suržyk to which even Russian speakers have gradually begun to switch. This is especially actively observed in small, spontaneously created social communities (for example, in the situation of conversations in shopping places, queues, etc.), which are considered quite “favorable” for the use of mixed speech. According to one of the respondents, *“In all spheres, let’s say, where there is the communication of ordinary people, it is possible to use a folk, mixed language”*.

Moreover, for some Russian speakers, Suržyk became a conditional transition code to the Ukrainian language and, accordingly, acquired a positive attitude. For example, compare how the respondents talk about it:

Ukrainization has already happened in our city, I think. More and more people speak their native language and do not hesitate to use Suržyk instead of Russian. If the service sector becomes completely Ukrainian, everything will go like clockwork. Those who use Russian will be in the minority because it will be unfashionable. Suržyk and Ukrainian will be fashionable (Cukr. 09/5/2022);

If, before the shift, I spoke perfect Russian and very bad Ukrainian, now I use perfect Ukrainian and Suržyk instead of Russian (Ukraïns’kij krizovij media-centr. 11/1/2023).

4. Conclusions

The conducted research proves that, after the large-scale invasion of Russia in Ukraine, distinct transformational processes were discovered with regard to the definition of one’s own identity, attitude to language policy, and language codes used in everyday communication, as well as direct models of language behavior of residents of the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions.

Today we can notice the formation of a new collective identity: a new collective Ukrainian “We” in the south of Ukraine. This fact is manifested primarily in the self-definition of Ukrainians by all respondents, the conviction that Ukrainians and

Russians are different peoples, the recognition of the obligatory command of the Ukrainian language by every Ukrainian, the identification of Ukrainian as their native language by all respondents, which quite clearly began to reveal its essence through the metaphorical image of “native language is the code of the nation”.

In the conditions of war, the attitude of citizens to the issue of the status of the state language has changed: in 2023, everyone expressed the opinion that Ukrainian should be the only state language. At the same time, Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism is perceived by the majority in a very negative way.

Today, we record a distinct activation of Ukrainian-speaking behavior patterns and a decrease in the frequency of using the Russian language. The public space is the most favorable for the spread of Ukrainian-language communication models. Even in situations of conversations with strangers, the majority prefers to use the Ukrainian language, thus publicly refusing speaking Russian language as a marker of the enemy.

The Russian language, remaining one of the means of communication for a certain part of Ukrainians, is gradually reducing its frequency of use in public spaces. In the family sphere, it remains a fairly “active” family code, without significantly reducing its frequency of use. Undoubtedly, the refusal to identify with the Russian world shows that Ukrainians do not want to have anything to do with the enemy, i. e. the Russian aggressor. However, directly in the family, they are not yet ready to change their language patterns of behavior, which is determined, in our opinion, by family traditions and the duration of contact with close people.

Currently, we notice the dynamics of a loyal attitude towards Suržyk, which acquired some new functions during the war: for many, it became a marker of a “friend”, as well as a conditional code for the transition from Russian-speaking to Ukrainian-speaking behavior.

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Changes in the Language Behavior and Language Attitude of Residents of the Black Sea Coast of Ukraine after February 24, 2022

Abstract

The article presents the results of a sociolinguistic study conducted in 2020–2021 and 2023 among residents of the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions of Ukraine. The main focus is on the trends of changes that occurred in the language behavior and attitude towards the languages used in everyday communication among the residents of the southern region of Ukraine after the large-scale Russian invasion

of the country. The results of the research testify to the formation of a collective Ukrainian identity in the south of Ukraine. This is reflected in the attitude of all citizens to the issue of the status of the state language: in 2023, 100% of respondents expressed the opinion that Ukrainian should be the only state language in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism began to be perceived by the vast majority in a distinctly negative way. The activation of Ukrainian-language behavior models and the decrease in the frequency of using the Russian language are observed. The change in the attitude towards Surżyk, which acquired some new functions during the war, is also observed: it became a marker of a “friend”, as well as a conditional code for the transition from the Russian-speaking to Ukrainian-speaking behavior.

Zmiany w zachowaniach językowych i postawach mieszkańców ukraińskiego wybrzeża Morza Czarnego po 24 lutego 2022 r. Abstrakt

W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań socjolingwistycznych przeprowadzonych wśród mieszkańców obwodów odeskiego i mikołajowskiego w Ukrainie w latach 2020–2021 i 2023. Główny nacisk położono na trendy zmian, jakie zaszły w zachowaniach językowych, i postawy względem języków używanych w codziennej komunikacji mieszkańców regionu południowego po inwazji Rosji na Ukrainę. Wyniki badań świadczą o kształtowaniu się zbiorowej ukraińskiej tożsamości na południu Ukrainy. Odzwierciedla to podejście wszystkich obywateli do kwestii statusu języka państwowego: w 2023 roku 100% respondentów wyraziło opinię, że ukraiński powinien być jedynym językiem państwowym. Jednocześnie dwujęzyczność ukraińsko-rosyjska zaczęła być postrzegana przez zdecydowaną większość w sposób wyraźnie negatywny. Zaobserwować można aktywizację języka ukraińskiego oraz spadek częstotliwości używania języka rosyjskiego. Badania ponadto wykazują dynamiczną zmianę postawy wobec Surżyka, który w czasie wojny nabył nowe funkcje: stał się wyznacznikiem „przyjaciela”, a także kodem przejściowym używanym w zmianie języka codziennego, tj. w przejściu z zachowania rosyjskojęzycznego do ukraińskojęzycznego.