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**Ivan PATRYLIAK**

*PhD hab. (History), Professor of the Department of History of World Ukrainianity the Faculty of History of the Kiev National Taras Shevchenko University, 60 Vladimirska Street, Kyiv, Ukraine, postal code 01601 (i\_patrilyak@ukr.net)*

**ORCID:** 0000-0002-4534-4654

**Dmytro HRYN**

*PhD (History), Associate Professor at the Department of World History the Faculty of History and Philosophy of Kyiv Borys Grinchenko University, 13-B Tymoshenko Street, Kyiv, Ukraine, postal code 04212 (grin\_dm@ukr.net)*

**ORCID:** 0000-0002-1378-636X

**Іван ПАТРИЛЯК**

*доктор історичних наук, професор кафедри історії світового українства історичного факультету Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка, вул. Володимирська 60, Київ, Україна, індекс 01601 (i\_patrilyak@ukr.net)*

**Дмитро ГРИНЬ**

*кандидат історичних наук, доцент кафедри всесвітньої історії історико-філософського факультету Київського університету імені Бориса Грінченка, вул. Тимошенка, 13-Б, м. Київ, Україна, індекс 04212 (grin\_dm@ukr.net)*

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**UNUSUAL NAZISM: UKRAINIAN NATIONAL-SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY IN THE POST-WAR DONBAS**

**Abstract.** *The purpose of the article is to research an extremely interesting phenomenon of post-war Ukrainian society – an attempt to create an underground Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party (UNSWP) in the Donbass and Sloboda Ukraine. The methodology of the research is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, multifactority, concreteness, science and comprehensiveness. The following general historical methods were used: historical-comparative, retrospective, problematic, microhistorical analysis. The Scientific Novelty.* Having introduced a series of new archival materials from the collections of the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine to the scientific circulation, we covered a whole new episode in the history of the anti-Soviet resistance movement in the East of Ukraine in the first years after World War II – the activity of the UNSWP that was not connected to the Ukrainian nationalist underground and did not obey its leadership. The article reconstructs the main episodes, related to the emergence of the underground party, its structure, activities, ideology, tasks. **The Conclusions.** The analysed documents of the bodies of the state security and constituent materials of the UNSWP confirm that the main initiator of the creation of an illegal party was a native

of Luhansk region Bronislav Boglachov-Stogneyev, who, during his service in the Red Army, was stationed in the Rivne area and got captured by the Ukrainian independence ideas, which he tried to adopt to the needs of his native working environment of the eastern regions of Ukraine. The illegal party he created was not characterized by nationalism or racism, national or cultural intolerance, and more closely resembled leftist populists in its rhetoric and vision of the future social order. The struggle for independence for B. Boglachov-Stogneyev and his few followers was rather a means of solving the pressing social problems of the population of East, South and Center of Ukraine (collective farms liquidation, private ownership of land, private trade, improvement of social security of workers, etc.) and not its prime mission. The party declared armed methods to fight the stalinist regime, but never used weapons or attempted to launch an uprising. All underground activity was limited to the production of program documents, the formation of structures and the attempt to seize the financial resources necessary for further clandestine work.

**Key words:** Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party, Ukrainian SSR Ministry of State Security, Central Committee, underground, party program, party structure.

## НЕЗВИЧАЙНИЙ НАЦИЗМ: УКРАЇНСЬКА НАЦІОНАЛ-СОЦІАЛІСТИЧНА РОБІТНИЧА ПАРТІЯ НА ПОВОЄННОМУ ДОНБАСІ

**Анотація.** *Мета статті* полягає у дослідженні надзвичайно цікавого феномена повоєнного українського суспільства – спроби створення на Донбасі й Слобожанщині підпільної Української націонал-соціалістичної робітничої партії (УНСРП). **Методологія дослідження** базується на принципах історизму, системності, базатофакторності, конкретності, науковості та всебічності. Використано такі загальноісторичні методи: історико-порівняльний, ретроспективний, проблемний, мікроісторичного аналізу. **Наукова новизна:** ввівши до наукового обігу низку нових архівних матеріалів із колекції Галузевого державного архіву Служби безпеки України, було висвітлено цілком новий епізод з історії антирадянського руху опору на Сході України в перші роки після завершення Другої світової війни – діяльність УНСРП, яка не була пов'язана з українським націоналістичним підпіллям і не підпорядковувалася його керівництву. У статті здійснено реконструкцію основних епізодів, пов'язаних з виникненням підпільної партії, її структурою, діяльністю, ідеологією, завданнями. **Висновки.** Проаналізовані документи органів радянської держбезпеки й установчі матеріали УСНРП дають підставу стверджувати, що основним ініціатором створення нелегальної партії став уродженець Луганщини Броніслав Боглачов-Стогнєєв, який під час служби в Червоній армії перебував на території Рівненщини й, очевидно, захопився ідеями незалежності України, які намагався адаптувати до потреб рідного йому робітничого середовища східних областей України. Створювана ним нелегальна партія не вирізнялася націоналізмом чи расизмом, національною або культурною нетерпимістю, а своєю риторикою і баченням майбутнього суспільного устрою більше нагадувала лівих популістів. Боротьба за незалежність для Б. Боглачова-Стогнєєва і групи його нечисельних послідовників була радше засобом для розв'язання пекучих соціальних проблем мешканців Сходу, Півдня і Центру України (ліквідація колгоспів, приватна власність на землю, приватна торгівля, поліпшення соціального забезпечення робітників тощо), а не самоціллю. Партія декларувала збройні методи боротьби зі сталінським режимом, проте жодного разу не застосувала зброї або не зробила спроби розгорнути повстання. Уся підпільна активність обмежувалася виготовленням програмних документів, формуванням структур і спробою заволодіти фінансовими засобами, потрібними для подальшої нелегальної роботи.

**Ключові слова.** Українська націонал-соціалістична робітничка партія, Міністерство державної безпеки УРСР, Центральний комітет, підпілля, програма партії, партійна структура.

**The Problem Statement.** When Ukrainian society discusses the anti-Soviet resistance movement in the final stages of World War II and in the early post-war years, the stereotypical imagination of the citizens presents one or the other image of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with close connection to Western Ukraine region exclusively. But this vision is not historically accurate.

**The Analysis of Sources and Recent Researches.** Academic research and archaeographic publications clearly prove that the anti-Soviet underground, which operated under the flags of the OUN or UPA, went beyond the boundaries of the Western Ukraine (Nikolskyi, (2001); Serhiichuk, (2005); Shchur, (2008); Khobot, (2010); Pahiria & Ivanchenko, (2011); Patryliak, (2019). For example, the analysis of the bi-weekly reports of the People's Commissariat for state security/ Ministry of State Security "On the course of the hostile element purges on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR" in 1946 indicates that during this year the number of arrested in the Western Ukrainian regions was 11602 persons or 53.32% of all arrested "on the line of state security", and the Eastern, Central and Southern regions of the Ukrainian SSR accounted for 10154 persons or 46.47% of all arrested (Patryliak & Liapina, (2016). Therefore, although the anti-Soviet movement in the East in the first years after World War II was weaker than in the West (for which there were objective reasons), it nevertheless existed. Moreover, as recent documents, detected in the Sectoral State Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine, indicate, it has sometimes taken on quite extravagant forms. We are referring to the existence of the Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party (UNSWP) in Donbas region. This article is devoted to the study of this extraordinary case.

First, we must point out that the number of sources discovered to date on the history of the UNSWP is quite limited. It includes both documents of the party itself and materials of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) of the Ukrainian SSR. All identified sources should be divided into the following groups: MSS reporting documents based on interrogation protocols of arrested members of the National Socialist underground, agent reports, and analytical assumptions of the investigators; the MSS policy documentation, aimed at further exposing and "developing" the structures of the national-socialist underground; UNSWP program documents; UNSWP policy documents; documents on the structure of the UNSWP; UNSWP certificates and forms (Sectoral State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 12–135).

**The purpose of the article** is to research an extremely interesting phenomenon of post-war Ukrainian society – an attempt to create an underground Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party (UNSWP) in the Donbas and Sloboda Ukraine.

**The Statement of the Basic Material.** One should immediately reject the notion, that the very appearance of the National Socialist Party was inspired by the soviet special services. Such a statement seems unlikely, given the fact, that the UNSWP underground exposure in Donbas was communicated by the Ukrainian SSR MSS heads to the first person of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (CP(b)U). L. M. Kaganovych ("Special Report on the Discovered and Liquidated Anti-Soviet Group in the Voroshylovgrad Region, which calls itself the "Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party". March 31, 1947") (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 12–18) and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, M.S. Khrushchev ("Special Report on the Discovered and Liquidated Anti-Soviet Group in the Voroshylovgrad Region, which calls itself the "Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party". March 31, 1947") (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 47–53). And for the pursuit of the underground network in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions, the heads of the MSS of Ukrainian SSR sent special instructions (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 120–123). It is also difficult to believe that the UNSWP was a product of German intelligence, because it was the period after the defeat of the Nazi empire. Another question emerges – why did the initiators of the underground organization choose such an exotic name, that should jeopardise their movement in the eyes of the population, which survived

all the horrors of the occupation regime of national-socialist Germany? We are well aware that, for example, in the OUN environment in 1944 there was an active debate about whether or not to rename the Organization so that the word “nationalism” was not associated by the population of the Central and Eastern Lands of Ukraine with the word “Nazism” (SSA SSU, f. 13, c. 372, vol. 1, pp. 58–59; vol. 13, pp. 72–79; vol. 16, pp. 300–301). And in this case, we are talking about the Donbas, one of the most eastern regions of Ukraine, and suddenly the initiators of an underground party creation name it “national-socialist” ... The answer to this riddle, obviously, should be sought in the two basic unresolved issues in post-war Ukraine – national and social. Active movement for independence, launched by nationalists, juggling Ukrainian “national issues” by Nazis and Bolsheviks during World War II, large-scale struggle against “bourgeois nationalism” after the end of combat actions, and at the same time the existence of fake ministries of foreign affairs and defence in Ukrainian SSR, made the problem of the Ukrainian statehood all the more relevant, raised the issue of the Ukraine right to self-determination among common man. At the same time, the catastrophic decline in the standard of living in the first post-war years, the rampant famine in the villages (caused by crop confiscation, fatal forms of collective farming and the drought), the ruthless labour exploitation (covered by the need to rebuild the economy), and the troublesome existence of the urban intelligentsia made social problems critical. Frustration with the fact that the Soviet policies did not liberalize after the war (as was hoped by the majority of the population) raised the question of any ability of the communist state to transform itself, to return to the needs of man. Thus, individual citizens began to look for ways to social change through the implementation of the idea of independence of Ukraine, closely combining social and national issues. The attempt to create a Ukrainian National Socialist Workers' Party in the post-war Donbas became a practical embodiment of this vision. Embodiment in a specific proletarianized region (reflected in the party name by the attribute “workers”). The program, tasks and slogans of this embryonic structure were not in close resemblance to the famous 25 points of the German Nazis, and its leaders rather sought to imitate the communist party structure better known to them than the structures of the German National Socialists.

The analysis of the available sources indicates that the originator and the actual creator of the UNSWP was a native of Starobilsk in Luhansk oblast, Bronislav Boglachov-Stogneyev (born in 1925), who spent the period of German occupation in the town Verhniy, Lysychansk district of then called Voroshylovgrad oblast (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 121). During the interrogations, however, he claimed that he had in fact been tasked to form UNSWP structures in the Donbas and Sloboda Ukraine by the heads of the UNSWP Central Committee (CC) from Rivne, so called “secretary general” of the UNSWP Central Committee, Mikhaïlo Omelyanovich Dnipryanyi, and UNSWP CC “Personnel Secretary” Ivan Pavlovych Omelchenko-Zadorozhnyi (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 14). His version, as told by MSS officers, was as follows: “In February 1943, after the liberation of the Lysychansk district, Boglachov was drafted into the Soviet Army. While serving in the rank of sergeant in the 254 tank regiment stationed in Rivne in 1945, he deserted in November with a weapon in his hands. After these events he arrived using fictitious document in Rubizhno, Voroshylovgrad oblast, where he lived without a residence permit with his mother Boglachova Nadia Mykytivna, not working anywhere until the day of the arrest. According to Boglachev, he deserted from the army on the assignment of Dnipryanyi Mykhaylo Omelyanovich, who was allegedly the Secretary-General of the UNSWP and another leading member of the UNSWP Ivan Pavlovych Omelchenko-Zadorozhnyi, by whom he had been recently recruited to the organization.

He was brought to Dnipryanyi and Zadorozhnyi in Rivne by a certain Zhuk Oleksander, who served together with him as a sergeant of the 254 tank regiment. He was on friendly terms with him, shared mutual anti-Soviet sentiments, and later Zhuk introduced Boglachov to the Dnipryanyi. As Boglachov indicated, sergeant Zhuk, following the instructions by Dnipryanyi and Zadorozhnyi, in April 1945 deserted from the army, taking along the weapons” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 14). From the quoted passage it is clear, that the stay in the German-occupied territory of Luhansk oblast, and later acquaintance with the anti-Soviet agitation of Ukrainian and Polish underground structures in Rivne, cast doubt in the young man’s soul on the truth of the Bolshevik propaganda and the correctness of the country’s social development path chosen by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Obviously, these doubts had to be serious enough to induce a 20-year-old sergeant to desert after the end of the war, when the risk of death in combat had diminished significantly and the threat of being caught and punished “for treason” was enormous. Bronislav Boglachov’s testimony seems to us a mixture of real and fictional facts. Most likely, he was really influenced by conversations with his fellow peer sergeant Oleksander Zhuk (a native of Duplinka village, Yarun district of Zhytomyr oblast) (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 122), possibly had some conversations with representatives of the Ukrainian nationalist underground who used the pseudonyms “Dnipryanyi” and “Omelchenko-Zadorozhnyi”, and received anti-Soviet agitation literature from them. However, it is unlikely that he was tasked with creating the UNSWP in the Donbas and Slobozhanshchina. It is known that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) tried to spread its influence as far as possible in the East of Ukraine and were looking among the “easterners”. for personnel capable of working underground. However, these people usually received clear instructions, program documents, passwords, reporting links, and more (Pahiria & Ivanchenko, (2011). No such documents were extracted from the arrested B. Boglachov. Moreover, all the party documents found during the arrest by the MSS (including the UNSWP program) were written and produced by Boglachov himself or on his own initiative (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 124). It is obvious that, inspired by the active Ukrainian underground in Rivne region, fascinated by the ideas of the struggle against the Soviet authorities, for social and national justice, the young Luhansk citizen decided that he was able to replicate something similar on his native social ground, and felt that his mission was to get the working class of Donbas and Sloboda Ukraine to fight, based on the ideas of liberating the individual from the excessive pressure of the stalinist system.

The UNSWP program points to its clear social orientation, aimed at the needs of the population, first of all, of the part of Soviet Ukraine that had an experience of living in the Bolshevik state before 1939. This idea is suggested by the fact, that out of 16 points in the party program 9 bore a very social complexion that was important for the population of the eastern, central and southern parts of the then Ukrainian SSR (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 128–129). Referring to point №6 “collective farms liquidation”, point № 7 “transfer of land, livestock and agricultural equipment for free and irrevocable use to peasants”. For Western Ukraine in 1945 – 1947 these items were not relevant, as the collective farm system was not yet formed in the region, and the peasants maintained an individual household. Points №8 and №9, which demanded freedom of movement, free choice of place of work, eight-hour workday and benefits for workers in “harmful production”. The requirements were especially relevant for the industrial regions of the East and South of the Ukrainian SSR, where there was a large layer of the proletariat, “harmful production” and so forth. Point 10 and 11, provided for the establishment of private ownership of land,

agricultural implements and the right of private trade for agricultural products. Point. 14, demanded to improve the material life of citizens and to stop the export of all products. Ban on export that supported pro-Soviet regimes or promoted communist parties in Western Europe were a particularly symptomatic requirement taking into account famine in eastern, southern and central Ukraine in 1946 – 1947. According to point 15, East Ukrainian “National Socialists” wanted to see state control over prices “for the full provision of wage earners” An interesting item, that could only emerge in the Soviet reality, where life “on one pay check”, that is, without the ability to steal, earn “on the side income”, etc., was considered almost a curse. Point 16, was a requirement for 100% “provision of pensions for disabled workers and elderly workers” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 128–129). Such requirements are also relevant for industrial regions with a lot of people with disabilities sustained at work. Five program points (3rd, 4th, 5th, 13th and 12th) demanded the establishment of universal democratic freedoms: the elimination of existing legislation, the formation of a democratic government, the adoption of a new democratic constitution, the freedom of religion, the establishment of equality between nations that inhabit Ukraine (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 128–129). Such demand for national equality is especially discordant with the name of the party. And only the first two points of the program can be attributed to “national” requirements. Referring to “Ukraine secession from the USSR” and “establishing a free, independent Ukrainian state” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 128). It is interesting to note the regional specificity in the wording of requirements. OUN underground fought for the creation of a Ukrainian independent unified state both on lands that were within the Ukrainian SSR/USSR and beyond, on the other hand the author of the UNSWP program approached the idea differently. He, as a man formed in the Soviet system, saw the Ukrainian SSR as a formal state, but “not free and not independent”, so he wanted this Ukrainian SSR “state” to secede from the USSR and become a full-fledged member of the international community. While OUN was promoting the establishment of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council to undermine the legitimacy of the “fake state power” of the Ukrainian SSR as a representative of the Ukrainian people, B. Boglachov saw no problem in legitimizing the Ukrainian SSR as an independent Ukrainian state, “re-established” on the socially oriented democratic foundations. The UNSWP program clearly points to its left bias (like the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party in 1926 – 1948). Out of the six “party missions”, only one – gaining Ukraine’s independence had to fulfil a national task, the other five had socio-populist nature (to build a free, joyful and prosperous Ukraine; to develop industry at the level of leading Western powers; to raise Ukraine’s economic development above development of other countries of the world; completely and irrevocably eliminate the impoverished position of the people; carry on the struggle for raising the standard of living of the people regardless of the central government) (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 129–130). It should be emphasized, that this desire for independence from the union centre, or as stated in the Russian translation of the document from the “central districts”, is further evidence that the program of B. Boglachov’s party was made without the consent of the nationalist underground based in the western regions of Ukraine, since the rhetoric of “independence from the centre” was on everyone’s lips specifically in Soviet Ukraine during Ukrainization period.

Feeling the weakness of his position as a self-proclaimed party leader, Bronislav Boglachov tried hard to imitate the existence of a mythical “party centre” outside Donetsk-Sloboda region in front of his supporters. According to testimony at the inquiry, in May

1946 he, without waiting for liaison from the Central Committee of the UNSWP, went to Rivne himself to the well-known safe house. With the help of the hostess, he allegedly contacted Zadorozhnyi, who allegedly gave him party orders and 500 rubles in cash for underground work, emphasizing, that he can no longer help with anything because of the difficult financial situation of the organization (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 15). It is interesting to compare this amount with prices at that period. This amount corresponded to the average monthly salary of a worker. In 1947 employees of the gypsum plant received an average of 258 karbovantsiv (krb.), workers of a chemical factory – 307 krb., an asphalt and concrete plant – 802 krb. Food prices were as follows: a kilo of flour cost 6 to 9 krb. depending on the locality, a kilo of buckwheat – 10 to 15 krb., and potatoes – 3–4 krb/kg, milk – 2.5–3.5 krb/litre, sour cream 10–20 krb/litre, eggs – 7 – 11 krb. for a dozen. In addition to food, people also had to buy clothes and other things that were also not cheap. A modest men's suit, for example, cost an average of 300 krb. Almost as much as leather boots. Rubber shoes were sold for 43 – 45 krb. For women's woollen hat one would pay from 39 to 51 krb. For children's hat – 60–80 krb. Musical instruments were extremely expensive – button accordion cost 1425 krb., the piano accordion – 2810 krb. Sewing machines cost from 650 krb (hand operated) up to 1300 krb. (foot operated), bicycle “Riga” – nearly 650 krb., “FED-1” camera – 1100 krb. (Isaikina, (n. d.))

The further development of events indicates that B. Boglachov's trip to Rivne could be his imagination, necessary to elevate his status. After all, he did not bring any literature, no written documents, practically no money from the Central Committee. Moreover, B. Bolgachev told investigators that on the way to Rivne he was staying at his fellow soldier's Ivan Yermolenko (born in 1910), who lived in the village Zubari in Fastiv district of Kyiv region. Boglachov seemed to have offered him to join the UNSWP, and he promised to “give it a thought” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 122). So, it is quite possible that he did not reach Rivne at all, but after spending some time in the Kyiv region, he returned to Luhansk oblast, where he told the story of a trip to a meeting with the “representatives of the Central Committee”. Immediately after his return B. Boglachov began to “persuade” Anastasia Belasheva, the cashier of the mine “Kreminna-Skhidna” to steal 150 thousand rubles from the cash desk for the needs of the underground (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 16). The cashier's indecisiveness prompted the inventive B. Boglachov to stage his trip to Kyiv for the “UNSWP Congress” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 16) in front of her and another member of the underground, Semen Cholombitko. To this end, he “fabricated two letters on behalf of the UNSWP Secretary, one of which, in the name of Belasheva, proving the necessity, in the interests of the organization, to steal money, and the other – in the name of Cholombitko, reprimanding the latter for his indecisiveness and inaction” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 16).

The logical question arises: if Bronislav Ivanovych Boglachov-Stogneyev was an ordinary criminal scammer who, for his own profit, created a “fake” party by playing on other people's anti-Soviet feelings and using them “blindly”? In our view, this could only be the case if Soviet legislation at the time would have provided lesser punishment for creating an underground political structure than for criminal offenses. But in fact, at the time of B. Boglachov's activity (that is, from the time of his desertion from the army in November 1945 until his arrest in March 1947), the creation of a party whose program provided for the fight against the regime, Ukraine's exclusion from the USSR was qualified by the legislation as a “high treason”. And in the case of detention, the initiator and members of the underground

anti-Soviet organization were threatened with Article 54-1”a” of the existing Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which provided for the death penalty, which (after decree “On abolition of death penalty” was approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on May 26, 1947) was replaced by 25 years’ imprisonment in labour camps and restriction of civil rights for 5 years (Misinkevych, 2013). Similarly, the death penalty could also be provided for the theft in the especially large scale, according to the famous “Law of 5 Spikelets” (Postanovlenie, 1932). This law was abolished only on June 4, 1947 by the Decree “On Criminal Responsibility for Theft of State and Public Property”, which imposed punishment in the form of imprisonment in correctional labour camps for 10 – 25 years with property confiscation for theft in particularly large scale, carried out by a group of people (Ukaz, 1947). So, at the time of the arrest, masking criminal acts as a fight against the Stalinist regime could not give B. Boglachov any advantages. Moreover, his desertion from the military unit, already meant death penalty. Therefore, obviously only ideological motives could encourage B. Boglachov for such actions in the conditions of the end of active combat. So, in our opinion, the assumption that the UNSWP organizer only covered his criminal intent with a fictitious party is incorrect. Most likely, he really believed in the need to fight the communist regime for the social and national liberation of Ukraine, and the active anti-Soviet struggle he saw in the Rivne region, instilled his belief that he, too, was able to organize something similar in his own homeland. In order to increase the confidence of his followers, B. Boglachov used fictitious letters and documents of the UNSWP Central Committee and inspired in them a belief in the scale of the underground and its future success. His mother, Nadiya Boglachova, Mykola Vodolazkyi, Semen Cholombitko, Anastasia Belasheva, arrested together with B. Boglachov, confirmed that they knew about the existence of the party, read its program, had copies of party documents, provided their assistance to Bronislav Boglachov in his underground work (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 16–17), meaning, they did not see him as criminal-adventurer.

Investigators of the UNSWP, while verifying the evidence, found that Boglachov did serve in a tank unit in Rivne, and that sergeant Oleksander Zhuk had indeed deserted from this unit (254 tank regiment). However, at the time of reporting, on March 31, 1947, they did not find a safe house in Rivne, where Boglachev allegedly met with members of the UNSWP Central Committee and did not find the “party leaders” of Dnipryanyi and Zadorozhnyi (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 17).

It is difficult to say how successful B. Boglachov was in building a real anti-Soviet underground in Donbas and Sloboda Ukraine. During interrogations, he told investigators that “...“UNSWP” is built on the principle of independent “ triplets (troikas)” (Appendix A) and has, apparently, the regional, city and district committees of “UNSWP” (Appendix B) (with clearly defined responsibilities of local leaders (Appendix C). He also informed of his “appointment as the First Secretary of the Donetsk (Joint) Regional Committee”. (Appendix D), and that the recruitment of new party members is conducted and background checks on them are done through security commissions (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 14). The arrested also very openly stated that the goal of the party is “an armed struggle for creation of an independent and free Ukraine, involving broad masses of population, regardless of their nationality” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 15), that the UNSWP is a “well-organized, deep-cover underground structure”, that has existed since 1941 (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 121). All these statements are more like boasting of a person with some mental disorders, who himself believed in his own fantasies about “deep underground”,


“independent troikas”, “nationwide uprising” and “security commissions”, self-appointed (under the pseudonym “Dranyov Mykola Semenovych”) to be the Head of the Donetsk (Joint) Regional Committee of the UNSWP, made assignments for himself, issued party identification certificates (Appendix F, Appendix G). The real achievements of the national socialists in the “party building” were much more modest. MSS investigators suspected, that some attempts to create underground units in Zhytomyr region were made by a former sergeant O. Zhuk, in Kyiv region – by I. Yermolenko, former fellow soldier of Zhuk and Boglachov, in Kharkiv region – by Yakiv Chernyshenko, an accountant of the “East-Kreminna” mine, born in Izyum district of Kharkiv region, (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 122–123). In Luhansk region, all underground was reduced, in fact, to four acquaintances and relatives recruited by Boglachov (including his own mother) (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, pp. 12–13).

In an effort to “stifle” the UNSWP network in its infancy, the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR MSS ordered its regional offices in Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Kiyv to organize “deep development” of Zhuk, Yermolenko, and Chernyshenko with the help of an “experienced agents”; to study their life during the German occupation; check the availability of leaflets written in the context of the party program of the Ukrainian national socialists; to send “experienced operatives” to Izyum, Yarun and Fastiv districts and etc. (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 123).


According to the available documents, the case of the UNSWP “died” immediately after the arrest of B. Boglachov and his closest accomplices. The “guardianship” of the state security agencies over Soviet society was too dense to allow an extensive underground network to be born there. The Ukrainian National Socialist Workers’ Party repeated the fate of most underground groups that were formed in the Soviet part of Ukraine during the 1920s – 1930s – it was very quickly exposed, developed through the agency, and eliminated. However, the most important for us, is the fact of the UNSWP existence, which confirms the will of the citizens to resist the regime, to actively fight despite the threat of executions, huge prison terms, exile, etc.

**The Conclusions.** Summing up, it should be noted that the analysis of the program documents of the Ukrainian National Socialist Workers’ Party points to its “east Ukrainian” nature with an emphasis on solving socio-economic problems through the realization of the idea of separating Ukraine from the USSR. The founding documents of the UNSWP are an interesting source for studying the moods and aspirations of an anti-Soviet-minded part of the East Ukrainian population in the first years after World War II. The UNSWP should rightly be called a “one-man party”, since all available sources indicate that it was Bronislav Boglachev-Stogneyev who initiated, organized, and is the only real leader of the underground party. A person with a rich imagination, as we see, ambitious and fanatical B. Boglachov tried to show the scale of his creation, its influence and scope in all the documents he crafted (and even during the investigation). The persuasiveness of B. Boglachov’s words and his actions not only attracted supporters to his organization, but also influenced the MSS investigators, who took the “development” of the underground organization very seriously, realizing, obviously, that the ideas announced by “Ukrainian Nazis” could find a favourable ground in the society torn by war and Bolshevik regime.


**Appendix A.** Scheme of construction of the UNSWP based on the “principle of independent triplets (troikas)” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 30).




Appendix B. Scheme of “Structure of Donetsk Regional Party Organization” (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 29).




Appendix C. “Duties of the First Secretary of the Donetsk (Joint) Regional Committee”. Translated into Russian from the Ukrainian original (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 22).




Appendix D. "Notification to the First Secretary of the Donetsk (Joint) Regional Committee" on his appointment. Translated into Russian from the Ukrainian original (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 25).



Appendix F. Certificate of membership in the UNSWP, which B. Bogachov wrote to himself under the name "Dranyov Mykola Semenovich" (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 26).



Appendix G. Sample of the blank form of the UNSWP Central Committee with a seal (SSA SSU, f. 16, d. 1, c. 625, vol. 21, p. 27).



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