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LIES AND DECEPTION IN MODERN ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE: PRAGMATICS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY FOCUS

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Abstract: *This article considers verbal means involved in the acts of lie/deception unfolding in the diplomatic discourse during the meetings at the United Nation Security Council. The article discusses the phenomenon of lies as a part of diplomatic “power play” and suggests a logical model of lying as a systemic phenomenon pertaining to modeling alternative realities. Verbal means responsible for creating false states of affairs or conveying false information are analyzed in terms of their semantics and stylistic potential. The units under analysis function as the means of misleading, subterfuge, bluffing, and informational distortion.*

The primary objective of the analysis is reconstruction of liars’ pragmatics intentions. Further interpretation of the reconstructed pragmatic intentions is carried out within the framework of the theory of myth-oriented semiosis and M-logic methodology. The said intentions are treated as systemic factors correlating in hierarchical, causative and complementary dimensions and shaping respective informational interactions.

The article treats liars-diplomats as language personalities and expands their characteristics as discourse personalities (involved in professional discourse) and model language personalities (successful liars).

Keywords: *verbal means, lie/deception, pragmatics, system, English, diplomatic discourse*

Introduction

*‘An ambassador is an honest man sent
to lie abroad for the good of his country.’*

Sir Henry Wotton¹

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Present-day realia of the supposedly globalized world that is claimed to be moving towards a “better future” and riding on the principles of democracy, tolerance, openness and diversity, reveal a number of fundamental discrepancies resulting in continuous crises and conflicts. The need for effective dialogue in all spheres of human activities, primarily in international relations, has so far been declarative rather than instrumental. The sphere of diplomacy as well as agents involved in respective relations and discourse activities have traditionally been associated with deception, manipulations and power play: ‘*all usages of diplomacy and those who practice it have in common...a faint air of benign duplicity*’² while ‘*diplomacy does indeed face a crisis of trust and legitimacy*’³.

Though the bulk of discourse studies are vast and growing, there have been really few insights into the nature verbal means of deception contributing to the desired “grudging compromise” as a result of diplomatic intercourse. While quite a number of works have been dedicated to lies and deception (P. Ekman, 2010; Lykken, 1959; Gamer, 2011; B.M. DePaulo, 2003; Joshua D. Greene and Joseph M. Paxton, 2009; E. Debey, 2015; K. Suchotzki, 2017; etc), this behavior in diplomatic discourse has been granted relatively little attention (Kedar, 1987; Xin Bin, 1996; Wodak, 1989; Sharp, 2004; etc.).

Diplomatic discourse involves a profusion of subtleties and semiotic representations that do not necessarily comply with the “true” (at least accepted as true and empirically verified) states of affairs. In this regard we share the definitions of a lie as “... *a conscious distortion of the facts; deception – this is some half-truth, aimed at deceptive expectations, in deception there is no lie; falsehood – the involuntary factual falsity of the message*”⁴. It is also obvious that in the sphere of diplomacy that is an informational power-play substitute for contrary systems’ direct conflicts most of issues are resolved “beyond the closed doors”. In this regard discourse practices unfolding in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) appear to be the surface of an iceberg, thus identified as complex verbal power play involving demonstrations, declarations, persuasion, deception etc. This public diplomatic discourse results in adopting a collective solution in real time, justifies previously achieved agreements or

¹ Henry Wotton, (2021, December 26). *Wikipedia*. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Wotton

² R. Bereson, *Lying Abroad: A Critical Study of Cultural Diplomacy* (Vol. 2) [E-book]. College of Arts & Sciences: University at Buffalo, 2007.

³ T. Fletcher, *The Naked Diplomat: Understanding Power and Politics in the Digital Age* [E-book]. William Collins, 2017.

⁴ V. Kazmirenko, *Lies and Deception as a Means of Protecting Information which is Hidden*. *Legal Psychology*, 2(21), 20–29, 2017.

<http://elar.naiu.kiev.ua/bitstream/123456789/13757/1/4.pdf>

fails to do so when discourse interactions slip toward excessive arguments and verbal bickering.

Therefore, this article provides multiaspectual analysis of the UNSC's representatives' verbal intercourse involving lies and deceptions. The paper suggests interdisciplinary interpretations of the respective reconstructed pragmatic intentions and discusses certain features of diplomats as "language personalities" / "discourse personalities".

The choice of material

We have analyzed discourse excerpts retrieved from archive documents from UN Security Council meetings in 1994 (162), 2004 (216), and 2020 (49).

The said documents refer to a total of 427 meetings of UN Security Council diplomats, including 29 closed meetings, 5 duplicates and 2 records are missing.

Notes on Methodology

The primary analysis of discourse excerpts involved identification of potentially false information with the help of the Model Statement lie detection technique⁵. The said technique considers stylistic and compositional peculiarities of discourse. For instance, while truth tellers employ the strategy of "spilling the beans", liars prefer a "*keep it simple*" strategy and avoid mentioning incriminating details⁶⁷. Other markers of lies are within-statements inconsistencies⁸; they report more additional information after the initial free recall by truth-tellers and the lack of it in liars' responses who most likely stick to a previously construed story⁹ and avoid providing too many core details. Yet another surface-level signal of potential lies is the invention and persistent representation of "*counter-*

⁵ A. Vrij, *Verbal Deception and the Model Statement as a Lie Detection Tool*. Frontiers in Psychiatry. Forensic Psychiatry. Published.

<https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsy.2018.00492/full>

⁶ P.A. Granhag, M. Hartwig, *A new theoretical perspective on deception detection: on the psychology of instrumental mind-reading*. Psychol Crime Law (2008) 14:189–200. doi: 10.1080/10683160701645181

⁷ M. Hartwig, PA Granhag, T. Luke, *Strategic use of evidence during investigative interviews: the state of the science*. In: Raskin DC, Honts CR, and Kircher JC, editors. *Credibility Assessment: Scientific Research and Applications*. Amsterdam: Academic Press (2014). p. 1–36. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-394433-7.00001-4.

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ K. Colwell, C.K. Hiscock-Anisman, J. Fede, *Assessment criteria indicative of deception: an example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement*. In: Cooper BS, Griesel D, and Ternes M, editors. *Applied Issues in Investigative Interviewing, Eyewitness Memory, and Credibility Assessment*. New York, NY: Springer, 2013, p. 259–92. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5547-9_11

truths”¹⁰ via diverse language means like repetitive designation of a key (fake) concept, speech rate (involving pauses and hesitations), individual word length, and the number of words from certain grammatical categories such nouns and verbs etc. (e.g., Burgoon & Qin, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006).

The secondary analysis involves the reconstruction of speakers’ pragmatic intentions, their inventorying and interpretation. Reconstruction of liars’ pragmatics is carried out within the notional framework of J. Austin’s theory as we focus on contradictions between the semantics of the message and the specific senses it causes in regard to social and political contexts, realia and states of affairs in a familiar “world” or “worldview”. Diplomatic illocutionary acts providing false information are then characterized through the prism of assumptions suggested by Searle (1975a) and A. Wierzbicka (1983, 1987).

The deep analysis targets the reconstructed pragmatic intentions and provides respective interpretations in regard to a number of universalia pertaining to open systems’ functioning. The said interpretations are carried out on the basis of the previously introduced theory of myth-oriented semiosis and the methodology of M-logic¹¹ which are applied to the mechanisms of modeling diverse alternative realities¹², including fake ones.

Lies and deceptive / misleading illocutionary acts are associated with the creation of secondary myths that appear to be operational simulacra which enforce fake states of affairs and their transformations upon the participants of diplomatic discourse as well as the inferential conceptual construals generated in respective discourse space.

We employ the 7-level model of an open system’s hierarchical plane (Figure 1) for multi-vectored integrative interpretations of speakers’ pragmatics.

¹⁰ A. Grunenber, *How to rethink Ardent’s reflections about lying in the political realm*. Russian Sociological Review, 17, 37–46, 2018.

<https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/lying-and-politics-how-to-rethink-arentd-s-reflections-about-lying-in-the-political-realm/viewer>

¹¹ Oleksandr Kolesnyk, *Cognitive premises of the myth-oriented semiosis* *Cognitive Studies | Études cognitives – #19. – 2019*. Warszawa : Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences URL: <https://ispan.waw.pl/journals/index.php/cs-ec/issue/view/112/showToc> (Scopus, ERihplus)

¹² Oleksandr Kolesnyk, *The Mythic Multiverse Through the Scope of Language: The “Procedural Anatomy” of Verbal Modelling* // *Cognitive Studies | Études cognitive* 21, 2021, Article 2447. <https://ispan.waw.pl/journals/index.php/cs-ec/article/view/cs.2447>

7. "Noo-spheric"
6. "Axiological"
5. "Communicative"
4. "Social-adaptive"
3. "Mental"
2. "Psycho-emotional"
1. "Physical-physiological"




Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of an open system

This model reflects a system's features and parameters in auto-focus (levels 1 - 3), in inter-systemic relations (levels 5-7), and in a transitional state (level 4). An open system's components as well as hierarchically correlated phenomena engage in the following systemic relations:

1. progressive-modificational (from level 1 to level 7);
2. determinative-regulative (from level 7 to level 1, each hierarchically higher level (subsystem) being a governing operator for the hierarchically lower one);
3. symmetric determinative-causative as in correlations of level 7 → level 1 (an "input program" attracts adequate material resources), level 6 → level 2 (axiological navigational coordinates trigger comfortable "emotional" states of a system), level 5 → level 3 (the peculiarities of inter-systemic relations determine the "mental" activities of each participant), while level 4 represents a transitional plane of an otherwise complete system¹³.

The model provides generalized framework for interpreting verbal phenomena, reconstructed pragmatics of discourse acts and the typological features of lying diplomats as "discourse personalities".

¹³ Oleksandr Kolesnyk, *The Mythic Multiverse Through the Scope of Language: The "Procedural Anatomy" of Verbal Modelling // Cognitive Studies | Études cognitive* 21, 2021, Article 2447. <https://ispan.waw.pl/journals/index.php/cs-ec/article/view/cs.2447>

Discussion. Basic notions and definitions. Lies and Deception.

Considering the nature of diplomatic discourse (at least in the traditional sense) and the scale of respective inter-systemic relations it would seem irrelevant to speak of lies as a productive “direct speech act”. Lying as “deliberately telling someone something that is not true”¹⁴ is a verbal explication of states of affairs that does not match the empirically verified one. Blunt as it is, in present day political “powerplay” it is employed by the “political bullies” for the sake of its sheer impropriety and absurdity that render their opponents short of means of immediate response.

On the other hand, deception as “the act of hiding the truth, especially to achieve an advantage”, “dishonest or illegal methods that are used to get something, or to make people believe that something is true when it is not”¹⁵ or “persuading someone that something false is the truth”¹⁶. Thus, deception appears to be more “strategic” or purposeful and is more likely to be expected in the traditional diplomatic discourse and is verbally manifested by a number of diverse speech acts and genres.

However, lies and deception complement each other as they both create simulacra shaping a “hyperreality that is perpendicular to the world we truly live in”¹⁷. We speak of “secondary mythology” as basis for verbally construed an alternative reality which could be entirely false depending on the key concepts embedded in its conceptual matrix. In this context we regard diplomatic discourse as a “procedural space” where secondary myths clash and generate further variants of reality where truth is replaced “...with an image of truth. The image still refers to the original, but it reflects reality in a very accidental way. It rather belongs to political propaganda”¹⁸.

As the logical premises of lying and deception are discussed¹⁹;²⁰. The formal-logical characterization of lies, deception, and associated notions²¹,

¹⁴ Longman. (2020). lie. In Longman dictionary.
<https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/lie>

¹⁵ Cambridge. (2020). deception. In Cambridge online dictionary.
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deception>

¹⁶ Cambridge. (2020). deception. In Cambridge online dictionary.
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deception>

¹⁷ D. Kellner, (2006). *Jean Baudrillard After Modernity*. International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 3. <https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/jean-baudrillard-after-modernity/>

¹⁸ H. Ardent, *The origins of totalitarianism*. Mariner Books, 1973.

¹⁹ Y. Wang, J. Eijck, & van H. Ditmarsch, (2011), *On the logic of lying*. Researchgate.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/47757658_On_the_Logic_of_Lying

²⁰ T. Heidenreich, (2013). *The formal-logical characterisation of lies, deception, and associated notions*. Researchgate.

we suggest the following notation of verbal LYING / DECEPTION in regard to the myth-oriented categorizational patterns.

- (1) In $WV(M)$ $(a;b;c;d)$; $WV(R)$ $(a';b';c';d')$
- (2) $D \{SCEN_n X (a^n;b^n;c^n;d^n) ; P (a^n;b^n;c^n;d^n)\}$
- (3) if $a^n \varepsilon a, a'; b^n \varepsilon b, b'; c^n \varepsilon c, c'; d^n \varepsilon d, d'$
- (4) then $D \Leftrightarrow \top$; $WV(M)$ trans $WV(M)_{n+1}$; $WV(R)$ trans $WV(R)_{n'+1}$
- (5) else $D \Leftrightarrow \perp$; $WV(M)$ trans $WV(M)_{n-1}$; $WV(R)$ trans $WV(R)_{n'-1}$
- (6) elif $a^n \Delta \varepsilon a, a'; b^n \Delta \varepsilon b, b'; c^n \Delta \varepsilon c, c'; d^n \Delta \varepsilon d, d'$
- (7) then $D \Leftrightarrow \Delta \top$; $WV(M)$ trans $WV(M) \Delta n$; $WV(R)$ trans $WV(R) \Delta n'$

which reads: (1) in a mythic world $WV(M)$ characterized by ontological (a), functional (b) axiological (c) and temporal-locative parameters (d) or in a real world $WV(R)$ marked by corresponding parameters $(a';b';c';d')$; (2) there occurs a statement (D) about a certain (n) scenario (SCEN) involving an object (X) or a person (P) characterized by respective features $(a^n;b^n;c^n;d^n)$ manifested to the degree / in the discourse-triggered mode of (n); (3) if verbally represented features $(a^n;b^n;c^n;d^n)$ demonstrate similarity to corresponding features of either real or mythic reality; (4) the statement (D) is considered true and the respective reality transforms along the $(n+1)$ or $(n'+1)$ vector; (5) if the verbalized features $(a^n;b^n;c^n;d^n)$ do not correlate to the features of either reality, the statement (D) becomes false and the respective reality transforms along the $(n-1)$ or $(n'-1)$ vector; (6) in case of partial or variable correspondence ($\Delta \varepsilon$) between the said sets of features determined by different vantage points of interpretation and experience; (7) the statement (D) becomes conditionally (quasi) true or is recognized as true though being false, while either reality transforms along an infinite number of possible vectors. As diplomatic discourse pursues compromise and involves diverse worldviews (and inchoative myths) the perception and identification of lies / deception may differ up to the point of ignoring or disregarding them.

It is the sets of verbal means creating a plausible simulacrum (a contextually relevant mythic operator) and providing ($\Delta \varepsilon$) that allow verbal manipulations and deception to function effectively within diverse discourse interactions: when a deception is successful or in a case when it

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311969457_The_formal-logical_characterisation_of_lies_deception_and_associated_notions

²¹ T. Heidenreich, (2013), *The formal-logical characterisation of lies, deception, and associated notions*. Researchgate.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311969457_The_formal-logical_characterisation_of_lies_deception_and_associated_notions

is diagnosed yet remains “unrecognized” and accepted as a part of mutually beneficial compromise.

Liar as a “discourse personality”.

We treat diplomats engaged in discourse interactions and generating false statements from the standpoint of the “language personality” theory. According to Karaulov Yu.N.²², a language user is identified as a structured set of generalized features: its first level is *“verbal-semantic, assuming standard natural language understanding for a native speaker...”* The second level is *“cognitive, the units of which are concepts, ideas, concepts that build an organized” image of the world in each linguistic individual...”* The third is *pragmatic, which involves recognizing and defining the motivations and goals that drive the formation of a language personality*²³.

A language personality involved in communicative activities and repeatedly exercising discourse genres of a certain type (primarily, professionally related) could be identified as a discourse personality. In this case all three planes of a language personality acquire properties of certain “profiles” as a person’s qualities are “configured and boosted” according to the purposes and conventions of specific intercourse. Depending on the productivity and success of professional activities (achieved perlocutionary effects) a discourse personality could be regarded as a “model” one.

Each of the discourse personality’s planes can be detailed in terms of the hierarchy of their components as Figure 1 suggests. Primarily, respective sets of a diplomat’s pragmatic incentives might be identified as: successful completion of immediate missions, delivery of speeches, introducing initiatives, supporting partners or denying opponents etc. (level 1), providing positive emotional state for oneself, teammates and partners as well as causing opponents’ emotional imbalance and discomfort (level 2), successful modeling of multi-level operations and large-scale verbal construals (level 3), securing one’s position, status and recognition within the professional group (level 4), building effective partnership within blocks and coalitions (level 5), representing the interests of one’s country and promoting national values (level 6), securing planetary safety (level 7). In a bizarre way, the same logic applies to the pragmatics of lies / deception.

In our analysis we tackled speech acts of discourse personalities representing radically diverse (contrarily configured) civilizations who

²² Y. Karaulov, *Russian linguistic personality and tasks of its study*. Nauka, 1989, 3–8.

²³ Ibidem.

attend the SC meetings: Mr. Nebenzya (Russia), Mr. Haitao (China), Ms. Pierce (Great Britain), Mr. Turk (Slovenia), and Mr. Jaafari (Syria). The said diplomats demonstrated differences at verbal-semantic and cognitive level (Table 1).

Table 1
Verbal-semantic and cognitive levels of diplomats as discourse personalities

Name / Country	Verbal-semantic characteristics (linguistic competence)	Cognitive level (dominant conceptual domains involved in discourse)
Ms. Pierce (Great Britain)	English	Peace, war
Mr. Haitao (China)	Chinese	Assault, crisis
Mr. Turk (Slovenia)	English	Peace, war, genocide, terrorists
Mr. Jaafari (Syria)	Arabic	War, lie, self-defense
Mr. Nebenzya (Russia)	Russian	War, terrorists
Mr. Yaacobi (Israel)	Not mentioned	Terrorists, faith

As linguistic competence dictates the use of translation and hinders effective lying, the choice of topics and dominant notions around which the speakers structure their discourse also signal of potential deceptions and manipulations.

The following linguistic markers have been considered for identifying discourse acts as representations of false information as well as speakers as “model liars”:

- **rhetorical questions:** (1) *Is it possible to occupy one's own territory?*²⁴. The following question appears to contain an element of camouflaged accusation as it is impossible to invade one's own territory. In this case, this rhetorical question as a “mild deception” aims at misleading and ridiculing the opponent. (2) *But can we believe in its innocence? Can we agree that all of these crimes should simply be disregarded because of an unprecedented media campaign to absolve the assassins and assign them the hero's role?*²⁵ is another case of camouflaged accusation combined of having pretense good intentions. Here Mr. Bicamumpaka from Rwanda (A) accuses the Rwandese Patriotic Front (B) of pretending that they were an innocent organization that had nothing to do in the respective conflict.

²⁴ The situation in Georgia, (1994, March 9). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3346>

²⁵ The situation concerning Rwanda.(1994, March 16). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3377>

• **synecdoche** cases: (1) *We, the Israeli people, have faced decades of violence by fanatic Palestinians and others*²⁶. Both metonymic designations are used in a speech act that comprises elements of declaration and explanation to represent two conflicting sides while the Israelis (A) are introduced as targets / victims whereas the Palestians (B) are marked as aggressors.

(2) *The Rwandese Patriotic Front, the political organ of the invaders, showed its true colours. It wanted power during the transitional period, and at any price*²⁷. The *Rwandese Patriotic Front* as a metonymic logical subject is ascribed a number of negative features (“invaders”, “power-thirsty”) that are projected onto the whole other side of the conflict.

• **Clarifications:** (1) *All this shows that UNITA’s alleged willingness to seek a peaceful, negotiated outcome of the Angolan conflict and the so-called unilateral cease-fire it announced last September are merely intended to conceal its militaristic purposes and to avoid the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council*²⁸. In this statement several assertive or declarative descriptors function as components of argumentation that creates a picture of UNITA is not an untrustworthy organization.

(2) *Those who voted for the designation of Gorazde as a safe area cannot now avoid the moral, legal and practical burden that they bear for the lives of those 70,000 individuals*²⁹. Accentuating designations are a part of “light deception” as this statement is an unintentional reference to an error rather than a part of manipulation.

• **hyperboles:** (1) *While Gorazde has been turned into a slaughterhouse, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a graveyard, unfortunately this most noble of institutions has been usurped into a Chamber of false promises and rationalizations for inaction ...*³⁰ These hyperbolic designations provide a contrasting

²⁶ The situation in the occupied Arab territories. (1994a, February 28). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 12, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3340>

²⁷ The situation concerning Rwanda.(1994, March 16). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3377>

²⁸ The situation in Angola. (1994, March 16).The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved March 20, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3350>

²⁹ The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994, April 21). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3367>

³⁰ The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994, April 21). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3367>

background for implicit accusations of UNSC's passive reaction and non-interference in the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(2) *As to the previous speaker's statement, I would like to emphasize that it is a disgrace that he is still sitting behind the Syrian nameplate and telling us shamelessly that **millions of Syrians, including the newly uprooted 560,000 children, are terrorists***³¹. The hyperbolic numbers and a generalization are a part of slandering tactics used to attack the opponent during the UNSC's meeting.

• **irony:** (1) *Six cities and towns have been declared "**safe areas**", but more communities are under siege and threatened*³². The ironic effect, triggered by the use of "safe areas" is actually rather grim as these turned out to be locations of massive massacres perpetrated by Serbs against the Bosnian people. We can identify this statement as a camouflaged accusation of the SC members, that due to their resolution which declared this area as safe, six cities and towns were under siege and threatened, thus they were not safe.

(2) *Surviving foreign terrorist fighters will be called "moderate armed opposition" of a third or fourth country – because their masters invest in terrorism*³³. The ironic designation of the Turkish military as "moderate armed opposition" provides insinuation of Turkey's intentions of occupying Syria and SC's error about assigning them the role of peacekeepers.

• **allusion:** (1) *While we can understand the position of **certain States – even of those that voted in favour of the resolution, sponsored it or spoke honestly in the informal consultations – we shall overlook those that support injustice** simply in order to join the ranks of the quartet of tyranny*³⁴. A direct allusion without providing evidence is a case of slander which nonetheless incepts a simulacrum into the "collective mind" of the council and impacts decision making. As this tactics is impactful, it triggers a response that reinforces the fact that the statement above is false: *"I had not intended to speak further until, unfortunately, the representative of the Sudan strayed from the point of our deliberations and launched what we would consider to be an unseemly and uncalled-for attack on the United States"*³⁵.

³¹ The situation in the Middle East. (2020f, February 28). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8738>

³² Resumption 1. (1994, February 14). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved July 05, 2021, from [https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3336%20\(Resumption%201\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3336%20(Resumption%201))

³³ The situation in the Middle East. (2020c, January 29). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved February 7, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8708>

³⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. (2004, September 18). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.5040>

³⁵ Ibidem.

(2) *The information I referred to was not written at **Sixty-seventh Street – where the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations is located** – it is information we received today after the situation had been clarified*³⁶. In this statement Mr. Nebenzia referred to certain nonexistent “official documents” making a futile attempt of justifying previous lies with yet another bluff (a case of outright lying).

Constructions and figures of speech as featured above involve both direct designations as well as a number of semantic transformations based on “inverted propositions”. The latter are responsible for a number of perlocutionary effects that could either conceal information successfully or trigger an aggressive response thus destroying “the dialogue”.

Lies and deception in different genres of diplomatic discourse

Discourse activities that take place in SC during discussions can introduce false information, disclose it and deviate towards accusations and allegations, shift a discussion towards different or personal topics, turn into “empty” declarations etc. The whole body of diplomatic discourse is segmented into topically relevant discourse genres. Let us consider several cases of verbally explicated lies / deception.

(1) *To avoid bloodshed, we sat down at the negotiating table, to which the people who had unleashed this war - in fact, rebels - were also invited* (President Shevardnadze (Georgia), meeting 3346, interpretation from Russian)³⁷.

This **statement** that features elements of **declaration**, **argumentation** and **explanation**, appears to represent a “mild deception” as it aims at shifting responsibility for a military conflict and creating a secondary myth structured around the image of a peace-minded reasonable subject (A), ready for compromise with the villain (B) in order to pursue greater good. In this case the following set of pragmatic intentions are involved:

(level 1) to explicate an obvious and expected reason of actions (*To avoid bloodshed*);

(level 2) to allude at A’s attempts of easing the tension and de-escalating the situation (*negotiating table*);

(level 3) to present a logical explanation of legally correct actions undertaken by A and reinforce the idea of the opponents’ (B’s) responsibility for violence and disorder (*people who had unleashed this*

³⁶ Ukraine, (2020, January 18), *The Security Council Meetings*. Retrieved August 24, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8726>

³⁷ The situation in Georgia, (1994, March 9). *The Security Council Meetings*. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3346>

war) as well as trigger a bunch of negative connotations by the direct qualifying designation (*rebels*); the said ideas are reinforced by direct accusations of B's treason and hostility (*It [the conflict in Abkhazia] was then fuelled from outside by weapons, finances, personnel, information and propaganda, and was used by political groups and clans for their own selfish political and other objectives, in order to achieve political and material benefits both within the Republic and beyond its borders*) as well as B's operating outside of legal framework (*It is hard to speak about legality and law with those who violate them*), while A's good will is provided extra emphasis implying the set of level 1 and level 2 incentives (*but we engaged in dialogue and concluded agreements simply in order to halt the war and the bloodshed*);

(level 4) to create a general impression of A's legitimacy and "fitting" the standards of the international community, SC in particular;

(level 5) to imply A's ability of cooperating and conducting dialogue even with the opponent (*rebels - were also invited.*) that determines the course of actions explicated at level 3;

(level 6) to stress A's adherence to the universal values of peace, open-mindedness and dialogue thus alluding to A's role of "climate changer" explicated at level 2;

(level 7) to represent A as a reliable, sustainable and benevolent system at the global scale which is certain to follow protocols as suggested at level 1.

(2) *We, the Israeli people, have faced decades of violence by fanatic Palestinians and others. We have mourned hundreds of Israelis killed in terrorist acts* (Mr. Jacobi's speech (Israel), meeting 3340)³⁸.

This **statement** that features elements of **declaration** and **explanation**, appears to represent a "mild deception" as it aims at shifting responsibility for an attack of terrorists from Israelis to Palestinians. Thus, here is a secondary myth structured around the image of a harmed Jewish nation (A), and the cruel murderers (Palestinians, B) representing A solely as victims. In this case the following set of pragmatic intentions are involved:

(level 1) to convince the society and all diplomats that the Israelis are good innocent people that have been suffering from violence for a long time (*We have faced decades of violence*);

(level 2) to demonstrate an attempt of A to label B as terrorists and murders (*have faced decades of violence by fanatic Palestinians and others. We have mourned hundreds of Israelis killed*);

³⁸ The situation in the occupied Arab territories. (1994a, February 28). The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 12, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3340>

(level 3) to stress that the Palestians (B) are not just terrorists that are dangerous for the Israeli people(A), but they are dangerous people for everyone because you never know what is in their mind (*fanatic Palestians*). Here we can also find lots of negative connotations towards the Palestians (*violence by fanatic Palestians; killed in terrorist acts*) that should reject the Palestians from the rest of society. While A's impression as a victim will be increasing with the help of extra emphasis of level 1 and level 2;

(level 4) to create a general impression of A's peaceful intentions toward the whole world in general, and SC in particular;

(level 5) to imply A's ability of cooperating, but only if B has an intention of stopping their violence towards A that determines the course of actions explicated at level 3;

(level 6) to stress A's behaviour as peace-makers and basically peaceful nation that supports international set of values;

(level 7) to represent A as a reliable, sustainable and benevolent country at the international arena.

(3) *Everybody came together in saying: long live peace in Rwanda. But alas, how disappointed we were when the moment came to implement the Accords, which had been negotiated with such difficulty. The Rwandese Patriotic Front, the political organ of the invaders, showed its true colors. It wanted power during the transitional period, and at any price (Mr. Bikamumpaki's speech (Rwanda) interpretation from French, meeting 3377)*³⁹.

This **statement** that features elements of **declaration**, **explanation**, revelation tends to represent a "mild deception" as it aims at showing the real face of the Rwandese Patriotic Front(B) that wants to wipe out from the Earth Rwandese (A) in order to save their power. In this case the following set of pragmatic intentions are involved:

(level 1) to explicate an obvious and expected reason of actions (*It (the Rwandese Patriotic Front) wanted power during the transitional period, and at any price*);

(level 2) to allude at SC's attempts together diplomats, members of different countries and invited guests in order to ease the tension and de-escalate the situation (*Everybody came together in saying: long live peace in Rwanda*);

(level 3) to explain a development of B's intentions no matter what, that at first there was a possibility to solve this situation in a positive way (*how disappointed we were when the moment came to implement the*

³⁹ The situation concerning Rwanda, (1994, March 16), The Security Council Meetings. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from <https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3377>.

Accords, which had been negotiated with such difficulty), but at the last moment they backed off, that all this time they were just pretending (*The Rwandese Patriotic Front, the political organ of the invaders, showed its true colors*); the said ideas are reinforced by direct accusations of B's deception and hidden motivation of power preservation (...*showed its true colors. It wanted power during the transitional period*); while A are good and they had the most peaceful intentions and expectations in finishing this conflict (*how disappointed we were when the moment came to implement the Accords, which had been negotiated with such difficulty*);

(level 4) to create a general impression of A as a peaceful country that completely supports peaceful intentions toward the whole world in general, and UNSC in particular;

(level 5) to imply A's ability of cooperating and conducting dialogue even with B (*came to implement the Accords, which had been negotiated with such difficulty*);

(level 6) to stress A's adherence to the currently glorified universal values of peace, open-mindedness and dialogue;

(level 7) to represent A as a reliable, sustainable and benevolent system at the global scale which is certain to follow protocols as suggested at level 1.

Any diplomat at some point of their career indulges in verbal activities that are identified as lies / deception. Diplomats involved in UNSC intercourse operate within a relatively limited number of conceptual domains and respective scenarios (those involving war, terrorism, assaults, peace, security, lying etc.) and basically reshuffle numerous verbalizations of several focal concepts. As a system "built to lie", a diplomat appears to be a "fractal avatar" of the over-system's pragmatic matrix as well as a "fractal container" of sub-systemic instrumental incentives. In each specific case of discourse interaction their pragmatics (levels 1 through 7) is "tweaked" and finalized by micro and macro settings.

Micro settings (sub-systemic plane, levels 1 through 3) are related to characteristics of a diplomat as a "language personality" (a certain conflux of mental-cognitive, language-competential and discourse-pragmatic features) and are responsible for successful deceptive / counter-deceptive activities. While a language personality exercising a certain type of discourse as part of professional responsibilities could be described as a "discourse personality", a successful diplomat (a successful liar in particular) is best described as a model personality.

Macro settings (over-systemic plane projected onto system's levels 5 through 7) that impact the potential liars' pragmatics are dictated by general agenda pursued by a diplomat's country or a certain alliance. For instance, Russia (Mr. Nebenzya) is a member of the CSTO and the SCO,

China (Mr. Haitao) represents the SCO, Britain (Ms. Pierce) from NATO, Slovenia (Mr. Turk) represents the EU, Syria (Mr. Jaafari) is the representative of the League of Arab States. As a result, three groups of interests may be distinguished: 1) the CSTO and the SCO, 2) NATO and the EU, and 3) the League of Arab States. The first two alliances are the opponents, and they are usually deceptive. The third group is often presented as a victim, whereas the first two debate and lie, blaming each other of concealing the truth.

Fundamental discrepancies between “explicit” (declared) and “functional” (pursued) pragmatics that actually constitute the essence of lies / deception in diplomatic discourse are determined by several universal systemic laws and algorithms. Primarily, any system operates within its etiological framework, is regulated by an oversystem’s program and follows its own exclusive optimal vector of development. For instance, a system construed as a “dominator / consumer” and historically manifested as an empire / super-state characterized by specific worldview and inchoative mythology (level 7) claiming to fit a balanced inter-systemic cluster (an ideal world as outlined by the UN principles) still pursues its own aggressive agenda and does not comply with the cluster’s configuration thus making the whole “collective cooperation” concept a lie. Following the logic of symmetric causation, any specific statement (declaring a country’s good will, accusing somebody else of aggression, justifying one’s action, i.e., a level 1 micro manifestation) is impacted by the level 7 informational structure and contains false information.

The same system is directed by a set of values (most likely, those of totalitarian, expansionist or extreme religious nature) that make the system’s orientation contrary to that of the cluster’s other members (level 6 discrepancies). Therefore, hidden contrary values dictate verbal lies / deception at level 2 of discourse activity: declarations of striving to ease tension, provide positive climate for dialogue are most likely false as the system in fact operates on the values of power / fear / domination and contributes from chaos and panic.

Furthermore, at level 5 this system shapes and enters alliances based on the level-6 values, reasons of profit and own security. These are not necessarily the same as officially declared during the UNSC meetings. Respectively, at level 3 a number of verbal rationalizations, false evidence, fake informational input and logical speculations are provided to create an illusion of “conceptual accord”.

The said macro-settings are generically enrooted in national and derivative secondary mythology, incorporated into irrational categorization practices, exercised by “avatar” discourse personalities and imposed upon other participants of discourse interactions.

Finally, at level 4 a system configured by both micro- and macro-settings actually participates in a scenario of a UNSC meeting and is involved in respective communicative scenarios in the “here-and-now” mode, delivering prepared speeches and situational responses containing false information.

Apart from the symmetric causality, a system’s configuration and verbal activity are determined by the law of polarity (natural ontological duality, “lies within the truth” and co-existence of contrarily configured systems), the law of alternative development (bifurcations in the choice of orientation as well as the choice of discourse tools of deception), algorithms of synergy (analogy and resonance employed in the choice of allies as well as the use of stylistic and rhetoric means for effective lying). As all systems operate on the same premises, counterparts are capable of diagnosing lies / deception. Driven by the law of duality (dialectic unity) they recognize their counterpart’s inherent presence and might choose not to expose the lies. While all participants coexist in the mode of silent recognition where every subject is capable of lying, compromise and surface unity is possible. The moment this balance is broken, diplomatic discourse loses its fluidity and turns into a verbal conflict.

Conclusions

As diplomatic communication in general aims at protecting national interests in the international arena, it also pursues the objectives of establishing and maintaining contacts between countries, providing solutions to controversial issues, interacting with the public opinion, justifying governments’ actions and activities. Discourse activities unfolding at the UNSC meetings are expected to facilitate solutions to the sensitive issues that could result into conflicts or provide reactions to the current military conflicts. In the said activities the subjects of discussions indulge in diverse verbal practices that, apart from the indicated primary objectives, conceal, distort or transform information.

Though participants of diplomatic discourse interactions are aware of potential deception, the dialogue never stops for the sake of compromise. Pragmatics of deception is determined by universal laws of systems’ functioning and is fueled by super-systemic irrational axiomatic operators that shape the worldview of the collective mind represented by liar-diplomats. Sets of pragmatic intentions that stimulate misleading speech constructions follow the logic of direct hierarchical determinism (concepts and stimuli of upper levels provide programs for units of lower levels), causative symmetry (concepts and stimuli from the macro plane impact those of the micro one), hierarchical structural complementation (concepts and stimuli from the lower levels function as bases for those of the upper

levels), fractality (worldview and pragmatics of a liar-diplomat duplicate those of their over-system).

We identify a lie / deception as a deliberate act of verbal modeling an alternative variant of reality on the basis of an inchoative irrational conceptual structure (secondary myth that sets up the trajectory of “irrational-rationalized” categorization of the world). Language means involved in creating a deviant reality represent a shifted vantage point, accentuate, modify, shade or “delete” sets of features of designated objects, phenomena and processes / events. Illocutionary potential and stylistic-rhetoric effects of the language units and structures used in discourse genres like declarations, requests, warnings, apologies, complains, discussion, agreement etc. is determined by propositional inversions and juxtapositions within their inner form.

Further analysis may target semiotic characteristics of language means creating fake realities in political discourse.

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