

**Strategies for sustainable
socio-economic development
and mechanisms their
implementation in the global
dimension**

**Collective monograph edited by
M. Bezpartochnyi**

VUZF University of Finance, Business and
Entrepreneurship (Sofia, Bulgaria) 2020

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Strategies for sustainable socio-economic development and mechanisms their implementation in the global dimension: collective monograph / edited by M. Bezpartochnyi, in 3 Vol. // VUZF University of Finance, Business and Entrepreneurship. – Sofia: VUZF Publishing House “St. Grigorii Bogoslov”, 2020. – Vol. 3. – 355 p.

The authors of the book have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to effectively use modern approaches to developing and implementation strategies of sustainable socio-economic development in order to increase efficiency and competitiveness of economic entities. Basic research focuses on analysis of formation and development of entrepreneurial activity, logistics management, environmental and economic management of the enterprise, formation of competitive advantages, study the nature of digitalization. The research results have been implemented in the different models and strategies of economic development of the national and world economy, improving the strategic management system, development labor potential, the public finance system, managing the enterprise's competitive behavior, social and digital marketing, improving the educational process. The results of the study can be used in decision-making at the level the economic entities in different areas of activity and organizational-legal forms of ownership, ministries and departments that promote of development the economic entities on the basis of models and strategies for sustainable socio-economic development. The results can also be used by students and young scientists in modern concepts and mechanisms for management of sustainable socio-economic development of economic entities in the condition of global economic transformations and challenges.

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ISBN 978-954-8590-64-8

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Sedliar Yuliia

Doctor of Political Science, Associate Professor

V.O. Sukhomlynsky National University of Mykolayiv

Stadnichenko Olga

Ph.D. in Politics, Associate Professor

Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University (Mykolayiv, Kyiv, Ukraine)

**INSTRUMENTS AND
COMMUNICATION
STRATEGIES OF
FOREIGN POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY**

For the past twenty five years non-military influence (economic sanctions and soft power) acquired growing prominence in foreign policy of the great powers. The US, the EU, China and Japan employ non-military tools in responding to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises that threaten their security. Non-military instruments these are means of great powers by which they seek to influence the behavior of

target states, to demonstrate leadership, to resolve international conflict and to express common values. The growing centrality of non-military instruments is partially a reaction to the limits of military power exposed during difficult and protracted operations inside the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Moreover, military interventions in the postbipolar international relations are difficult to justify. Without any challenger on the horizon, it is highly unclear what constitutes a threat to national security that needs to be addressed with military force together with its inherent sacrifices in life and expenditure. Above all, because economic rather than military strength is increasingly seen by states as the prime determinant of international power, non-military tools may begin to assume an even more prominent role.

Notwithstanding the fact that the debate on the nature of economic sanctions has been in existence for five decades, the investigation on their efficacy has not yielded satisfactory results. Scientists in the West have long argued that there is no automatic link between the effectiveness of economic sanctions in inflicting economic pain and in compelling policy changes in the target. D. Drezner, B. de Neuilly, C. Portela, emphasize that sanctions regimes with a remarkable economic impact have failed to induce changes in the conduct of target non-democratic states. D. Drezner, conversely, stresses that mere threat of economic sanctions has sometimes succeeded in bringing about the desired policy change [Drezner, 1999]. Ukrainian scientists S. Galaka [Galaka, 2003], V. Pahil [Pahil, 2000], and S. Romanenko [Romanenko, 2001] are strong supporters of this wide-spread concept. Works by contemporary researchers on issues related to the economic sanctions and financial statecraft, among whom are Margaret Doxy [Doxy, 1971], Richard N. Haass [Haass, 1998], Zachary Selden [Selden, 1999], Brendan Taylor [Taylor, 2010], play an important role in understanding the nature of economic coercion in foreign policy making, but they say a very little on how to estimate the economic sanctions effectiveness. Thus, the determinants for the success and failure of economic sanctions have not been ascertained. The inherent difficulty of the task has been further compounded by a transformation of the instrument itself in the contemporary system of international relations. Soft power has become part of popular political discourse since it was coined by Harvard's Joseph Nye in his 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, strengthened by his *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, and further elaborated in *The Powers To*

Lead (Nye, 2004), in *Soft Power and US foreign policy* by M.Cox, (Cox, 2010).

The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature of non-military instruments (economic sanctions, soft power and communication strategies) of foreign policy within the international relations theory, because these tools are becoming increasingly central to shaping strategic outcomes in the XXI century.

At first, we will try to conceptualize the definition of the economic sanctions in the international relations theory. There is no generally accepted definition of economic sanctions. The term “economic sanctions” is one of the more confused and confusing to have entered the lexicon and discourse of international politics.

For instance, Daniel Drezner, a towering figure who made path breaking and enduring contributions to political analysis of the economic sanctions, the author of the “sanctions paradox”, defines economic sanctions as “the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state, called the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand” [Drezner, 1999: 2]. R.J. Ellings ascertains economic sanctions as the governmental policies that cut or curtail economic relations in order to coerce the target country(ies) into behaving in accordance with the sanctioner’s(s’) objectives [Ellings, 1991: 16]. G. Lopez and D. Cortright qualify economic sanctions as the “coercive foreign policy action of a nation(s) in which it intentionally suspends customary economic relations such as trade and/or financial exchanges in order to prompt the targeted nation to change its policy or behavior [Lopez and Cortright, 1998: 15]. N. Crawford determines economic sanctions as “the denial of customary interactions (strategic, economic, or social); they are intended to promote social, political, or economic change in a target state” [Crawford, 1999: 5]. According to J. Blanchard, N. Ripsman and Shambaugh, economic sanctions strategy is the particular form of the coercive foreign policy in which a state disrupts its normal economic relations with another state in order to achieve one of the following objectives: (1) to induce the targeted state to change its behavior; (2) to generate popular pressure on the government that causes it to change its policies; or (3) to provoke a coup or revolt that leads to the emergence of a new government that will act in accordance with the sanctioning state’s wishes [Blanchard, Ripsman 2000: 219; Shambaugh 1999: 4]. Rennack evaluates economic sanctions like “coercive measures imposed

by one country, or coalition of countries, against another country, its government or individual entities therein, to bring about a change in behavior or policies [Rennack 2000]. American theorist in economic sanctions policy M. O'Sullivan characterizes economic sanctions as the deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations for foreign policy purposes [O'Sullivan, 2003: 12].

Theorists in international politics distinguish economic sanctions from economic wars. For instance, R. Pape illustrates the difference between these two categories. According to the scientist, economic sanctions "seek to lower the economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behaviour" [Pape, 1997: 93-94]. By contrast, an economic war takes place "when a state threatens to inflict economic harm... in order to persuade the target state to agree to terms of trade more favorable to the coercing state" [Pape, 1997: 94].

Economic sanctions operate in a similar way to military warfare. Both share the same end, the "political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. The method used is value deprivation" [Galtung, 1967: 386]. The theory foresees a roughly proportionate relation between both phenomena: the more intense the value-deprivation, the more widespread the political disintegration in the target state. J. Galtung explains: "The idea is that there is a limit to how much value deprivation the system can stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate" [Galtung, 1967: 388].

Thus, two central definitional elements can be discerned in the concept of economic sanctions: the coercive measures need to be economic in nature and its aim needs to be political.

It is necessary to note that the basic methodological approaches to the study of the nature of economic sanctions as the tool of foreign policy formed over decades within the paradigm of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

Realism is concerned with the efficient use of economic sanctions for the pursuit of national interests. Realists conceptualize (economic) sanctions not as punishment on illegal or immoral acts but as a state's foreign-policy instrument used for the pursuit of national egoistic interests. In classical definition of the realism, sanctions entail "the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal of trade or financial relations to obtain foreign policy goals" [Hufbauer, 1985: 2]. James Barber

defined economic sanctions simply as “economic measures directed to political objectives” [Barber, 1979: 367].

Realist scholars of economic sanctions assume that: 1) a primary sanctioner in world politics is not a collective international actor as international organization, but state; 2) economic sanctions are not measure of law enforcement but a foreign policy instrument; 3) the key role of economic sanctions on the world stage is not to reduce the number of deviant acts but is to coerce the target state to fulfill a sanctioning country wishes; 4) economic sanctions are realized in the anarchical international system which consists of states as the primary actors. Thus, realists explain the nature of economic sanctions through the logic of power, interests, and rationality.

On the other hand, liberals borrowed their ideas of economic sanctions from municipal laws. Overall, the nature of economic sanctions within liberalism can be characterized by the following provisions: 1) economic sanctions should be applied by the international organization in order to maintain international peace and security. For instance, Quincy Wright claimed that the use of sanctions must be authorized by an international organization [Wright, 1965: 206]. Liberals argue that the United Nations Security Council applies economic sanctions to deal with four different categories of threats to international peace and security: 1) armed conflict between states; 2) armed conflict within states; 3) international norm-breaking states (the so-called “rouges”); and 4) international terrorism; 2) economic sanctions are applied in the international system which is not anarchical, but should be understood as community that is composed of state and non-state actors who share common interests; 3) economic sanctions should be governed not by power politics but by the rule of law; 4) the use of the mechanism of economic coercion should be regulated not by the balance of power but by collective security.

How does collective economic sanctions system work? M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani summarize liberal arguments articulated in the interwar period concisely:

1. The balance of power system is dead. It has failed to prevent wars and maintain the peace. What is the alternative?

2. By the establishment of an international organization. How will this system enforce the law without military conflicts?

3. By the establishment of international economic sanctions. This weapon is powerful, effective, relatively cheap, bloodless, and moreover, easy to use to bring any aggressor to knees.

4. Economic sanctions have a moral power. They enjoy universal public support.

5. States are innately rational. With the economic threat hanging over their heads, they will not find it worthwhile to deliberately wage wars aggression.

6. Neutrality is a precarious concept which the community of nations needs to abandon [*Daoudi and Dajani*, 1983: 18-19].

At last, constructivism as the methodological approach in the international relations theory holds the view that: economic sanctions are not objective phenomenon, but the social construction is shaped by shared ideas as well as material forces; economic sanctions are based on the identities and interests of political actors are shaped primarily by shared ideas [*Wendt*, 1999: 1]. In other words, economic sanctions are the means by which social construction of reality has been created. What is the main goal of economic sanctions in international policy? According to constructivists, the sanction strategy is aimed to ensure common values in the international society but not in the international system which is based on the power balance whether normative rules of the international institutions.

Theorists in international politics are primarily interested in answering two questions: 1) do economic sanctions work?; and 2) under what conditions do economic sanctions work?

The determinants of the efficiency of economic sanctions in international relations studies could be characterized by the following provisions:

– economic sanctions are to be designed to maximize pressure on the culpable actors, to inflict pain and suffering upon the leaders whose policy the sender tries to influence. Sanctions should be appropriately targeted to minimize humanitarian impact on population in the objective state;

– the evidence from the cases suggests that the presence of political opposition in the target which oriented on sanctioning state makes economic sanctions more fruitful. The political groups that lose from economic sanctions will find themselves in a financially diminished position, which may reduce their political influence. The “fifth column” effect is probable response of groups in the political elite of the target to economic sanctions and that rely on imports or export-oriented producers;

– scientists in international relations stress that economic sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals like regime change and democratization. The security, political or other costs of complying with the

sender demands may simply be higher than any pain that can be imposed with economic sanctions. That is why economic sanctions succeed if they are designed to achieve moderate political goals in the target;

- multilateral cooperation among the sanctioning states is a necessary and/ or sufficient condition for generating a successful outcome [Drezner, 2000].

- theorists in international politics assume that economically punishing sanctions are less likely to succeed against a nondemocratic target than they are against a democratic target. The reason for this conditional relationship is twofold. First, sanctions increase a leader's ability to extract rents. Greater rents increase a nondemocratic leader's ability to hold onto power, but greater rents do not increase a democratic leader's ability to retain office. Second, the pressure to yield to sanctions depends critically on who is bearing the brunt of the costs in the targeted state. To succeed, sanctions need to target the regime's winning coalition, the size and composition of which depend on a state's political institutions [Portela, 2010].

In XXI century the processes of globalization and the information revolution led to essential transformation of the international system, which is now composed of three different spheres: a military sphere, where the USA has unipolar control but there are several states with a growing military potential as China and Russia and which are ready to become rivalries to the American presence around the world; an economic sphere, where there is a multipolarity shared by the USA, the European Union and Japan; and a third transnational sphere, where a diversity of state and non-state agents coexist [Nye Jr 2002: 39]. The characteristics of the emerging threats also have their origins in the processes of globalization and the information revolution: their main agents are non-state entities that exist and act in the transnational sphere. If hard power resources can be effective in the military and economic spheres, only soft power can work at the transnational level and in reality of proxy war. For Ukraine which is evolved in a war conflict with Russia the soft power instruments can become effective tools to secure national interests of Kyiv. So in terms of aggravation of Ukrainian-Russian confrontation in its bilateral and multilateral dimensions, the issue of the content and consequences of the soft power mechanism, the soft power mechanism's role in the relations among countries require an in-depth study.

Let now look at theoretical formulation of soft power. The concept of soft power that is well known throughout the world is only the

definition used by professor Joseph Nye; nevertheless, it is not the only one and its various definitions are not free of contradictions among them.

Taking into considerations mentioned above, we are addressing the conceptualization of soft power given in Nye's main works.

We will begin with a brief discussion about the nature of power, admittedly one of the most disputed concepts in political science and international relations. Nye opts for a succinct definition: 'power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants' [*Nye Jr.*, 1990: 25–9, 2002: 4–5, 2004: 1–5]. This conciseness allows him to focus on other aspects of power in international relations, as he moves on to articulate the distinction between hard and soft power. The concepts are twofold: 'The distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resource' [*Nye Jr.*, 1990: 267, 2002: 176, 2004: 7]. This distinction between power behaviors and power resources is the crucial element in Nye's concept of soft power.

Thus, Nye defines soft power as the ability to make others want what you want. In this sense, soft power is the opposite of hard power, the ability to make others do what you want. As traditionally understood in international relations theories, hard power presupposes an active and direct engagement of the actors involved, expressed by incentives or threats, and is usually related to military force or economic resources. Soft power, which Nye also calls co-optive or indirect power, rests on the attraction a set of ideas exerts, or on the capacity to set political agendas that shape the preferences of others. Therefore, soft power is related to intangible resources like culture, ideologies and institutions [*Nye Jr.*, 1990: 31–35].

According to Nye, power behaviors are ways of exercising power. Different types of behavior form a spectrum ranging from command power to co-optive power. Command power is the ability to change what others do, while co-optive power is the ability to shape what others want. Therefore, command power is manifested through acts of coercion and persuasion, and co-optive power can be seen in the attraction exerted by a given agent and his capacity to define political agendas.

The second distinction between hard and soft power deals with the tangibility of power resources. However, the scientist does not apply any specific terminology at this point. Referring to tangibility, Nye uses the terms hard power resources and soft power resources. Hard power resources are well known: population, territory, natural resources, the

size of the economy, armed forces, technological development, among others. These are tangible resources. In opposition, soft power resources are characteristically intangible resources: culture, ideology, values and institutions are the most common examples.

It is also worth noting that in all works of Nye there is no discussion on the meaning of tangibility. The question of what would qualify a resource as tangible or intangible is not a simple one. Nye classifies economic resources as tangibles, but an argument could be made that most of the time they do not have a physical existence. A financial agreement lending money to a developing country could save its economy from a major crisis, but it is not easy to see the tangibility of this power resource – especially in credibility crisis, as economists well know. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Nye classifies institutions as intangible resources. It is comprehensible that he might be referring to institutional ideas and what they represent, but some institutions have physical existence, very important and present ones, running projects and programs all over the world. The fact is that Nye leaves the reader with no criteria to address the tangibility of power resources.

In any case, the distinction between hard and soft power is given by taking together the nature of the agent's behavior and the tangibility of the resources. However, a serious problem arises directly from this articulation. It has to do with the relation between power behaviors and power resources: "... soft power resources tend to be associated with co-optive power behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. But the relationship is imperfect" [Nye Jr 1990: 267, 2002: 176, 2004: 7]. The logical consequence of the terminology used by Nye is that command power is related to hard power resources, and co-optive power to soft power resources. But these relations do not always hold true: it is possible for command power behavior to utilize intangible soft power resources, in the same sense that co-optive power behavior can make use of tangible hard power resources. Actually, it is even possible that command power creates soft power resources, or that co-optive power creates hard power resources.

Communication as an element of soft power has a significant impact on foreign policy, both in the policy-making process and at a higher level associated with the nexus of foreign policy and international relations. Communication involves the transmission or conveying of information through a system of symbols, signs, or behavior. Communication connects individuals and groups; (re)constructs the context; and defines, describes, and delineates foreign policy options.

The current trends are the synthesis in many areas, with a focus on the psychological processes associated with who communicates, how, to whom, and with what effect in the realm of foreign policy; and with the structural characteristics of communication or discourse. The major areas of publications on foreign policy and communication include: (a) the making of foreign policy and the role of mass media in this process; (b) how foreign policy is understood as a communicated message by allies and adversaries in international relations; and (c) constructivism, poststructuralism, and discourse analysis. Within the scope of foreign policy and media falls work associated with the *CNN effect*, framing, and public opinion. Works within international relations have focused on how foreign policy signals international intent, including threat and willingness to cooperate [Gilboa, 2002].

Conclusions. Summing up the above mentioned we admit that economic sanctions as the foreign policy tool that prescribes the disruption of economic relations in order to coerce the target state to change disapproved policy. Theorists assume that the main goal of economic sanctions is to change target country's behavior as desired by a sanctioning state. Thus, scientists suppose that compellence is the main aim which pursues sanctioning country. Other goals of economic sanctions are specific deterrence, weakening, international and domestic symbolism.

Scholars are unanimous in the opinion that economic harm leads to political disintegration brought about by an unwillingness of the population in the target country to suffer economically because of internationally unpopular policy.

It is determined that soft power is the use of attraction and persuasion rather than the use of coercion or force in foreign policy. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies, whereas hard power develops out of a country's military or economic might. Thus, the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). On the other hand, the set of liberal ideas promoted by the USA and shared by other Western states, such as democracy and free markets, made soft power resources easier to implement. With other states sharing the same principles and values, the costs of maintaining the order through economic incentives or military threats were reduced.

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