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CONTENTS

Editorial	5
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STUDIES

<i>Olena Humeniuk</i>	
Ukrainian Student Movement in Czechoslovakia in the 1920–1930s: Brief Outline	9
<i>Marcin Jędrysiak</i>	
A Poet's Narrative of Race: Yuriy Lypa and His Vision of Ukrainian National Character	17
<i>Oksana Salata</i>	
Preparing to Implement Nazi Germany Information Policy in Occupied Ukraine in 1941–1944	34
<i>Alenka Jensterle-Doležalová</i>	
Forming New Political Identity: Slovene Writers and Yugoslav Idea at the Beginning of the 20th Century	46
<i>Ekaterina Rycheva</i>	
Cultural Aspect in Learning Russian as Foreign Language	57

Oksana Salata

PREPARING GERMANY TO IMPLEMENT NAZI INFORMATION POLICY IN OCCUPIED UKRAINE IN 1941–1944

The 20th century seemed to be a period when humanity faced new technologies essentially within political and military confrontation. This had a major effect on masses. Using information policy concept as method of influencing enemy troops and population became major advantage in the World War II. The countries with totalitarian regimes started using information technology to create closed political systems.

Being targeted by information and psychological operations of the USA and Britain, Nazi Germany developed powerful arsenal of methods of information influence used in fight against the Allies during World War II. By that time, German government had developed the concept of information policy for the occupied territories and improved methods of shaping informational space in the occupied territories of the USSR including Ukrainian lands.

During World War II, Nazi propaganda was studied by European and Soviet scholars such as E. Hadamowsky,¹ N. Müller,² P. Longerich,³ etc. Special attention was given to Germany's attack preparations on the Soviet Union and the development of methods to wage information-psychological war against the Red Army and civilian population of the USSR. Nazi propaganda was to weaken the morale of the Red Army and secure obedience and labour by local people.

The problems of propaganda policy of Nazi Germany during the temporary occupation of Ukraine and Belarus and its psychological influence on the population were studied by Western European and American scholars such as

¹ Hadamowsky, E., *Propaganda und nationale Macht: die Organisation der öffentlichen Meinung für die nationale Politik*, Oldenburg 1933.

² Мюллер, Н., *Вермахт и оккупация (1941–1944)*, Москва 1974.

³ Longerich, P., *Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter Ribbentrop*, München, 1987.

D. Armstrong,⁴ G. Förster,⁵ M. Balfour,⁶ G. S. Jowett,⁷ I. Kershaw.⁸ Their works are particularly characterised by extensive study of documents from the Nuremberg process, archival materials from Europe, memoirs of Soviet partisans and members of the Ukrainian national movement. Alas, information policy of German occupation administration remained omitted by scholars.

Major contribution to the elucidation on information policy of the Nazi leadership was made by a Ukrainian scholar B. Chernyakov.⁹ While studying the periodical press, he had determined significance level of occupation authorities for Nazi press and its leading role in the Third Reich.

The Ukrainian historian A. Lisenko suggested that new conceptual ways of studying of World War II explore advocacy campaign launched by the German authorities on the occupied Ukrainian lands to secure voluntary labour for the economy of the Third Reich and force farmers to continue working on collective farms. Analysing propaganda campaign of the Nazi government, Lisenko concluded that the system of collective responsibility established by the Nazis differed little from Soviet collectivism, hence it promptly lost public confidence.¹⁰

Each party in the German-Soviet War had its own military policy. German policy promoted the Nazi regime and prevented regime change. At the same time, the Soviet Union strived to strengthen its defence capabilities and ideological front particularly among rural population. National Socialists “under the motto expansion of the *Lebensraum* – living space for Germans” aimed to establish dominance in the Eastern countries and achieve its aggressive ambitions of conquest.

According to the political concept, German authorities developed military-political strategy, a combination of political action in security and defence, the state system of military-political ideas. Military-political strategy of Nazi Germany in the 1930s included development and implementation of a range of key military and political objectives. Hitler’s military-political strategy was known to be an important setting military policy in Germany. It was supported by the socio-political, strategic and military-technical base of military doctrine, and the nature and objectives of the military strategy. The main foreign policy goals were set out by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*.

The strategy of Hitler’s government was based on the following principles of military policy:

⁴ Armstrong, J. A. (ed.), *Soviet Partisans in World War II*, Madison 1964.

⁵ Ферстер, Г. и др., *Прусско-германский генеральный штаб 1640–1965. К его политической роли в истории*, Москва 1966.

⁶ Balfour, M., *Propaganda in War, 1939–1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, London – Boston – Henley 1979.

⁷ Jowett, G. S. – O’Donell, V., *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Newbury Park 1992.

⁸ Kershaw, I., *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich*, Oxford 1983.

- compliance with long-term political goals and military-political situation in Germany, Europe and the world in the period of the 1920s and 1930s;
- use of political, economic, diplomatic and military measures to address military and political objectives;
- use of socio-economic and military-strategic advantages of the country;
- identifying and using strengths and vulnerabilities in the enemy defence system and contradictions in their relations;
- attracting to its side maximum number of allies and ensuring the unity of common efforts;
- consistent weakening of potential adversaries.

The monopolistic bourgeoisie of Germany seemed to have the leading role in the concept of foreign policy of Nazi Germany. They paid great attention to the impending Eastern expansion. This was proved by the letter sent to Hitler from the Deutsche Bank in October 1933. It was noted that the German people could get extra lands in the East. According to the Bank, the German people found resources and territories.¹¹ The USSR, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in particular, were considered to be an inexhaustible source of cheap raw materials.

Despite the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR (23rd August 1939) including the secret additional protocol, Germany kept on planning campaign to the East. First, on 21st July 1940 Hitler announced immediate political goals of Germany concerning the fate of the Ukrainian state and the Federation of the Baltic states and Belarus. Some Nazi leaders, such as J. Goebbels, H. Göring and H. Himmler, expressed the view that Eastern lands should be captured as soon as possible to solve more vital geopolitical problems of Germany.¹²

The plans of some political activists reached the greatest intensity at the beginning of March 1941. It was the period of the preparations of German attack on the USSR. The High Command developed *Directive No 21 (Operation Barbarossa)* with special issue concerning the occupied Soviet territories.¹³ It was a conflict between two ideologies. Formation of nation states was not part of Hitler's plans, because *Barbarossa* was amended to create geographic units instead of states.

Kyiv was designated to be the centre, given its historic, cultural and political. The main political line in the region was to encourage Ukrainian aspirations to national independence, potential creation of their own state or unification of Ukraine with the Don region and Caucasus. Such union, according to Hitler's

¹¹ Höhn, H. et al, *Auf antisowjetischem Kriegskurs; Studien zur militärischen Vorbereitung des deutschen Imperialismus auf die Aggression gegen die UdSSR (1933–1941)*, Berlin 1970, 64.

¹² Гальдер, Ф., *Военный дневник. Ежедневные записи начальника Генерального штаба Сухопутных войск 1939–1942 гг.*, т. 2, Москва 1969, 60.

¹³ Данилов, В., *Сталін опоздал...*, Родина, 1995, № 7, 70.

government, would create the Black Sea Alliance. It was supposed to be an opposition to Moscow when defending living space in the East. At the same time, the region would serve as a strong resource base for the Great German Empire.

Generally, the *Directive* contained an action plan that included the creation of a central body to coordinate the actions of the USSR. There were issues connected with the development of the required political guidance to individual administrative units taking into account the specific situation and tasks; providing important military supplies from all the occupied territories.

Under *Barbarossa*, Hitler ordered Göring to develop a plan for future captured territory in the East. The Oldenburg plan was developed and approved in March 1941. It provided for immediate implementation of ambitious economic policies and the use of Soviet resources after the war. Economic headquarters were established immediately. They were completely separated from the General Headquarters. The Soviet territory was to be economically decentralised and turned into an agro-raw material appendix of Germany.¹⁴

Nazi leadership tried to avoid protracted war on two fronts. Therefore, the first steps had been taken by Germany: first, an attack on France and England. The attack on the Soviet Union was to be held only after the solution of problems in the West. This political concept was also reflected in *Mein Kampf* and was fundamental for Nazi military doctrine.¹⁵

Military doctrine of Nazi Germany was basically developed according to German military theorists A. von Schlieffen, E. Ludendorff, F. Bernhardt, G. Ritter and others. It built upon the experience of the past, and a new military theory and practice of creating armed forces of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States.¹⁶

The authors of the doctrine were military leaders of the Third Reich: A. Hitler, H. Göring, H. Himmler, R. Heydrich, A. Rosenberg, W. von Blomberg, W. von Brauchitsch, W. von Reichenau, W. Keitel, A. Jodl, and others. Having developed the doctrine, they paid great attention supporting all the ministries of the Reich inside Germany and beyond.¹⁷

Along with the surge of hostilities in Europe, German government engaged in tasks within German economy and armed forces, aimed to prepare for a global war by 1939. The memorandum on economic preparation for the war, signed in August 1936, stated: "The war requires such a large amount of raw materials,

¹⁴ Мюллер, Н., *Вермахт и оккупация (1941–1944)*, Москва 1974, 11.

¹⁵ Загорулько, М. М., *Крах плана Ольденбург. О срыве экономических планов фашистской Германии на временно оккупированной территории СССР*, Москва 1980, 17.

¹⁶ «Совершенно секретно. Только для командования». *Стратегия фашистской Германии в войне против СССР. Документы и материалы*. Сост. В. И. Дашичев, Москва 1967, 76–77.

¹⁷ Ферстер, Г. и др., *Прусско-германский генеральный штаб 1640–1965. К его политической роли в истории*, Москва 1966, 483–485.

that there has been no precedent in world history, who could really manage to create reserves for a long time..." With this, German economy poses two major problems: 1. four years of an efficient army; 2. four years later, the German economy should be ready for the war.¹⁸

The next step in the programme of the Nazi concept was to develop a policy on the Occupied Eastern Territories. Even before the war, there was already a plan for Eastern Europe. Its first version, the *Ost* was developed in 1941 by the Reich Main Security Office. It was presented on 28th May by the Chief of Staff of the *Reichskommissar* for Consolidation of the German Nationhood, the SS-Oberführer K. Meyer-Hetling, so-called "master plan *Ost*, the foundations of legal, economic and territorial structure of the East."¹⁹ The only proof of the existence of this document is "Observations and proposals of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories general the *Ost* plan."²⁰

The main objectives of the Nazi leadership in Germany were reflected in the *Ost* plan and aimed to seize future political and military space acquired by the eviction of indigenous population.²¹ Some basic ideas of the *Ost* plan were thought out and proclaimed during World War I.

The interests concerning Eastern territories were explained either as the Bolshevik threat or in terms of the *Lebensraum*. One of the Nuremberg participants testified that, at the beginning of 1941, Himmler explained to twelve heads of the SS groups that extermination of 30 million Slavs would be "the aim of the campaign against Russia."²² The same witness explained the main reasons for fighting the guerrillas as "the fight against the guerrilla movement had been quite an important reason for the destruction of Slavic and Jewish population."²³

The development of the plan for the Eastern campaign and the use of Eastern territories was under control of multiple agencies of the Third Reich. One of the authors of the plans for the Occupied Eastern Territories was Rosenberg.²⁴

In his memorandum, Rosenberg emphasised that the attitude to certain parts of the territory should focus on achieving political goals in management, economic

¹⁸ «Совершенно секретно. Только для командования». Стратегия фашистской Германии в войне против СССР. Документы и материалы. Сост. В. И. Дашичев, Москва 1967, 78.

¹⁹ Дашичев, В. И., Стратегия Гитлера – путь к катастрофе, 1933–1945, т. 3: Банкротство наступательной стратегии в войне против СССР, 1941–1943, Москва 2005, 13.

²⁰ Замечания и предложения «Восточного министерства» по генеральному плану «Ост». [online: <<http://lib.rus.ec/b/149273/read>>, cit. 2016-02-16].

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg 1947; Допрос свидетеля Эриха фон Бах-Целевски, 7 января 1946 года, 356.

²³ Ibidem, 358.

²⁴ Безыменский, Л. А., Разгаданные загадки Третьего Рейха, 1933–1941: Книга не только о прошлом, Москва 1981, 88–89.

and ideological terms. In the memorandum, he outlined plans according to different parts of the Soviet Union. The cornerstone of the concept was inciting hostility between different nationalities of the USSR to implement the great German policy. Baltic countries, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became an area of German colonisation. There was a plan to form the Black Sea Alliance within Ukraine, the Don and the Caucasus to “keep Moscow under attack and to provide living space for the Great Germany in the East”.²⁵

The Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, led by Rosenberg, developed a structure of the occupation apparatus for Soviet territories. The memorandum attachment of 7th April 1941 (No 2) was known to be the document for the administrative apparatus in the East. Thus, Rosenberg recommended H. Lose as the *Reichskommissar* of Baltic countries and Belarus, A. Schickedanz – as a *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine – a person, who had been responsible for the “Great Russian” for the last 20 years. H. Backe was advised to run the Nazi business in the Caucasus. D. Klagges, the Braunschweig Minister, was advised as a Don-Volga *Reichskommissar*. In case of Moscow occupation, Rosenberg planned to E. Koch to be the head of *Reichskommissariat* of East Prussia.²⁶

Anticipating imminent victory over the Soviet Union, Hitler said at a meeting of Nazi government on 16th July 1941 about the new order in the occupied territories: “The creation of the state West of the Urals should never be on the agenda [...] All Führer’s followers must know: The Empire would only be safe when there are no alien forces West of the Urals. Germany is responsible for the protection of the territories from all possible dangers...”²⁷

The meeting discussed the massacre of civilian population that resisted the occupation regime. Most of the present leaders of the Third Reich came to conclusion that most likely this problem could be solved by shooting resistance members. W. Keitel outlined the importance to make the local population responsible for their actions and for any misconduct.²⁸

Hitler’s plans were also revealed by M. Borman in his letter sent on behalf of Rosenberg. The letter showed that the Reich government was not interested in increasing the population on these territories, because the programme offered a reduction in fertility among Slavs. It was also proposed that local people shouldn’t have access to higher education.²⁹

²⁵ Германский империализм и вторая мировая война. Материалы научной конференции. Комиссия историков СССР и ГДР в Берлине (14–19 декабря 1959 г.), Москва 1963, 117.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Преступные цели – преступные средства. Документы об оккупационной политике Германии на территории СССР (1941–1945), Москва 1985, 50–51.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Дашичев, В. И., Стратегия Гитлера – путь к катастрофе, 1933–1945, т. 3: Банкротство наступательной стратегии в войне против СССР, 1941–1943, Москва 2005, 39.

The entire main territory of the living space had to be regulated by law. Hitler demanded that the local population is not given many laws and be existentially limited to the very essentials. The German administration should be rather small. Regional commissioner should work with local elders. There shouldn't be created single Ukrainian board as significant as the *Generalkommissariate* or even *Reichskommissariat*.³⁰

The Nazis planned to reduce to a minimum the population of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus on their lands and settle there 10 million German colonists. The Poles, Ukrainians and Belarusians who wanted to stay alive, had to serve as free labour for German owners. The occupation authorities were instructed to keep the population in obedience by extreme cruelty, always using mass executions and other forms of destruction.³¹

Since the beginning of the occupation, the new clear management system began to emerge: Rosenberg oversaw four *Reichskommissariate*: Ostland, Ukrainian, Moscow and Caucasus. Each of them were divided into *Generalkommissariate*. Hence, *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine was divided into Volyn-Podolsk, Mykolayiv, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Tavria *Generalkommissariates*. The lowest level of the German occupation administration were provincial commissariats. 1 050 such departments were planned for the occupied Ukrainian lands. 144 officers and 711 governors from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Labour Front organisation were officially sent to serve for the Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.³² As an administrative-territorial unit, *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine consisted of districts, regions (hebits), counties and townships, that were overseen by general, hebit and district commissioners. The occupied Western region of the Soviet Union did not have a single unified civilian administration and management. The administration elected the head or mayor from the local population. Village elders were elected in villages.³³

The Nazi government, implementing its occupation policy in the East, created conditions which worsened the situation of the local population. According to Himmler, people dying of starvation made the colonisation process easier. During the senior SS meeting in Wewelsburg, he clearly declared that one of the objectives of the Eastern campaign was the destruction of 30 million of Slavs.³⁴

³⁰ «Совершенно секретно. Только для командования». Стратегия фашистской Германии в войне против СССР. Документы и материалы. Сост. В. И. Дашичев, Москва 1967, 122–123.

³¹ Нюрнбергский процесс: Сборник материалов в 8 томах, т. 2, Москва 1988, 89.

³² Дашичев, В. И., Стратегия Гитлера – путь к катастрофе, 1933–1945, т. 3: Банкротство наступательной стратегии в войне против СССР, 1941–1943, Москва 2005, 10.

³³ Ibidem, 11.

³⁴ Королук, В. Д. (ed.), Германская экспансия в Центральной и Восточной Европе, Москва 1965, 273.

To keep such a vast large area under control, avoiding resistance from the local population, German government established local police. Thus, on 17th July 1941, Hitler signed a decree about policing and security in the occupied Eastern regions. To make the decree more effective, each of *Reichskommissariat* officers worked together with senior SS, who was directly and personally subordinated to *Reichskommissariat* officer. The general and main regional heads of the commissariats worked with the SS and police officers in full submission.³⁵ Such a strict protection system was quite similar to the Bolshevik system of supervision of military officers during the Civil War 1917–1921 in Bolshevik Russia during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.

The Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories developed instructions which defined the content of advocacy agencies for the Wehrmacht on the German-occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR. They included: providing moral and psychological influence on local population through political and cultural propaganda via the press, radio and television; implementation of promotional actions which had to influence the mood of the population serving the interest of the German Reich and local administration.³⁶

In terms of intensive advocacy of German army on the occupied territories, it was necessary to create the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The Eastern Division was the first step towards it. The Ministry formed its own department of education and propaganda. Its section defined main policy lines for propaganda and political trends.³⁷

The structure of Ministry was developed, which included the following one – Propaganda Department and a special department worked effectively according to the opinion at the Ministry.³⁸

The Enlightenment and Propaganda Department of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories also focused on the work of Ostarbeiters, especially among those who voluntarily went to work in Germany. In such situation, it was impossible to conduct among them propaganda urging them to cooperate.³⁹

In the same period, anti-Bolshevik illustrated posters and brochures of 134 pages asking: “What is the importance to fight with the Soviet Union?” Twenty thousand copies were written in local languages where they were distributed.⁴⁰

³⁵ *Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.)*. Ред. Е. А. Болтин, Москва 1965, 125.

³⁶ Дашичев, В. И., *Банкротство стратегии германского фашизма. Исторические очерки. Документы и материалы, т. 2: Агрессия против СССР. Падение Третьей империи 1941–1945 гг.*, Москва 1973, 196.

³⁷ *Bundesarchiv*, Koblenz: R 55/606, 54.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, 55.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, 60.

⁴⁰ *Bundesarchiv*, Koblenz: R 55/1470, 6.

In addition, in 1941–1944 radio broadcasted anti-Bolshevik reports about atrocious acts of the Soviet system. Most of these reports were aimed to Ukrainian population.⁴¹

Methods and propaganda technologies of the Third Reich used to influence not only its citizens, but wider European community. At a meeting of the National Assembly, G. Kittler, the speaker of the investigation group, presented examples which evidenced the effective work of National Socialist propaganda in European community. To make it more persuasive, it was necessary to create truly striking examples of propaganda material, to confuse public opinion in Europe. In one of the striking examples, he suggests that Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941.⁴²

In September 1942 through the propaganda was circulated through all departments of the ministries about Hitler's recommendation for tough control over the manuscripts that came to press agencies, and print published in Eastern occupied countries and potential colonies.⁴³

During the first months of German occupation government encouraged activities of educational institutions, theatres, museums, and individual research institutions. On the other hand, German occupation administration carried out regular campaigns to check political loyalty among all who agreed to cooperation, first and foremost, teachers.

The Administration of Press and Propaganda was formed in structure of the Occupied Eastern Territories Ministry. In summer 1942 the so-called "Russian Committee" of the imperial foreign minister Ribbentrop was founded.

For almost the entire period of Nazi occupation, ideologues and occupation authorities used direct psychological influence on Ukrainian population. A protocol dated on 16th July 1941, from A. Hitler to A. Rosenberg, H. Lammers, W. Keitel and H. Göring, included further plans for Ukraine and its territory.⁴⁴

To exert psychological influence in the occupied territories more effectively, the occupation administration used the latest tools of influence and communication technologies. There opened theatres. Films by well-known Ukrainian filmmakers with the heroic past of the Ukrainian people were shown along with such plays as *Cossack beyond the Danube*, *Taras Bulba*, etc.⁴⁵

The implementation of the conceptual foundations of information policy was performed with the help of the powerful branched military-administrative system of the occupation administration in the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine and

⁴¹ Ibidem 7, 8.

⁴² *Bundesarchiv*, Berlin: R 55/21377, 1.

⁴³ *Bundesarchiv*, Berlin: R 55/21441, 4.

⁴⁴ Косик, В., *Україна Другій світовій війні у документах: Збірник німецьких архівних матеріалів*, т. 2, Львів 1998, 172.

⁴⁵ *Волинь, Часопис для Волині*, 1. 9. 1941, 4.

the military occupation zones. The activities of military administrations were often out of the box. Therefore, the nature of such policy differed in some areas and its reception varied accordingly.

The most effective methods of information influence used by the Nazi government in the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine and in the area of military administration were extra techniques: persuasion, suggestion, information, misinformation, incentives, coercion; usage for spreading false information of war mechanisms; creating adverse psychological atmosphere among the population of the occupied territories, which undermined the credibility of the Red Army and the Soviet system.

In general, in the first period of the war – from June 1941 to May 1942 in large parts of Ukraine, local population did not engage in significant resistance. Yet in the summer of 1942, the methods and techniques of Nazi propaganda were less effective and had no psychological effect on most of the Ukrainian population. By the winter of 1943–1944, the population of the occupied territories joined mass guerrilla groups to resist Nazi occupation.

To summarise the developments, the formation of German information effort on the territory of the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine and in the area of military administration and its transformation took place in three different stages.

From early June 1941 to March 1942, Nazi government understood that the war with the Soviet Union would be complex and rather long. Nazi information policy aimed to convince the population of the occupied regions of Ukraine. Admittedly, it succeeded in that period. Some peasants and intellectuals believed that Germany would help Ukraine to free itself from the Bolshevik regime, to build its own state and advanced Ukrainian culture. Farmers waited for the settlement of the land issue and the agrarian reform promoted by Nazi administration. It attracted a considerable number of peasants. In the same period, the occupation authorities created favourable conditions for intellectuals: educational institutions were opened; theatres staged works by Ukrainian writers. Nazi Germany was presented to the Ukrainians by press and cinema as a highly developed country. Small portion of the population under the influence of Nazi propaganda, also motivated by the hope to save their lives and those of their relatives, deliberately agreed to cooperate with the German occupation administration.

Significant changes in the information policy of the German occupation authorities took place in the second part of March – April 1942 when the situation on the front deteriorated for the German army. German government immediately strengthened the occupation regime. Everyone suspected of guerrilla collaboration refusing to work for Germany, sabotaging the orders and instructions by local authorities, was persecuted. During this period, the Nazi propaganda power slogans were changed dramatically. It didn't promise happy life in their own country. There was no word about the implementation of the agrarian reform. Cultural

and educational institutions kept on closing; theatres worked mostly to entertain Wehrmacht military *Volksdeutsche*, where frequent raids in the theatres and cinemas used to take place. Local residents and young people were forced and sent to Germany as labour slaves. This situation could not keep people indifferent. The moral and psychological state of the population was extremely gloomy. People began to support the guerrillas and participate in the resistance movement organised by OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and Soviet partisans. At this stage, the main theme of German propaganda was to intimidate local residents, punish them for cooperating with the guerrillas and the Soviets.

The third period of Nazi information policy was accompanied by the adverse military-political conditions and the defence on the part of the German army. Since summer 1943, Nazi government had changed the tactic and conduct information policy on the territory of the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine. The content of the propaganda was filled with slogans not to support guerrillas and Soviet power. The Bolshevik government was dealing with only repression's policy according to prisoners of war and their families who stayed on the occupied territories. The collective farm system was presented as slave farming deprived of the opportunity to work on their own land. The occupation authorities intensified activities concerning the agrarian reform, though it eventually was not implemented. The year 1944 brought the beginning of the destruction of *Reichskommissariat* military administration and economic power.

ABSTRACT

Preparing Germany to Implement Nazi Information Policy in Occupied Ukraine in 1941–1944

Oksana Salata

The article presents the main directions of Nazi Germany information policy, which was to be implemented in the occupied territories of Ukraine during the World War II. It portrays the military-political strategy of the Third Reich, which was a set of political actions in the field of security and defence, the state system of military-political ideas, beliefs and practical measures that determined the goals and general orientation of political struggle, its forms, methods, military aspects of higher national interests and security of the state. The study shows that the implementation of the Nazi information policy on the territory of the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine and in the area of military administration was planned

in three stages. Since the occupation policy was cruel and inhuman in nature, the information policy of the Nazi Germany did not deliver the expected results.

Key words: Nazi Germany Occupation Policy, Occupied Ukraine, Information Policy, Information War.

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