

Stereotyping of the Crimean Tatar people's image as a problem of interethnic communication in Ukrainian society

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ABSTRACT

With the transition of the Turkic-speaking peoples to a settled way of life in the eastern steppes of Europe, stereotypes were increasingly established in European public opinion, which determined the stereotyped and often unfair perception of the "steppe" peoples, including the Crimean Tatars, several centuries earlier. This problem is especially relevant for Ukraine, whose territory has become a place where different civilizations, cultures and religions collide. Considering this, an important task at the present stage is to overcome worldviews and prejudices that complicate the process of interethnic communication and the establishment of a dialogue of cultures. The proposed article examines the main features of the process of stereotyping the Crimean Tatar people's image as a factor influencing interethnic communication in Ukraine. On the example of folklore and classical literature, as traditional relayers of the public consciousness of Ukrainians, the main negative markers-pronouns that were used to designate the Crimean Tatar people were determined. The main reasons that contribute to stereotyping the image of the Crimean Tatar people and hinder the development of efficient communication practices have been clarified. In this context, special attention is paid to the study of the historic and religious factors' role. The nature of social interaction and conflict-generating between Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian forces in the Crimea before the occupation is outlined. The influence of modern political events on the change in the image of the Crimean Tatar people is determined. The main measures that were implemented in order to overcome prejudices against the Crimean Tatars and to establish efficient and positive interethnic communication inside the Ukrainian society are outlined.

KEY WORDS

Crimean Tatar people, Crimean Tatars, stereotyping, prejudice, interethnic communication, dialogue of cultures, Ukrainian society, Russian occupation of the Crimea

Introduction

In the conditions of the Russian occupation of the Crimea and a full-scale invasion, an extremely important task for Ukraine is to strengthen internal consolidation among all groups of society, especially those that are legally recognized as indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, even today certain prejudices and historical myths persist about the Crimean Tatars, which not only complicate the process of ethnic interaction, but also play an important role in the Russian information war against Ukraine. Therefore, overcoming national stereotypes is not just an important, but a strategic task of both the Ukrainian government and the society in general.

In modern historiography, the problem of stereotyping the Crimean Tatar people is understudied. In this context, only a few highly specialized works can be listed. Thus, one of the first investigations in this context is the article of the Ukrainian orientalist Yu. Kochubei "Ukrainian-Turkish-Crimean relations in the works of Ukrainian writ-

ers (on the problem of literary stereotypes)" (1993). A valuable work is the study of O. Halenko (2003), which is devoted to the problem of Crimean Tatar raids in Ukrainian historiography. The author emphasizes the insufficient study of this issue. In his opinion, historians quite arbitrarily use different models of attitude - from Tatarophobic to unconditionally exculpatory, which often led to the search for arguments of a mainly political or ideological nature (Halenko, 2003: 64).

Studies related to the stated problem are the work of D. Muller (1999), A. Bezverkha (2017), R. Finnin (2019). The authors raise such issues as the integration of the Crimean Tatars into the Ukrainian space, the reflection of the historical memory of their deportation in the mass media, the peculiarities of Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar relations in the context of literature analysis. In addition, the articles by N. Rybak (2017) and S. Kulchytskyi (2018), which are devoted to the problem of the return of the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland, are relevant.



An important group of scientific works consists of works that have a complex nature and reflect new views on the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people. In this context, first of all, the work of A. Fisher (1978) and B. Williams (2001, 2015) should be noted. The 4-volume work of St. Petersburg researcher V. Vozgrin "History of the Crimean Tatars" (2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) is a voluminous work of recent decades. Particular attention should be paid to the works devoted to clarifying the attitude of Ukrainian society to Islam and its spread in Ukraine, because it is this religion that occupies a dominant position among the Crimean Tatars. In this context, the works of V. Liulka (2017), M. Yakubovych (2016, 2018), P. Kraliuk (2018), V. Shchepanskyi (2018) and S. Vivchar (2018) are relevant. Thus, the research problem stated by us in the article has not found its full reflection in modern historiography. At the same time, we cannot fail to emphasize that today there is a significant number of scientific works, which are distinguished by their original approach, permit an objective look at the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people, and thus deconstruct common stereotypes and prejudices.

Research methods

An important theoretical and methodological task of the work is the clarification of key definitions, namely such concepts as "stereotyping" and "interethnic communication", since these characteristics play an important role in the public perception of Crimean Tatars. As a rule, stereotyping is understood as a process of perception and assessment of a person or a group of persons by giving them certain characteristics formed on the basis of stereotypes developed in society. The latter quite often serve as a marker to indicate such categories as "own", "friend" – "alien", "enemy". It should be noted that for many centuries exactly this model of opposition existed between the "Slavic" and "Tatar" worlds. Such stereotypical practices of public perception have a negative impact on the process of interethnic communication – communication between persons representing different peoples (ethnic groups). Prejudiced judgments about one or another ethnic group can lead to the growth of social tension, which in its turn can turn into a serious inter-ethnic conflict. As the Ukrainian researcher N. Semeniv rightly observes, "even as the forces of globalization reduce the traditional boundaries of the group, the desire for ethnic roots and ethnic belonging continues to remain a deeply troubled social landscape throughout the world" (Semeniv, 2018: 312). Therefore, an important task at the present stage is to overcome prejudices against certain ethnic groups, which is only possible if the problem is studied in detail, its popularization among the general public through the publication of scientific and popular scientific publications, development of educational and methodological materials for general secondary and higher education, organization of educational events and projects initiated by both public organizations and the state in general.

Results and Discussion

Stereotypes about the Turkic-speaking peoples who settled in the lands of the present-day south and south-east of Ukraine determined their stereotyped and often unfair perception several centuries in advance. The origin of the formation about a negative image of the Crimean Tatars as "enemies" should be sought in the distant Middle Ages, when in the 13th century the Mongol invasion of

the state of Ruthenia took place. The Mongols' invasion was accompanied by a series of destruction and looting of Ruthenia cities. Perhaps the most striking example is the capture of Kyiv by the troops of Batu Khan in 1240. The main political consequence of the Mongol invasion was the final consolidation of the separate fragmentation of the Ruthenia state. At the same time, the Mongol Empire also did not last long. Like any empire, it was torn apart by internal contradictions, which led to its rapid division into several smaller state entities. One of these was Ulus of Jochi, better known as the Golden Horde, under whose rule a significant part of Ukrainian lands fell¹. The same territories that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland were subjected to periodic raids. It is clear that the Mongol invasion and the establishment of the Golden Horde rule, which were accompanied by looting and robberies, were etched in the historical memory of the Ukrainian people as a destructive phenomenon.

In the middle of the 15th century as a result of internal contradictions and external pressure from Tamerlane's state, the Golden Horde disintegrated. A new state – the Crimean Khanate – was formed in a part of the territories once subject to it, namely: the Crimea, the steppes of the Northern Black Sea region between the Dniester and Don rivers, as well as the lands of the northern Kuban. Since the latter was considered the main legal successor of the Golden Horde, it inherited not only a similar system of socio-political and socio-economic organization, but also all the negative markers that were attached to its predecessor.

A good example in this context is the practice of using the term "horde". Etymologically, the word comes from the Turkic "horde", which literally means "camp", "tent" (Burgan, 2009), "seat of power" (Hartog, 1996) or "royal court" (Kohn, 2005). However, as noted by the Ukrainian historian and Turkologist O. Galenko, with the Mongol conquest the word entered many European languages (English and French horde, German Horde) in the meaning of numerous irregular troops. In Ukraine, it meant any separate army of steppe neighbors, as well as any steppe state entity, regardless of its degree of independence (Halenko, 2010: 622-623).

Since the word "horde" came with the Mongol conquest, it acquired a pronounced negative connotation in everyday Ukrainian practice and began to be perceived as something destructive, uncivilized, or barbaric. Gradually, it also came into use as a negative pronoun of the ethnonym "Crimean Tatars". A vivid example of such a practice is Ukrainian folklore, which is a reflection of people's worldviews about the past and the surrounding world. Thus, in one of the most famous Ukrainian folk songs "Zazhurilas Ukraina", ("Ukraine Got Sad") which

¹ For more information about the western possessions of the Golden Horde, see: Cherkas, B. (2014). *Zakhidni volodinnia Ulusu Dzhuchy: politychna istoriia, terytorialno-administratyvnyi ustroi, ekonomika, mista (XIII–XIV st.)*. Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy.

was created probably in the 17th century, and first recorded in writing by the Ukrainian historian and ethnographer M. Maksymovych in the collection "Ukrainian folk songs" (1834), it was noted: "Ukraine was sad that there were no children: / The Horde trampled all the little children with their horses. / She trampled the little ones, cut down the old ones, / And took the middle ones, drove them into captivity" (*Maksymovych, 1834: 108*).

In addition to common folklore, similar negative connotations to the word "horde" can also be seen in Ukrainian literature of the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus, the famous Ukrainian poetess Lesia Ukrainka (1871–1913) wrote in her poem "Dreams in a Storm": "An evil-fierce chase rushes after us, / Some large, countless horde, / It roars, cackles, roars / With malicious, cannibalistic laughter. Black, / Terrible horde... Oh horse, horse, faster!..." (*Ukrainka, 2021: 420*).

It should be noted that the term "horde" is not the only marker of negative content that was used as a pronoun to denote the Crimean Tatar people. Classics of Ukrainian literature of the late 18th – early 20th centuries in their works they repeatedly resorted to the practice of using such a word as "Tatarva". This term, like "horde", is a collective negative label that was often used to denote both Mongols and Crimean Tatars. In fact, it corresponds synonymously to the concept of "enemy/enemies". In the famous historical novel of the Ukrainian writer Panteleimon Kulish "The Black Council", written in 1857, you can find the following words: "It's fun and hard to remember you, our old ancestor Kyiv! Because great glory has shone upon you more than once, and great misfortunes have gathered for you from all sides... That glory, those misfortunes have been knocked out of our heads by the godless Tatarva, just as Batu broke into your Golden Gate. It's enough for us recent memories of your ruin..." (*Kulish, 1994: 56–57*). As we can see, by "Tatarva" the author means exactly the Mongol troops of Batu Khan, who invaded Kyiv in 1240. At the same time, he also uses the same term to refer to the Crimean Tatars: "If it weren't for the Cossacks, the devil would have licked you long ago, long ago until now, the Iyakh with their sublyakh have been strangled, or the Tatars have driven them to the Crimea!" (*Kulish, 1994: 60*).

In a more negative sense, the term "tatarva" can be found in the novel by the Ukrainian novelist and playwright Panas Myrnyi "Do the oxen roar if the manger is full?", written in 1875. Thus, the term defined in the work is equal to "God's punishment" itself, which from the point of view of the conservative religious society of that time was one of the worst forms of punishment that could befall a person: "Such sadness, as if God's punishment fell on the village, or the Tatarva moved on..." (*Myrnyi, 2012: 92*). Such an allegory emphasizes all the negativism that reigned in the public consciousness of Ukrainians about the Crimean Tatars. Note that in the same work, the terms "Tatarva" and "Tatars" are also used to denote individuals or groups whose behavior and actions have a destructive, criminal nature: "Then the Tatarva was... burning gardens,

villages, slaughtering people, captured the captive, drove them to the pit... And now?... Here, the churches are being stolen!... Who? – Tatars!.. Where was it seen?! And there was discord between relatives... The son raises his hand to the father; the daughter does not bat an eyelid to her mother; brother stands up to brother; sister is at odds with sister; a woman prepares poison for her husband... Everyone – like a fool, like mad!" (*Myrnyi, 2012: 233*).

"Tatarva" is not the only wording used by P. Myrnyi. The work also uses such a modified word as "Tatariuha". The main difference between both terms is the level of their expression's pronouncement. In contrast to the first, the wording "Tatariuha" has a more emotional negative color: "Tatarva rushes like crazy... "Yeah! Hostile tataruyugas!" – he shouts after them..." (*Myrnyi, 2012: 121*).

It can be assumed that the labels "Tatarva" and "Tatariuha" are the author's subjective vision. However, the above-mentioned works of Ukrainian literature were written in the spirit of social realism, which was designed to reflect real historical events, facts, social and everyday scenes from life, etc. Therefore, such works are a kind of mirror reflection of worldviews and stereotypes that dominated Ukrainian society. Therefore, there is no doubt that the concepts of "Tatarva" and "Tatariuha" were used in the everyday usage of Ukrainians during the 18th and early 20th centuries. The correctness of our opinion is also confirmed by the first comprehensive explanatory dictionary of the Ukrainian language in the history of Ukraine, compiled by Boris Grinchenko in 1907–1909. In it, the negative clichés "Tatarva" and "Tatariuha" are indicated as synonyms to the ethnonym "Tatars" (*Grinchenko, 1909: 249*).

The decisive role in the formation of a negative and prejudiced attitude towards the Crimean Tatar people was played by the frequent raids of the Crimean Khanate in the 15th–16th centuries. As a rule, they were always accompanied by looting and yasyr (captivity)². Undoubtedly, such military raids and campaigns had a very negative impact on the overall image of the Crimean Tatars in history. However, it should be understood that the problem of raids by the Crimean Khanate is extremely complex and requires detailed study. In this regard, as early as 2003, O. Halenko successfully noted that "thorough research and frank discussion of this problem is gaining political acuity", "but" it seems that Ukrainian scholars feel comfortable in the role of judges, not researchers, repeating the accusations leveled against the Tatars by historians of past generations" (*Halenko, 2003: 52*). Although 20 years have passed since then, the author's words that "to date, the purpose and reasons for the raids, their relationship with the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, have not been fully deter-

² See more about Tatar raids and yasyr in: Dashkevych, Ya. (1993). Yasyr z Ukrainy (XV – persha polovyna XVII st.) yak istoriko-demohrafichna problema. *Ukrainskyi arkhеohrafichnyi shchorichnyk. Nova seriia*, 2, 40–47; Halenko, O. I. (2003). Pro tatarski nabihy na ukrainski zemli. *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 6, 52–68.

mined, Rzeczpospolita and other states" and that in modern historiography "there is no complete register of Tatar attacks" (Halenko, 2003: 52) remain relevant. Precisely due to the lack of comprehensive and in-depth research, the issue of the Crimean Tatar raids is subject to manipulation based on previously formed ideas and myths.

In view of the acuteness of the problem, we will try to cite a few historical facts that, in our opinion, disprove the stereotypes widespread in Ukrainian society about the Crimean Tatar raids and their role in the life of the Crimean Khanate. First of all, it should be noted that not all Crimean Tatars participated in military actions. As it is known from the descriptions of travelers of that time, the population of the Crimean Khanate was heterogeneous and consisted of various ethnic and sub-ethnic groups that had different features of the socio-economic system. For example, the famous cartographer and traveler Guillaume Levasseur de Beuplan divides the Crimean Tatars into two peoples - the Nogai Tatars and the Perekop or Crimean Tatars (Boplan, 1990: 128). The first who lived in the steppe part of the country, outside the Perekop fortress, were engaged in nomadic herding and occasionally made raids on Ukrainian lands. Others, the Perekop Tatars, who were in the territory of the peninsula, developed agriculture.

Emilio Dascoli, who visited the Crimean Peninsula at the beginning of the 17th century, reported that during his trip, wheat and other crops were grown in the mountainous and coastal areas of the Crimea, while part of the harvest was sent to Istanbul for sale (*Opisanie Chyornogo morya*, 1902: 121). The Kadiasker records of the Crimean Khanate emphasize that agriculture played an important role. The sydzhil³ "Sale of land" contains information about the agreement for the sale of Shahdane Ablash's garden: "My garden on the Kachi River, which was left to me by my husband by right of mehr-i muezhel... I sold by firm agreement to the said Ali for thirty florins" (*Rustemov*, 2017: 105). A similar record is contained in the court transcript of the former defterdar (minister of finance, chief treasurer) Mehmed Efendi: "Purchased by me in the town of Shuli from Rejeb and Karamush, and from Mangub Agha Hassan in the known boundaries between the neighbors of the bakhchi (fruit-and-vegetable-garden) and half of the garden, I sold to my wife Aisha and to a Cossack named Ferhat. A deal was made between us. Let it be written in the sydzhil" (*Rustemov*, 2017: 108). Similar court records about the sale of land, commanded either to collect debts in sufficient quantity, or to make a conclusion, that a significant part of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean Peninsula led a sedentary life and physically could not afford to participate in raids.

In addition, it is necessary to note the complexity of internal relations between the khan and the beys. The latter, having significant levers of state influence, did not always

listen to their ruler, and therefore often resorted to robberies on their own. Brian Davis, a professor at the University of Texas at San Antonio, shares this opinion. He notes that an important contemporary factor was the constant dependence of the khan on local beys and clans, who concentrated in their hands significant land holdings and often acted at their own discretion (Davies, 2007: 23).

It is also worth trying to consider the raids from the point of view of the socio-political and socio-economic system in the Crimean Khanate of that time. According to A. Fischer, Slavic historians describe these events with a certain "disappointment", and therefore one should treat it less emotionally and nationalistically and try to consider the Tatar raids as a very successful form of economic activity, thanks to which the Tatars created a lively urban and cultural society. In his opinion, it was buying and selling of captives that became a significant profitable branch of the slave trade. The influence of this form is evidenced by the fact that even in the Council Code of the Moscow Tsar in 1649, it was mentioned about the creation of a special monetary fund for the collection of an annual tax for the purpose of ransoming prisoners. A similar practice was also used by the Rzeczpospolita: such a tribute acted as an appeasement to prevent raids (Fisher, 1978: 27–28). Thus, the examples given by us testify to the need to abandon the one-sided interpretation of Tatar attacks and to take into account various aspects and features of this phenomenon in view of the realities of that time.

Along with the raids of the Crimean Khanate, an important role in the formation of a negative and prejudiced attitude towards the Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian society was played by the repressive policy of the communist authorities during the Second World War. In April 1944, Soviet troops launched an offensive in the Crimea, which ended with the expulsion of Nazi troops from the peninsula. A day before the end of the operation, the State Defense Committee of the USSR on May 11, 1944 issued a secret Resolution (No. 5859ss), which provided for the forcible deportation of the Crimean Tatar people beyond the borders of their historical Motherland into the depths of the Soviet Union. According to the document, the "reason" for the forced eviction was accusations of mass collaborationism and war crimes against both soldiers and the civilian population: "During the Patriotic War, many Crimean Tatars betrayed the Motherland, deserted... and went over to the side of the enemy, joined the volunteer units formed by the Germans. Tatar military units fought against the Red Army; ...participating in the German punitive detachments, the Crimean Tatars were especially distinguished by their brutal massacres of Soviet partisans, and also helped the German occupiers in organizing the forcible abduction of Soviet citizens into German slavery and mass slavery"⁴.

It is worth noting that the process of forced deportation was covered up both inside the country and abroad. Soviet propaganda emphasized the "voluntary" resettlement of

³ Sydzhil is a court record in the Crimean Khanate, which was entered into the book of court records – Kadiasker books.

⁴ Postanovlenie GKO № 5859ss. O krimskikh tatarakh. Moskva, Kreml. Ot 11 maya 1944 g. (1992). *Vostok*, 2, 132–134.

Crimean Tatars to Central Asia (*Williams: 2001: 401*). After the deportation in 1944, the communist party authorities tried to destroy all references to the Crimean Tatars. In Moscow, they clearly stated their goal “to create a new Crimea according to the Russian order”. All Crimean Tatar cities and villages received new Russian names, Muslim cemeteries and religious buildings were destroyed or turned into secular buildings (*Magocsi, 2010: 690*).

In general, the term “Crimean Tatar” was removed from the Russian-Soviet lexicon. During the Stalin era, no one could even admit that there was such a national group as the Crimean Tatars among the Soviet nations. As a result, during the Soviet censuses (1959, 1970 and 1979) many could not recognize themselves as Crimean Tatars. Only in 1989 was the secret ban on the ethnonym “Crimean Tatars” abolished (*Izmirlı, 2008: 238*).

Undoubtedly, this policy of the Soviet government had a negative impact on the perception of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukrainian society. The myth of “betrayal” and its purposeful removal from historical memory were revealed. Thus, with the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991 and the gradual return of the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland, considerable social tension was observed in the Crimea. For the local population, especially for pro-Russian forces, they turned into “unwanted foreigners”⁵. The dynamics of interethnic communication in the first two decades had an extremely negative character, which often caused conflict situations.

A vivid example of such conflict-genicity was the tragic incident that took place in 2010 in the city of Dzhankoi. Then the Crimean Tatar Server Ibrahimov killed the five-year-old boy Vitya Shemiakin. The incident gained wide publicity and provoked a significant wave of tension. The then pro-Russian forces, in particular the “Russian Bloc”, and mass media in the peninsula spread information that it was allegedly a ritual murder, and that S. Ibrahimov himself belonged to radical Islamic groups (*Abibulla, 2010*).

Such accusations caused considerable indignation among the Crimean Tatar people. In connection with the situation, the Mejlis – the representative body of the Crimean Tatars – officially appealed to the mass media. The mentioned statement read: “...the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people draws attention to the inadmissibility of indicating the nationality of the victim and the criminal, regardless of who it is, which can cause a sharp deterioration of the socio-political situation in Crimea... The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people proceeds from the fact that the person who committed the specified crime, regardless of his nationality, origin or other differences, must be punished in accordance with the procedure provided by the current legislation of Ukraine and in accordance with the court's decision” (Mejlis addressed the media, 2010). Moreover, in addition to the official statement, the Deputy

Speaker of the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, had to explain to the public that there was no human sacrifice in Islam, and the ritual of sacrifice took place once a year during the Ramazan Bairam holiday, when a ram is sacrificed (*Abibulla, 2010*). The case of 2010 demonstrated not only the fact of the existence of significant prejudices against the Crimean Tatar people, but also the activation of pro-Russian forces that openly professed Tatarophobic ideas.

On the eve of Russia's occupation of the Crimea in 2014, inter-ethnic relations between Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian forces deteriorated even more. On May 17, 2013, Ukrainian actor and director, Crimean Tatar Akhtem Seitablayev presented the feature film “Khaytarma” (from the Crimean “Qaytarma” – return) at the Taras Shevchenko Cinema in Simferopol. The film is based on real events and tells about Stalin's deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944. The main character of the plot was the famous Soviet ace pilot, the national hero of the Crimean Tatars, Amet-Khan Sultan (*Na ekrany vykhodyt khudozhnii film, 2013*). The release of the film caused displeasure on the part of then Consul General of Russia in Simferopol, Volodymyr Andreev. Military pilots and comrades-in-arms of the double Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan, whose fate formed the basis of the film's plot, were invited to the premiere screening. However, after the conversation with the Consul General, several guests who came to Crimea at the expense of the organizers of the “Haitarm” premiere immediately refused to go to the cinema hall (*Skandal v Krymu, 2013*).

On May 21, on the live broadcast of the ATR TV channel, explaining his action, V. Andreev stated: “If this were a multi-part film, where 17 out of 20 episodes would be about the feat of the Soviet people, Soviet soldiers, legendary pilots during the Great Patriotic War, 2 episodes would be about cooperation with fascist occupiers of Crimean Tatar nationality, and the final, perhaps, series about deportation, tragedy and state crime of the Soviet leadership, I would go to this film, I would watch all 20 series... I don't need your advice! Everything I said today is completely official. Here write and turn to any Crimean Tatar. My word and the word of Russia must be heard, must be known, including my interview today, so that the truth about the Great Patriotic War could be heard. Including those episodes that are covered in silence on May 18, they are not in this film – this is precisely the subject of treason” (*Ofitsialnaya pozitsiya Rossii, 2013*). V. Andreev's remarks did not end there. Later, answering journalists' questions, he noted: “This is the tragedy of the Soviet people, not the Crimean Tatar people. The topic of mass betrayal of Crimean Tatars during the Great Patriotic War cannot be separated from this topic” (*U Krymu vybukhnuv dyplomatychnyi, 2013*).

The position of V. Andreev caused considerable indignation among the Crimean Tatars, who, at the call of the Mejlis, protested near the building of the Russian Consulate General in Simferopol. More than two hundred people took part in the action. Their main demand was the recall of

⁵ For more information about the problems faced by the Crimean Tatars during their return to Crimea, see the project: *Samopovernennia v Krym. Nashi 30. Stories*. <https://90.in.ua/crimea-homereturn>

V. Andreev from Ukraine. About a hundred policemen were brought to the consulate general, who did not allow the participants of the protest action to break into the diplomatic mission. A small scuffle broke out at the scene, but representatives of the Mejlis, who organized the picket, managed to quell the protesters. The event ended with the burning of posters depicting the consul in the company of Stalin and Beria (Abibbula, 2013).

The significant public resonance of the scandal forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia to recognize the consul's words as incorrect. Immediately after that, V. Andreev himself announced his resignation, noting that he does not agree with the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry and remains true to his opinion (*Henkonsul RF u Krymu*, 2013).


The situation surrounding the film "Khaitarma" testified to the significant tension between Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian groups. The disdainful attitude of the local Russian diplomatic agency made it impossible to establish any efficient inter-ethnic communication, which very soon turned into another conflict. This time, the cause of inter-ethnic conflicts was the publication in August 2013 of the 4-volume work by the St. Petersburg historian V. Vozgrin "History of the Crimean Tatars" (2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c). This work, like the film "Khaitarma", caused significant criticism from local Russian organizations.

The then head of the "Congress of Russian Communities of Crimea", deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Region, Serhiy Shuvaynikov, called the work "racist and Russophobic", as well as a special "order of the Mejlis". In addition, representatives of the "Congress" demanded from the local prosecutor's office to give a legal assessment of the historian's statement concerning inciting inter-ethnic and inter-religious enmity (*Avtora «Istorii krimskikh tatar»*, 2013). The Union of Orthodox Citizens of the Autonomous Republic joined the protest against V. Vozgrin's book. On October 13, 2013, about 70 representatives of pro-Russian organizations picketed the building of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people in Simferopol and accused the author of incorrectly covering the policy of the Russian Empire towards the Crimean Tatars, and his work is full of Russophobic clichés (*Pravoslavnie krimchane*, 2013).

It is paradoxical that, as the activists themselves admitted, they did not read the book. Such an action is a vivid example of an information company of pro-Russian forces aimed at discrediting the Mejlis and accusing it of instilling anti-Russian sentiments among the Crimean Tatars.

Despite the fact that 10 years have passed since then and the political situation in Ukraine has undergone drastic changes, the problem of stereotyping the Crimean Tatar people among Ukrainian society continues to exist. This, in particular, is evidenced by sociological surveys performed by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)⁶ in 2019 (see diagram 1)⁷

Diagram 1. The index of xenophobia of ethnic groups in Ukraine as of September 2019 (according to the results of the KMIS sociological survey)



⁶ Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) is a private Ukrainian company that cooperates with the National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy". KIIS was founded in 1990 as a research center at the Sociological Association of Ukraine, and since 1992 it has been transformed into a private enterprise specializing in sociological, political, marketing and other research.

⁷ Mizhnetichni uperedzhennia v Ukraini, veresen 2019. (2019, November 7). *Kyivskiy mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologii*. <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=904&page=2&t=10>

According to the obtained results, the index of xenophobia¹ towards the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine made 4.11. For comparison, the best result among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians is 2.18, and the worst among Roma – 5.41 (Inter-ethnic prejudices in Ukraine, 2019)².

Another example of a biased attitude towards the Crimean Tatars was the scandal of 2020. After completing the External Independent Assessment (Zovnishnie nezalezhne otsiniuvannia, ZNO)³ on the history of Ukraine, several graduates of Kyiv City School No. 90 recorded and posted in the Internet a video with insulting remarks against the Crimean Tatars. In addition, one of the students stated that “the Crimea is Russia” (*Beha*, 2020). The reason for this reaction of the participants of the ZNO was their dissatisfaction with the content of the certification work, namely task No. 25, the purpose of which was to test knowledge about events and personalities related to the Crimean Tatar people.

The situation created a significant resonance in society. The Ukrainian Center for the Quality of Education Assessment strongly condemned aggressive statements directed at the Crimean Tatar people⁴. The administration of Kyiv City School No. 90 published an official apology for its students on its Facebook page. The three schoolchildren who starred in the video also publicly apologized for their actions. The head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, R. Chubarov, also paid attention to the situation. He called on all Crimean Tatars to accept an official apology, and invited the graduates from the scandalous video to the Mejlis Office (*Beha*, 2020).

The meeting was attended by the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, People's Deputy of Ukraine Mustafa

Dzhemilev, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People R. Chubarov, Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis Ilim Umerov, members of the Mejlis Eskender Bariev, Haiana Yuksel, Riza Shevkiev, representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, director of school No. 90 Volodymyr Kliui, his deputy for educational work Oleksandra Dykalenko, parents and relatives of schoolchildren, as well as the graduates themselves. The participants discussed the causes of such a situation and measures that should be taken to prevent similar incidents in the future. On behalf of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, books on the history of Crimea and the Crimean Tatar people were handed over to graduates and to the school library (*Predstavnyky Medzhlisu*, 2020). Note that R. Chubarov's official reaction and the meeting initiated by him are a vivid example of a constructive approach to establishing efficient interethnic communication.

Although the scandal with the graduates was quickly resolved, and the culprits apologized, the very fact of such a situation testified to certain gaps in the education system. First of all, the question arises: is the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people studied at a sufficient level in school? The analysis of the content of modern textbooks on the history of Ukraine indicates that information about the Crimean Tatars is presented quite succinctly. Conventionally speaking, if you collect all the available material from grades 7 to 11, it can easily fit into a small brochure of up to 20 pages. For example, 2.5 to 5 pages of the printed text in the 7th grade textbook are devoted to the political history of the Crimean Khanate, a state that existed on the territory of Ukraine for 342 years (1441–1783) (*Gisem & Martyniuk*, 2020: 118–120; *Vlasov et al.*, 2020: 149–155). Later, it is mentioned very briefly already in the 8th grade and, as a rule, only in the context of Tatar raids, the Cossack uprising led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian Empire (*Gisem & Martyniuk*, 2021; *Vlasov et al.*, 2021).

There is even less information in the textbooks about the culture of the Crimean Tatars. Such a “stingy” approach to highlighting the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people will not definitely contribute to the rapid overcoming of prejudices among modern Ukrainian youth, and therefore to the establishment of high-quality inter-ethnic communication in Ukrainian society. In addition, it is necessary to take into account subjective factors, namely the pedagogical approach to covering this issue in the lesson, where the teacher's personal position and interest play an important role.

Finally, we note that the religious factor plays an important role in stereotyping the image of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukrainian society. Historically, the Crimean Tatars belong to peoples who practice Islam. Despite relatively high religious tolerance, the prejudice of Ukrainians towards this religion as a non-Christian denomination is one of the highest. According to the results of a socio-

¹ Since 1994, KIIS has been carrying out research on the attitude of the Ukraine's population to certain ethnic groups. This research is performed according to the scale of the American sociologist Emory Bogardus (adapted by N. Panina). For each ethnic group in the list, respondents have to answer how close relationships they are willing to afford with representatives of each group. This is called a social distance. Minimal social distance 1 (agree to admit as a family member), is maximum 7 (would not allow to enter Ukraine). Often, the level of social distance is interpreted as the level of prejudice against one or another group.

² After the full-scale armed invasion of Russia on February 24, 2022, the xenophobia index in Ukraine has experienced significant fluctuations. For example, according to a sociological survey performed by KIIS in September 2022, the worst indices were obtained by Russians – 6.39 and Belarusians – 5.34, on the other hand, the position of Poles – 2.95, Canadians – 3.51 and Americans – 3.72 significantly improved. Unfortunately, Crimean Tatars were not included in this most recent survey, so we do not present it in our study. See more about this in: Mizhethnichni uperedzhennia v Ukraini, veresen 2022. (2022, October 20). *Kyivskiy mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologii*. <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1150&page=1>

³ With the beginning of full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the ZNO was replaced by the National Multidisciplinary Test (NMT).

⁴ Ukrainyskyi tsentr otsiniuvannia yakosti osvity rishuche zasudzhuie ahresyvni vyslovlennia na adresu krymskotatarskoho narodu. (2020, July 11). *Ukrainyskyi tsentr otsiniuvannia yakosti osvity*. <https://testportal.gov.ua/ukrayinskyi-tsent-otsiniuvannia-yakosti-osvity-rishuche-zasudzhuie-agresyvni-vyslovlennya-na-adresu-krymskotatarskogo-narodu/>

logical survey by the Razumkov Center⁵, conducted in November 2021, about 14.4% of respondents have a negative attitude towards the Muslim religion. At the same time, regional and age differences are noticeable. So, the worst attitude towards Islam is in the western regions of Ukraine – 23.5% (see table 1) and people over the age of 60 – 17.5% (see table 2)⁶. The latest indices indicate a certain bias and conservatism in the worldview of Ukrainian society.

This negative attitude towards Islam is caused by a number of factors. Firstly, throughout history, the mentality of Ukrainian society was formed in the Eastern European Christian tradition, which led to a certain conservative outlook and one-sided perception of the surrounding

reality. Secondly, due to the Crimean Tatar raids mentioned above, Islam remained in the perception of Ukrainians as the religion of "enemies". Thirdly, the policy of atheism of the Soviet authorities deprived the society of the opportunity to expand its knowledge about various confessions or religious schools, which caused the "stagnation" of the religious worldview. Finally, a significant role is played by current political events in the world, namely: the presence of radical terrorist Islamist groups, whose activities contribute to the active spread of Islamophobia. In this context, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, the consequences of which are still felt all over the world, became a turning point.

Table 1. Attitude of Ukrainian society towards Islam as of November 2021 (according to the results of a sociological survey by the Razumkov Center)

How do you feel about Islam? (% of respondents)					
Attitude	Ukraine	West	Center	South	East
Positive	18,3	7,7	13,2	19,1	15,7
Uncaring	32,9	26,2	37,1	31,5	33,7
Negative	14,4	23,5	11,8	15,4	9,3
Promptly	30,4	28,1	32,4	29,0	30,3
Turn a deaf ear to this religion (religious school)	8,8	14,6	5,3	4,6	10,4
Did not answer	0,3	0,0	0,1	0,4	0,6

Table 2. Ukrainian society's attitude towards Islam by age as of November 2021 (according to the results of a sociological survey by the Razumkov Center)

How do you feel about Islam? (% of respondents)						
Attitude	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years and more
Positive	11,0	14,0	14,6	13,2	14,1	12,5
Uncaring	35,0	29,3	33,4	28,7	36,5	33,2
Negative	11,0	13,4	12,3	14,9	13,5	17,5
Promptly	36,0	32,9	31,2	32,8	26,7	28,2
Turn a deaf ear to this religion (religious school)	7,0	10,4	8,5	10,3	9,2	7,8
Did not answer	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9

⁵ Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov is a leading non-governmental analytical center of Ukraine that performs research on state policy. It was founded on August 19, 1994. According to the "Global Go to Think Tank Index Report", which is published annually by the University of Pennsylvania, the Razumkov Center ranked first among similar think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe in 2019 and 2020.

⁶ Osoblyvosti relihiinoho i tserkovno-relihiinoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukrainy: tendentsii 2000–2021 rr. (Informatsiini materialy). (2021). *Tsentr Razumkova*. Kyiv, pp. 114, 116. <https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021-Religiya.pdf>

After the occupation of Crimea in 2014, there were still shifts in the perception of Islamic and Crimean Tatar culture in Ukraine. In this context, first of all, the fact that the Law of Ukraine “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”¹ was adopted on July 1, 2021 deserves special attention, according to which, for the first time² in Ukrainian history, at the legal and national level, it was clearly stated that Crimean Tatars, along with Karaites and Krymchaks, belong to indigenous peoples. Such a legislative arrangement has an important ideological significance and is a significant step forward in the implementation of a fair ethnonational policy of the Ukrainian authorities in relation to the Crimean Tatar people.

An important role in overcoming historical and religious myths about the Crimean Tatars at the current stage is played by the intense activity of the public union “All-Ukrainian Association “Alraid”³, which is the first association of Muslim public organizations in Ukraine. The main fields of its work are: familiarization of Ukrainian society with Islamic and Arab culture; strengthening of friendship and relations between citizens of different nationalities; moral, spiritual and cultural education of youth; promoting the development of scientific, cultural and sports relations with public organizations and citizens. One of the products of the “Alraid” association is the information portal “Islam in Ukraine”⁴, which contains separate sections dedicated to Islam and the history of the Crimean Tatars.

Among public organizations, the Ukrainian Center for Islamic Studies (UCIS)⁵ also deserves special attention. Its head is one of the Muslim spiritual leaders of Ukraine, mufti of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma” (2009–2022), Ukrainian Islamic Scholar Sheikh Said Ismahilov. UCIS carries out intense research activities and studies the phenomenon of Islam from the point of view of religious studies, philosophy, history, sociology, political science, etc. It was with his assistance that the world saw such works as “Islam in Ukraine: history and modernity” (Yakubovych, 2016), “Volyn Tatars: history, culture, contacts” (Yakubovych et al., 2018) and “Ukrainian enlighteners and Islam” (Vivchar, 2018).

It should be noted that in recent years, the number of popular scientific studies devoted to the history and culture of the Crimean Tatar people has increased significantly. In this context, first of all, we should mention the collective work edited by V. Smolii “The Crimea: a path through the ages. History in questions and answers” (2014), published by the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Hulnara Abdulaieva’s book “Crimean Tatars. From ethnogenesis to statehood” (2021).

Finally, we would like to mention the documentary educational multimedia project “Our 30. Stories”⁶, prepared

by the National Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine (Public) and timed to the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s Independence. As part of the project, 9 longreads are presented, which consist of video and audio chronicles, maps and timelines of events, eyewitnesses’ memories and archival documents about historical events of the 1990s specially collected by documentarians. One of the presented longreads is “Return to the Crimea”⁷ – a story about the difficult process of Crimean Tatars’ repatriation to their historical homeland. Such a project is a good example of a quality information product that can easily be used both at history lessons and during various educational activities aimed at establishing an efficient intercultural dialogue.

Conclusions

Thus, the process of stereotyping the image of the Crimean Tatar people was long and began immediately after the arrival of Mongol-Tatars in the territory of Ukraine. As a rule, most of the stereotypes present in Ukrainian society are negative in nature and primarily related to certain historical processes that took place in the past. In this context, the decisive role was played by the Tatar raids of the 15th–17th centuries, the negative memory of which was later reflected both in national folklore and in classical Ukrainian literature. The ethnonym “Tatars” and its derivatives – “Tatarva” and “Tatariuha” have become synonymous with the word “enemy”. This phenomenon did not escape the concept of “horde”, which also acquired a negative connotation. The given terms evoke associations with something “barbaric” and “alien” in the public consciousness of Ukrainians. Later, an important role in the negativization of the image of the Crimean Tatar people was played by the repressive policy of the communist authorities, which was accompanied by the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatars, accusing them of collaborationism and treason, as well as removing mention of them from public discourse.

During the years of Ukraine’s independence, a noticeable phenomenon was the growth of social tension in Crimea, which was caused by the activation of pro-Russian forces, which publicly accused the Mejlis and the Crimean Tatars of falsifying history and inciting inter-ethnic enmity. Along with historical and political processes, prejudice against Islam is an equally important reason contributing to the stereotypical attitude towards the Crimean Tatar people. In the minds of many Ukrainians, this religion continues to be perceived as “hostile” and associated with the terrorist activities of radical Islamist groups. Such a negative stereotypical perception of the Crimean Tatar people complicates the process of establishing efficient interethnic communication in the midst of Ukrainian society. It is certain that Russian occupation of the Crimea prompted the Ukrainian authorities and society to reconsider their position regarding the history and culture of the Crimean Tatars. Their recognition at the legislative level as indigenous people of Ukraine is a vivid example of that. At the same time, the results of sociological surveys and isolated cases of inter-ethnic misunder-

¹ Zakon Ukrainy «Pro korinni narody Ukrainy». № 1616-IX (2021, July 12). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1616-20#Text>

² The Constitution of Ukraine from 1996 mentions indigenous peoples, but who exactly belongs to them and what specific rights they have were not spelled out. See in: Konstytutsiia Ukrainy. (1996, June 28). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text>

³ Vseukrainska asotsiatsiia «Alraid». <https://www.arraid.org.ua>

⁴ Islam v Ukraini. <https://islam.in.ua/ua>

⁵ See information about the Ukrainian Center for Islamic Studies on the portal *Islam v Ukraini*. <https://islam.in.ua/ua/ukrayinskyj-centr-islamoznavchych-doslidzen>

⁶ Nashi 30. Istorii. <https://90.in.ua/historytelling>

⁷ Samopovernennia v Krym. *Nashi 30. Istorii*. <https://90.in.ua/crimea-homereturn>

standing testify to the fact that for a significant part of Ukrainian society, the Crimean Tatars, their history and culture continue to remain a "white spot".

We are convinced that only a deep and comprehensive state policy, aimed at comprehensive study, preservation and popularization of historical and cultural heritage of the Crimean Tatar people, can overcome the stereotypes existing in society, and thus strengthen interethnic communication.

Gratitude.

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Стереотипізація образу кримськотатарського народу як проблема міжетнічної комунікації в українському суспільстві

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З переходом тюркомовних народів до осілого способу життя у східних степах Європи, у європейській суспільній думці дедалі більше утверджувалися стереотипи, які на кілька століть наперед визначили шаблонне та часто несправедливе сприйняття «степових» народів, в тому числі й кримських татар. Особливо актуальною ця проблема є для України, терени якої стали місцем зіткнення різних цивілізацій, культур та релігій. Зважаючи на це, важливим завданням на сучасному етапі є подолання світоглядних уявлень та упереджень, які ускладнюють процес міжетнічної комунікації та налагодження діалогу культур. У пропонованій статті розглянуто головні особливості процесу стереотипізації образу кримськотатарського народу як фактору впливу на міжетнічну комунікацію в Україні. На прикладі фольклору та класичної літератури, як традиційних ретрансляторів суспільної свідомості українців, визначено головні негативні маркери-займенники, які використовувалися для позначення кримськотатарського народу. З'ясовано основні причини, які сприяють стереотипізації образу кримськотатарського народу та перешкоджають виробленню ефективних комунікативних практик. У цьому контексті, особливу увагу приділено дослідженню ролі історичного та релігійного факторів. Окреслено характер соціальної взаємодії та конфліктогенності між кримськими татарами та проросійськими силами в Криму до часу окупації. Визначено вплив сучасних політичних подій на зміну образу кримськотатарського народу. Окреслено основні заходи, які були здійснені з метою подолання упереджень щодо кримських татар та налагодження ефективної позитивної міжетнічної комунікації в середині українського суспільства.

Ключові слова: кримськотатарський народ, кримські татари, стереотипізація, упередження, міжетнічна комунікація, діалог культур, українське суспільство, російська окупація Криму.

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