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Mental Revival of Ukraine: A Stranger Among Friends?

Abstract: The authors of the study analyze the problem of the mental revival of Ukrainians in the post-war period, as well as consequences of the division of society into the categories of “friends” and “strangers”. The authors distinguish three stages in which the Ukrainian society distanced itself from Soviet political system values in the transition from *homo soveticus* to the modern Ukrainian political mentality: political distillation, sublimation and calcination. Two waves of internal migrants in independent Ukraine have been identified: the first in 2014–2015, and the second and after February 24, 2022. The study focuses on the profession as an indicator for the level of political awareness among citizens. It is noted that since the beginning of the hybrid war, there has been a division of Ukrainian society into those who left and those who remained to live under occupation. The attention is also paid to the importance of understanding the motivation and behavior of these people, as well as reasons for making decisions in favor of or against cooperation with the occupants. The issue of potential and existing manifestations of collaboration in the occupied territories is analyzed. By using the “triangle of power and relations by Stephen Karpman”, the article examines general sentiments of Ukrainians on the division of their society into “friends” (“heroes”) and “strangers” (“traitors”) during military operations in Ukraine. The authors analyze communication and behavior types of citizens within three models: “victim”, “traitor” and “hero”. The study indicates that citizens who were and were not in the occupied territory are wary of each other; several scenarios of relations between them are identified. The first is acceptance as “friends”, a manifestation of compassion, a tolerant attitude, and willingness to help the “victim”. Another scenario is non-acceptance by the community, assignment to the category of “stranger”, and tense and suspicious attitude towards the “traitor”. The authors note that, in the post-war period, another division of society is likely to be observed, but not on the basis of the language or territory, but on the actual place of residence of citizens (in territories occupied or controlled by Ukraine) during hostilities.

Key words: political mentality, mental revival, waves of migration, occupation, collaborationism, internal migrants, IDPs, universalism, Karpman drama triangle

Even though the war in Ukraine has not yet reached its final phase, one of the key issues on the agenda is the post-war existence of Ukrainian society, in particular the problem of different population groups' coexistence. It is true, first of all, for the problem of accepting internally displaced persons, forced to leave their home due to the occupation of part of Ukrainian territories, into Ukrainian society with further reintegration.

The contemporary Ukrainian political community has yet to understand the genesis of the conceptual principles for the consolidation of Ukrainian society in new socio-political conditions. Already at this stage, the threat of division of Ukrainian society at the end of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine is becoming more and more obvious. It is important to note that the division of Ukrainians on various grounds as such existed before (Wilson, 2002, p. 31–54). Although this was not officially recognized at the state level, it was actively used by various political forces during election campaigns.

Contemporary Ukrainian society in its permanent state is too politicized. Moreover, the politicization of the population has acquired a hypertrophied, distorted form. Obviously, in the current conditions, domestic politicians had to take into account the multiethnic and multicultural nature of Ukrainian society in the process of forming a model of national revival (Šabi, 2007, p. 54). However, now the situation has become even more complicated: there is a division between those who left the country and who stayed; who had to live in the occupied territories, and who did not. In this context, it would be reasonable to establish certain ideas for regulating relationships within Ukrainian society at the government level, primarily in matters of attitude towards internally displaced persons with a view to their further reintegration, and to implement them even before the end of hostilities. This course of action would prevent aggravation of the split in society in the post-war period.

It is important to note that the problem of the division of society is universal for all states, since, as can be seen, no one is immune from a military invasion. This is not the first time for Europe when it is necessary to consolidate efforts and demonstrate solidarity in the fight against global threats. For example, the *Covid* pandemic, as one of the obvious means of suppressing national sovereignty, is a typical drill aimed at working out the interaction of elements and parts of the global governance mechanism in conditions close to combat. However, the new round of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which entailed full-scale hostilities on the territory of Ukraine, forced Europe to reconsider the principles

of its coexistence, pass a stress test for stability and focus not only on issues of the energy and military-industrial complex, but also on issues of human security. Therefore, the search for universal decision-making mechanisms to overcome such situations should be a priority for all European countries.

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset paid considerable attention to research on issues of national and political consolidation. He studied the problems of national consolidation in a multi-ethnic state. Ortega y Gasset noted that “the unity of a nation primarily involves the establishment of close ties between ethnic and political groups. Nations are formed and live as long as they have the agenda for tomorrow” (Ortega y Gasset, 1994, p. 152). American political scientist Philippe Schmitter also contributed to the development of this issue. As part of his study of democratic consolidation, he focused on a set of problems related to stabilizing a democratic system (Schmitter, 1994, p. 52).

Among modern studies devoted to the problem of reintegration and consolidation of Ukrainian society, it is necessary to mention the works by V. Demyanenko (Demianenko, 2002, pp. 93–100) (problems of the political consciousness of the Ukrainian people), A. Nyvnia (Nyvnia, 2023, p. 173) (analysis of social reintegration models based on world experience), K. Shvets (Shvets, 2022, p. 68) (world models of managing post-conflict territories). However, despite the complexity and comprehensiveness of modern scientific research on the issues of Ukrainian citizens' consolidation and reintegration, current studies lack in-depth attention to the essence of the categories into which Ukrainian society was divided during the military conflict, their transformation, and opportunities for further reintegration.

Taking this into account, **the purpose of the study** is to analyze the evolution of ideas about a “stranger” among “friends” in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

Hypothesis. The presence of citizens in the territories occupied and controlled by Ukraine during hostilities may provoke another division and confrontation of the population during the post-war period.

The study used an interdisciplinary approach designed to ensure the solution of sharp political issues and the social conflicts caused by them through the involvement of socio-psychological methods as the main tool for achieving this purpose. It is proposed to use the “Karpman drama triangle” modified by the authors as the key tool to establishing effective communication between different groups of civil society.

The problem of potential and existing manifestations of collaborationism in the occupied territories, motivation, and factors that could potentially influence the decision was investigated by applying the Agency Theory, according to which every person is free and has the opportunity to choose.

The sociological approach used in the work made it possible to study migration processes from the standpoint of migration behavior, which allowed consideration of the causes and motivation of internal migrants, the impact of hostilities on the nature of decisions on change of the place of residence. We also managed to consider the adaptation of migrants in the host social environment, the conditions for adaptation and factors of conflict in the context of the interaction of internal migrants with host social communities.

So, in 2014–2015, there was the 1st wave of internal migrants – citizens left Donbass, primarily for political reasons (while in September 2013, only a small part (1.3%) of the population of Donbass was pro-Russian, in February – at the beginning of March 2014, there was already 23% of support from citizens with pro-Russian sentiments). The internal migrants did not share the political views of their former cohabitants and did not want to greet the Russian rescuers. For such people who were forced to suddenly flee from their homes (“I will embroider a colored shirt And, wearing it, I will proudly walk across the world. Wearing it, I will meet the dawn time, And I will find bright happiness wearing it!” (Krasotkina, 2021)), the concept of an internally displaced person (IDP) appeared in Ukrainian legislation: “this is a citizen of Ukraine ... who was forced to leave or abandon their place of residence as a result of or in order to avoid the negative consequences of an armed conflict, occupation, widespread manifestations of violence, violations of human rights and natural or man-made emergencies” (Kutsenko, 2022). The majority of IDPs went to the western regions of the country. Along with solving the problems of accommodation and employment for internally displaced persons from the occupied territories, authorities and public organizations paid much attention to the problems of political socialization of internally displaced persons (Prymush, Lavrynenko, 2020, pp. 297–316). In general, scientists agree on the understanding of political socialization as a process of active “individual’s assimilation of political knowledge, norms and values of the society to which one belongs throughout one’s life; the gradual entry of a person into the world of politics, the formation of political ideas, orientations, the acquisition of skills of political participation, growing into the

political culture inherent in this society” (*Social...*, 2008). The division of Ukrainians based on various grounds (territorial, linguistic, religious, cultural, etc.) existed before and was actively involved during election campaigns (Riabchuk, 2002; Hrytsak, 1998, pp. 263–281). At present, the regional split, which seemed to be overcome for a while in 2004, is still strong, as it is constantly used to mobilize society and legitimize power. It should be emphasized that a person is politicized mainly under the pressure of circumstances, and this is very dangerous for society: “The oversaturation of political life with destructive ideas and demands creates a dangerous background that dynamizes the activity of the individual completely not in the spirit of freedom and democracy” (Probyholova, 2004, pp. 88–95). Therefore, for IDPs, political socialization on the territory of their own country is extremely important.

After the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, there was a mass fleeing of families from the Donbass, the 2nd wave of internal migrants. The war forced them to finally decide who was on which side of the front. At a briefing (December 14, 2022), Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets named the number of internally displaced persons: “4.9 million internally displaced persons were registered in Ukraine due to the Russian invasion, of which 30% are pensioners and people with disabilities” (*How to restore...*, 2023). At the same time, 82% of the settlers still oppose any territorial concessions to end the war as soon as possible (only 5% support concessions) (*Readiness...*, 2022). This public mood of the IDPs showed Ukrainian foreign partners that they often underestimated and did not understand Ukraine and Ukrainians.

The war and occupation are a very difficult life test that each of the Ukrainians had to pass. All received different public assessments.

At the same time, it is occupation (from the Latin word *occupatio* – “to capture”) that can be considered as an indicator of the level of formation of citizens’ political consciousness:

- 1) some people fled to the Ukrainian-controlled territory (some could not even come to terms with the idea of living together with the occupiers, betraying their homeland, betraying their own principles and values; others were saving their property and only worried about themselves and their families);
- 2) some people remained in the occupation (some of them received a psychological trauma and could not recover in time; others decided that this was an opportunity for them to improve their financial situation, to gain some kind of greater power).

The Ukrainians who remained in the occupied territories of Donbas experienced the military conflict in different ways (depending on where they lived (in a city or village), where they worked, whether they managed to stay in the same place with the beginning of the occupation, and whether there was a general improvement in their living conditions, etc.). Therefore, it is extremely necessary to understand the motivation and behavior of a single person in conditions when they make (or do not make) a choice in favor of serving the occupation regime – collaborationism.

Various aspects of the phenomenon of wartime collaboration (from the French word *collaboration* – “cooperation”), including collaborationism of Soviet citizens with the Nazi occupation regime, have been covered in numerous scientific papers, but a revision of the question of motivation for collaboration has recently begun in the studies of political scientists (Edele, 2017, pp. 165–178). So, taking into account the factors that could potentially influence the decision-making of one or another collaborator and allow getting closer to understanding the problem of motivation of collaborators, it is proposed to apply Agency Theory (Makhalova, 2019, pp. 280–288). Agency Theory operates with such concepts as a free agent, freedom of choice and responsibility (in this case, for the choice made), and a person who decides to serve the occupiers is perceived as an agency unit. According to Agency Theory, each individual person can be considered a “free agent”, that is, have the opportunity to choose (Barnes, 2000, p. 3). The disadvantage of this approach lies in the overgeneralization of the question of motivation to cooperate with the occupation regime.

The fact that people were often forced to cooperate with the occupiers by force, and refusal to cooperate could be life-threatening, should not be rejected as well. Along with ideological and social factors, an important place in motivation was occupied by the possibility of obtaining, albeit limited, but power over others.

Such consideration, obviously, will allow getting closer to understanding the rational choice that each of the collaborators made. At the same time, it is very important that people do not settle scores with each other with the help of fictitious denunciations, as in the “Soviet realities of the 1930s and 1940s” (Martynenko, 2013, pp. 152–167; Motrevich, 2007, pp. 150–157).

To study the general sentiments of Ukrainians regarding the existence of a division of society into “friends” (“heroes”) and “strangers” (“traitors”), especially in the midst of the Russian invasion, the authors propose the use of a modified “triangle of power and relations of Stephen Karp-

man” (*Karpman’s...*, 2021) in as information and psychological tools. Due to the fact that the “Karpman drama triangle” finds a strong emotional response in almost every citizen, the described model is a powerful technology for influencing the mass consciousness. In addition, the use of simplification (the selection of a simple feature to designate complex phenomena of reality) and concretization (the combination of abstract concepts with specific familiar images) is highly effective in shaping public opinion (*Karpman’s...*, 2021). The symbiosis of these two operations leads to the creation of stereotypes (internal roles of average people) that underlie the mythologization of counterparty images.

Let’s consider this technology using the example of the analysis of relations between citizens in the occupied territories, namely, the models of people’s behavior according to three understandable scenarios: “victim”, “traitor” and “hero” (figure).




Figure 1. Models of citizen communication (“victim” ↔ “traitor”, “victim” ↔ “hero”, “traitor” ↔ “hero”) according to the modified “Karpman triangle”

Source: Self-elaboration.

At the same time, the occupying authorities allow citizens to move along their life trajectory only within the conditional “Karpman triangle

with political overtones”, that is, a person can be a “hero”, but at some point become a “victim”; and one can be a “victim”, but at some point become a “traitor”. But initially, one seeks to choose those roles that correspond to one’s position in life. In search of the most optimal situations for each person, participants can change positions, moving from one corner of the triangle to another in any direction and without time limits. But the triangle severely limits the possibilities of further self-realization within the framework of the role that was chosen. Regardless of the fact that there are only three roles, and they periodically move from one political actor to another (from one top of the triangle to another), the result of such relationships is always politically unpredictable, since a person is constantly adapting to renewing political circumstances. Each of the positions of the triangle allows a person to experience the feelings experienced by the “victim”, “traitor” and “hero”. But one of the roles in which a person feels more comfortable and prefers to stay more often and longer becomes the main one.

A fair question arises: “If the relationship between people is nothing more than a tug-of-war, taking place according to pre-known and far from always honest and fair rules, then why does all this happen?”. Thus, people assert themselves in society in one role or another, expecting to avoid situations in which their desires are in conflict with the expectations of society. Such a communication model, according to the authors, can clearly reveal the most common roles in human relations, especially during the threat of a crisis of statehood, in positions: “victim” ↔ “traitor”, “victim” ↔ “hero”, “traitor” ↔ “hero”.

1) “VICTIM” → “TRAITOR”

The belonging of fellow citizens to the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” in itself became an aggravating circumstance in the eyes of the Ukrainians who had fought against the Russian Federation. Sociologists recorded cases of worsening relations between locals and migrants (*Sociologists...*, 2017). A very cautious position (so that the “victim” of the occupation would not become a “traitor”) was also taken by individual Ukrainian political forces: “Today, in Galicia, migrants from both Crimea and Donbass are welcomed with hugs. However, our sincerity must be friends with great vigilance! Since a large number of terrorists and militants from the East, knowing about the imminent escalation of fighting in order to

create a 'corridor' from the border to Dnipro, are already sending not only relatives, but also their own families to the West of Ukraine, there are already certain people whose families related to the separatists, hospitably received by your countrymen. Having settled among you, they can also perform secret undercover functions..." (*Carpathians...*, 2014). A study by the Right to Defense Charitable Foundation (*Internally...*, 2022) and the *Info Sapiens* Research Agency showed (*How to restore...*, 2023) that Ukrainians can be united by three traits: patriotism, trust in each other, and diligence. The "prevalence of traitors" narrative complicates the return of territories to Ukrainian rule and threatens consolidation of unity.

2) "TRAITOR" → "VICTIM"

However, there also were traitors. Mostly these were people who fell for big money and the promises of the rashists. When the trend began that rashists even abandoned their men, the collaborators abruptly began to seek amnesty in the eyes of the patriots and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine. But everything has its price, and they will have to pay their price for their betrayal as well. People know who betrayed and who did not betray their neighbors, so the conversation will be, in fact, very short, and the reaction will be harsh. Whoever is more lucky will be arrested. And someone will be a little less lucky... Times were very difficult during the occupation, people suffered a lot from this. Therefore, the mood among people is such that collaborators will simply be "torn to pieces" on the streets.

Episodes of cooperation with the occupiers should be investigated and punished, but it should be remembered that the majority of residents are fellow citizens. As Evhen Holovakha, director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, notes, "the war led to such processes that Ukrainians could not imagine ... the contingent of 'quilted jackets' – pro-Russian-minded Ukrainian citizens – have not disappeared, although many of them began to reconsider their positions against the background of the invasion, massive war crimes of Russian invaders and the blatant lies of the Kremlin" (Holovakha, 2023). "We will have many problems in this sense with those who have lived in the occupied territories for a long time. Because children there were well brainwashed. It will be very difficult work. And this should be done by both the authorities and society," says demographer Ella Libanova (Libanova, 2022).

3) “HERO” → “TRAITOR”

Unfortunately, there are also such compatriots who, being in the occupation territory, hid, moved away from the situation. “Do not be afraid of enemies – they can only kill; do not be afraid of friends – they can only betray; be afraid of people who are indifferent – it is with their tacit consent that all the most terrible crimes in the world take place” (Fuchik, 1946, pp. 99–138). After the de-occupation of their hometown, they told how soldiers came to them, how their property, vehicles and food were taken away, that they did “nothing bad” for their country, they just tried to avoid any contact with the occupiers, because it was a constant risk for their relatives, and they are the “heroes and saviors” of the family.

Some stereotypes that were formed in Soviet times regarding the “hero”/“traitor” have survived to this day. Their stability is due to the fact that these stereotypes were formed under the influence of fear. Intimidation was used as a political technology that helped maintain power, stability, and integrate society. But this is a quiet betrayal of oneself, and of all Ukrainians. No one wants to make a mistake and see their colleagues or associates or friends as hypothetical traitors. These are two different things – to *know something* and to *prove something*. However, everyone should be responsible, get what they deserve.

4) “TRAITOR” → “HERO”

Residents of different occupied territories of Ukraine go through similar stages of perception of the situation. It all starts with a belief in the imminent end of the occupation and a return to the old life. But against the backdrop of bloody hostilities and delay of solution, there is a growing willingness to accept any stabilization of the situation. Moreover, the longer the invaders stay on Ukrainian lands, the more citizens are forced to interact with them. The inevitable interaction with the occupiers provokes fears among ordinary citizens that they will have to bear responsibility, and people in the free territory will not understand the specifics of forced survival. The Russian Federation is actively feeding these fears with disinformation, convincing citizens that they are tarnished in front of Ukraine and, accordingly, there is no alternative to the current state of affairs. Thus, after a while, people adapt and accept the new rules of the game, whether they support them or not (*We should not dream...*, 2023).

Already after the de-occupation, citizens will evaluate the dynamics of their lives in the occupation differently, but human behavior is standard. There are many cases when collaborators, after the liberation of Ukrainian lands, joined the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and later even received awards for distinction in battles. This indicates that their choice did not depend on adherence to a particular ideology, but on the situation, which in military conditions was prone to change.

5) “HERO” → “VICTIM”

There are always people in society who consider themselves outside of politics – they are not interested in any changes in the socio-political life of the country, they are used to the fact that everything is always decided for them by the state. Therefore, remaining in the occupied territory, they waited for everything to be somehow resolved. Moreover, many even considered themselves “heroes” who did not leave their small homeland, and thought that the neighbors who left should have been ashamed of their cowardice and flight. It was the political cowardice of the so-called “heroes” that the occupiers used to propagate and reproduce the “just” picture of the world they needed. Manipulation of facts, coverage of only one point of view (advantageous for the occupiers), and often outright lies – any means were used to introduce and spread a certain idea into the public consciousness, to force people to take arguments on faith and not to check the facts. Thus, the invaders created a familiar and acceptable situation for the “heroes”: when, during the Soviet period of Ukrainian history, political socialization was ideologized and only what was manifested within the interests of the state, the ruling communist party, was acceptable. In the minds of people from the occupied territory, there was a substitution of concepts. “When it had been brainwashed for so many years, it took root” (Riabchuk, 2015, pp. 138–156). But when, in order to be sure that any opportunity for Ukrainians in the occupied territory to think critically was eliminated, the occupiers created a whole filtering system for sorting the population in the areas of occupation (detention, interrogation and processing of Ukrainian civilians), then people began to realize politically that they had become victims of propaganda. A report by the Yale Digital Humanities Lab (Raymond, Howarth, 2022) documents the detention and disappearance of 226 people in the Kherson Oblast from March to October 2022; arrangement of 21 filtration camps in

the occupied territories in Ukraine (*It became...*, 2022) etc. The researchers cited a number of evidence of a targeted campaign of terror by the Russian forces: “This is the widespread use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during imprisonment; robbery of detainees; sexual violence; forced participation in propaganda videos; enforced disappearances; potential arrests for revenge; threats to relatives; and monitoring or seizure of electronic devices” (*Yale University...*, 2022). In addition, the *Conflict Observatory* also recorded numerous cases of damage to medical and educational institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions occupied by Russian troops (*It became...*, 2022).

Thus, there are no standardized war casualties.

6) “VICTIM” → “HERO”

The main thing is to clearly separate the Ukrainian supporters of the regime that ruled the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine from the dissenting Ukrainians known for their strong political convictions and ability to defend them. That is, a person who has become a “victim” of the occupation does not want to put up with such a political role for themselves and begins to deal with the challenges of real life, achieve success and turn into a “national hero”.

There are many examples of the struggle and heroic resistance of Ukrainians in the occupation: “Kherson is Ukraine!”. Open protests of Kherson residents (a man with a Ukrainian flag climbed onto a Russian armored personnel carrier on the move, the Russian military opened fire in the air, one of the protesters was wounded), which continued until it became extremely dangerous, were replaced by a partisan struggle (a flash mob “Fight away fascism” to destroy enemy propaganda advertising; first virtual protests (about 65,000 people joined the on-line rallies in the occupation), etc.). In an interview with BBC News Ukraine, one of the activists of the “Yellow Ribbon” resistance movement said: “Everyone can express their own protest. Just tie a yellow ribbon as a symbol of civil resistance. And this ribbon will remind an average Ukrainian that this is Ukraine. And they do not lose hope” (Kovalevska, 2022). The real hero of Kherson was the indestructible Hrihoryi Yanchenko, who was not afraid to resist the invaders with an open face – he rode a motorized cart through the occupied Kherson and raised money for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Another legend was the work of Ukrainian soldiers on the Antonovsky

bridge: the inhabitants understood that these attacks were bringing the liberation of the city closer. Kherson residents did everything to bring victory and de-occupation closer. Slogans were heard: “The occupation is temporary, but Ukraine is eternal!”.

Today, there is a request in Ukrainian society to memorialize those citizens who, at the cost of their own lives, fought for the independence of Ukraine and the integrity of its territories. Their slogan in the fight against the enemy was the following words: “When you love your native land, join the ranks! Shine with saint courage! Because only the sword – and not the words – will gain the rights of the nation” (Voronyi, 1921, p. 5).

Researchers also agree with the opinion (Uilson, 1998, pp. 23–47) that after the end of the war in Ukrainian society, it will be necessary to solve the problem of coexistence with collaborators in one country. Now, as sociologists note: “Only 12% of Ukrainians are critical of those who continue to live in the territories occupied after February 24, 2022, and consider them collaborators or indifferent to Ukraine. For the vast majority (72%), they are victims of circumstances who want the return of Ukraine’s control over the occupied territories” (*Victims...*, 2022). Ukrainians are opposed to any territorial concessions in all regions of the country. Even in the East, where intense fighting is underway, 68% of Ukrainians are not ready to sacrifice the territories of Ukraine for the sake of achieving peace. Only 19% believe that in order to maintain independence, some territories can be abandoned. It is also important that for 77% of Ukrainians (among the inhabitants of the occupied territories), no territorial concessions are acceptable (18% are ready for concessions) (*Are Ukrainians...*, 2022).

Summing up this study, it should be noted that the very essence of the occupation as a consequence of the enemy invasion suggests that citizens who were and were not in the occupied territory would be wary and even hostile towards each other. Not the last role in complicating/facilitating the social adaptation of Ukrainians living in the occupied territory is played by the media, which mythologizes the situation without providing reliable information about real events.

The war has changed Ukrainians, and this process is irreversible, there have been tectonic shifts in the public consciousness of citizens. As for the situation after the war with the main asset of Ukraine – Ukrainians, it, according to most experts (*Ella Libanova...*, 2023), will remain unchanged: a deepening of the split should not be expected, although a cer-

tain updated division of the population will be inevitable. However, this is a generally accepted historical experience, which is not unique, but rather widespread in world practice. The new section of the population will most likely be connected not with language or territorial issues, but with the actual place of residence of citizens during military actions on the territory of Ukraine.

A special place in the study is occupied by the various influences of the images of the “other” (“victim”, “traitor”, “hero”) on the consciousness of individuals and society in Ukraine identified by the authors through the prism of the “Karpman triangle”. Citizens in the occupied territories go their own difficult way, which is accompanied by heroism, doubts and, inevitably, for a significant part of them, collaborationism. It is substantiated that during armed conflicts, intergroup boundaries become clearer, which affects the subjective perception of reality and plays a key role in the formation of political identity. Using the “Karpman triangle”, which describes the relationship between people and the motives for many human actions (“victim” ↔ “traitor”, “victim” ↔ “hero”, “traitor” ↔ “hero”) quite accurately, the study identified several scenarios of attitudes towards fellow citizens who were in occupation by other Ukrainians. One of them is acceptance as “friends”, a manifestation of sympathy, a tolerant attitude, and a willingness to help the “victim”. Another scenario is non-acceptance by society, perception as a “stranger”, tense and suspicious attitude towards the “traitor”.

Basically, hatred of potential outsiders is the flip side of people’s inherent love for “friends”. Propaganda willingly plays on this part of a human psyche and most often wins. While a democratic civil society is able to cope with everyday xenophobia, during wartime, it still treats fellow citizens who survived a long occupation as potential shapeshifters, a potential enemy (such a preventive attitude was often observed towards German citizens during World War II (*Are there “good Russians”...*, 2022)). Therefore, it is extremely important to find a common language with the inhabitants of the Ukrainian occupied territories after the de-occupation and ways of reconciliation of Ukrainians. Now the priority is to find new ways to advocate humane treatment of internal migrants, because the people affected by the conflict are, first of all, compatriots who need to be helped, not isolated and lost. Further research in this direction will contribute to overcoming the consequences of a hybrid war in contemporary Ukraine, one of the goals of which is the destruction of the unity of society.

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Mentalne odrodzenie Ukrainy: obcy wśród przyjaciół?

Streszczenie

W publikacji autorzy podejmują problem mentalnego odrodzenia Ukraińców w okresie powojennym, a także konsekwencje podziału społeczeństwa na kategorie „przyjaciół” i „obcych”. Zaproponowano trzy etapy oddalania się społeczeństwa ukraińskiego od wartości systemu politycznego typu sowieckiego, a zatem w procesie przechodzenia od *homo soveticus* do współczesnej ukraińskiej mentalności politycznej: destylację polityczną, sublimację i kalcynację. Zidentyfikowano dwie fale migrantów wewnętrznych w niepodległej Ukrainie: pierwszą w latach 2014–2015 oraz drugą – po 24 lutego 2022 r. Zwrócono także uwagę na zawód jako wskaźnik poziomu kształtowania się świadomości politycznej obywateli. Podkreślono, że od początku wojny hybrydowej w społeczeństwie ukraińskim istnieje podział na tych, którzy wyjechali i tych, którzy pozostali, by żyć pod okupacją (w odniesieniu do terenów czasowo okupowanych). Pochylnono się nad motywacjami tychże zachowań oraz przesłankami stojącymi za decyzjami o podejmowaniu lub odmowie współpracy z władzami okupacyjnymi. Opisano problem obcych oraz potencjalnych przejawów kolaboracji na terenach okupowanych. W celu analizy podziału społeczeństwa ukraińskiego podczas działań wojennych – na „przyjaciół” („bohaterów”) i „obcych” („zdrajców”) – wykorzystano mechanizm zwany trójkątem dramatycznym Stephena Karpmana. Autorzy rozważają typy komunikacyjne i zachowania obywateli w ramach trzech modeli: „ofiary”, „zdrajcy” i „bohatera”. W wyniku badań wykazano, że istnieje nieufność między obywatelami, którzy byli, a tymi, którzy nie byli na okupowanych terytoriach. W związku z tym, możliwych jest kilka scenariuszy dalszych relacji między nimi. Jednym jest akceptacja jako „przyjaciół”, przejaw współczucia, tolerancyjna postawa i chęć pomocy „ofierze”. Innym – brak akceptacji ze strony społeczeństwa, identyfikacja z kategorią „obcego”, napięty i podejrzliwy stosunek do „zdrajcy”. Autorzy konkludują, iż w okresie powojennym można spodziewać się kolejnego podziału społeczeństwa, ale nie ze względu na język czy miejsce aktualnego

zamieszkania, ale ze względu na miejsce zamieszkania obywateli w czasie działań wojennych: na terenach okupowanych lub kontrolowanych przez Ukrainę.

Słowa kluczowe: mentalność polityczna, odrodzenie mentalne, fale migracji, okupacja, kolaboracja, migranci wewnętrzni, przesiedleńcy, uniwersalizm, trójkąt dramatyczny Karpmana

